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## Schenkerizing *Tristan*, Past and Present

JOHN KOSLOVSKY

### PART I: SETTING A CONTEXT

It has become almost a commonplace in our day and age to say that no music analysis is immune to the context in which it is written. Like a performance, improvisation, or composition, music analyses are culturally situated acts that involve a complex and dynamic interplay of historical, social, and intellectual forces. Among other things, the study of the musical “act” (whether compositional, performative, or analytical) has become an integral part of the discourse, as have strategies that adopt a more intertextually-sensitive framework in which to place such acts.<sup>1</sup> In the field of music theory, numerous studies have combined these strategies with various analytical approaches, for instance as a way of examining broader issues of compositional “influence” (in Harold Bloom’s sense).<sup>2</sup>

However, while scholars have dealt with compositional and performance history by aligning intertextual strategies with music-analytical viewpoints, few have approached the history of music analysis *itself* as an object of intertextual critique. To be sure, most discursive analytical accounts, past and present, continue to be viewed as finalized, reified objects of singular authorship, which is due in no small part to the intellectual investments of most music scholars. Even when the work of a theorist is thoroughly contextualized (no doubt the case with Heinrich Schenker), the manifold intertextual qualities that arise from that work are often passed over for the sake of historiographic or analytic expediency. Put somewhat more colloquially, it is far more appealing and even rewarding to publish one’s own analysis of a piece than it is to painstakingly explicate the intricacies of another’s analysis—detailing its contexts, problematizing its position vis-à-vis other analyses, and exploring the fault lines of its perceptual or even phenomenological consequences.

What happens, then, when an analyst is confronted with a piece of music with an unprecedented and indeed unavoidable reception history? Surely every analyst must feel some degree of scholarly anxiety when impelled to say or write something about the Prelude to Act I of Richard Wagner’s music drama *Tristan und Isolde* (hereafter the “Tristan Prelude,” or “TP” for short). It is not only that the TP induces utter bafflement among even the most sensitive analysts; it is also because of this bafflement that the work has been accorded an overwhelming significance within the history of tonality. If we are to believe Theodor Adorno that all music is laden with its own immanent historicity, then surely Wagner’s prelude is unparalleled for inflecting most any historical-theoretical account of tonality in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. *Tristan*, we might say, has always stood as the *sine qua non* of any history of tonality.

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1 For a useful overview of intertextual theories in the twentieth century, see Allen 2000. For an early discussion of intertextuality’s relevance for the field of music, see Hatten 1985.

2 See Straus 1990 and Korsyn 1991. Other, wider-reaching approaches to music analysis and intertextuality have come from Korsyn 1999 and Klein 2005. One of the first studies to approach analysis as a perceptual “act” is David Lewin’s landmark article, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception” (Lewin 1986). In his case, Lewin takes what he calls a “post-Bloomian” approach to influence, wherein the very act of creating one kind of work (broadly construed) itself becomes an understanding of another work. See Lewin 1986, 381–82.

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Far be it for this paper to do full justice to the manifold ways in which both the Tristan Chord (henceforth “TC”) and the ensuing Prelude have occupied the historical-theoretical imagination since the nineteenth century. Among those who have taken the trouble, some, such as Martin Vogel (1962), have offered detailed historical accounts of the TC from the nineteenth century to his present day;<sup>3</sup> while others, like Robert Bailey (1985), have compensated for the analytical overload by offering a small compendium of analytical texts on the TC and TP (however incomplete a picture this inevitably leaves). And still others, such as Joseph Kerman, have admitted to the near impossibility of summarizing competing analyses in any concise fashion. In his contribution to the *Cambridge Opera Handbook to Tristan und Isolde*, he writes: “Much has been written about the linear and harmonic aspects of bars 1–17 of *Tristan und Isolde*, much more than can be summarized here. Let us bite the bullet and summarize none of it at all, for there are other important points to make about this music—points about rhythm, dynamics, and affect” (Kerman 2011, 54).

But what if we were to bite an even bigger bullet, one that not only *summarized* attempts to understand the linear and harmonic aspects of the opening seventeen measures, but also *positioned* them as perceptual acts against one another, in order to trigger that larger interplay of intellectual forces described at the outset? Such a juxtaposition could potentially open up another kind of discourse: one that reads and evaluates one analysis against another; that cross-references the verbal and non-verbal strategies accompanying an analytical idea; and that works more generally—and in a determined manner—“between texts.”

While no single analytical methodology operates in a bubble, Schenkerian analyses of the TP provide a useful testing ground for engaging the history of analysis from this more dynamic and intertextually-sensitive point of view. Attempts to “Schenkerize” the TP have a history that goes back at least to the 1940s, and extends well into the 1990s, providing a corpus of works spanning some fifty years. And, given the widespread dissemination of Schenkerian theory in the second half of the twentieth century (most especially in North America), it is also worth considering what impact that methodology has had on approaches to the Prelude that are not Schenkerian *per se* but which contain identifiable *traces* of Schenkerian thinking. The picture that I hope will emerge over the course of this essay is one that can shed another light on the broader history and reception of Schenkerian ideas in the second half of the twentieth century; at the same time, I hope to throw into question some basic assumptions we might have about the nature and status of an analysis, especially as it relates to its intertextual qualities and/or perceptual consequences.

## TONALITY IN *TRISTAN*

Before offering a synopsis of Schenkerian analyses of the TP, it is worth setting the stage by posing a more fundamental question: what is the extent to which scholars have approached the TP as a “tonal” or “post-tonal” piece of music, Schenkerian or otherwise? Almost from the very beginning of its critical

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3 More recent surveys of the TC’s analytical history can be found in Wason 1985; Danuser 1998; and Martin 2008.

reception, *Tristan*'s tonal status was the object of debate: while Hector Berlioz quipped on the sheer "incomprehensibility" of the music after the Paris premiere of the TP in 1860 (Huebner 2011, 145–46), Eduard Hanslick noted in 1861 after the Vienna Philharmonic's premiere of the work that "the impression made by this restlessly surging, undifferentiated tone-mass, with its incessant repetition of the same little motive, was anything but pleasant. Nowhere does the ear find a resting place or a cadence; [the work] gives rise to the same painful feeling that must be caused by hearing a long series of antecedents whose consequent is missing" (Hanslick, quoted in Karnes 2007, 59).

Berlioz's and Hanslick's comments notwithstanding, a more critical analytical discourse around the TP took hold in the nineteenth century and has continued unabated. For one thing, analysts have employed just about every methodology at their disposal as a way of interpreting the harmonic, contrapuntal, formal, and dramatic attributes of the music, often with radically divergent results. For another, many theorists have used these results to weigh in on the overarching concept of tonality: either by positioning *Tristan* as the turning point in Western music history (take Ernst Kurth's famous proclamation of a "crisis" of Romantic harmony in *Tristan*); or even by projecting the purportedly "non-tonal" qualities of the work and thus transforming it into a thoroughly "post-tonal" piece of music (Boretz 1972, Cone 1976, Babbitt 1976, and Forte 1988). Schenkerian analysts too have made tonality a pressing issue in *Tristan*, perhaps *the* pressing issue. One might say that the mere fact that one approaches *Tristan* from a Schenkerian vantage point assumes that the analyst believes the piece to be "tonal." But, such an assumption will require scrutiny as we examine Schenkerian analyses of the TP.

Table 1 in the appendix (pp. 30ff) offers an overview of the analyses of the TP under consideration, in chronological order.<sup>4</sup> The table provides the date of each publication, the scope of each analysis, and the figures in the appendix to which each analyst corresponds. Given the history of Schenkerian theory in the second half of the twentieth century, it is no wonder that the majority of analyses come from the pen of an Anglo-American scholar, Felix-Eberhard von Cube and Annie Coeurdevey being the two European outliers.<sup>5</sup>

In what follows, I first outline the contexts in which Schenkerian analyses of the TP have come to fruition. With these general contexts in place, I then zoom in on a number of finer analytical points that enable us to open up a wider relational network between the approaches, particularly (though not exclusively) as they relate to the opening seventeen measures.

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4 All figures in this article have been included in an appendix. This is done for ease of comparing the analyses and because the figures will be cited on multiple occasions (and often in non-ordinal fashion). With the exception of John Rothgeb's graphs, I have left each figure in facsimile to maintain the graphing styles of each author.

5 Schenkerian responses to the *Tristan* Prelude before the Second World War are scarce. Schenker's own analytical ideas about the TP are limited to just a few select passages, found in the 1906 *Harmonielehre*, in a few scattered comments in his diaries, lesson books, and correspondence, and in his brief discussion of the *Tristan* Chord in vol. 2 of *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik* (Schenker 1954, 1996). The few comments related to the TP in Schenker's correspondence, diaries, and lesson books can be found on [schenkerdocumentsonline.org](http://schenkerdocumentsonline.org). Due to their fragmentary nature, the specific contents of this material will not be considered here.

**EARLY SCHENKERIAN APPROACHES TO THE TRISTAN PRELUDE: KATZ AND VON CUBE**

Adele Katz and Felix-Eberhard von Cube are, to the best of my knowledge, the first analysts to have produced analytical graphs of the TP. In both cases, their respective analyses of the TP formed but a small part of a larger analytical and historical investigation of tonal coherence in Western art music. As readers of this journal will undoubtedly know, Katz's 1945 book, *Challenge to Musical Tradition*, was the first book-length study in English of Heinrich Schenker's principles, and as such is a landmark text in the history of Schenkerian theory in the United States.<sup>6</sup> But Katz's book was more than a mere summary of Schenker's ideas in English. Using Schenker's principles of tonal coherence, it probed the work of eight canonical composers in the history of Western music and in doing so investigated the effect that each composer's use of tonal procedures had on the broader history of tonality. Of these eight composers, only four were part of Schenker's own canon of musical genius—J.S. Bach, C.P.E. Bach, Haydn, and Beethoven. The other four composers lay outside that limited canon and as such presented a greater “challenge” to the tonal tradition: Wagner, Debussy, Stravinsky, and Schoenberg.

First among these is Wagner, whose work with “intense chromaticism” and the *Leitmotiv* inspired later, more radical departures from tonality. In Katz's telling, *Tristan* is “the climax of chromatic daring within the stronghold of tonality, as it is the final word in the chapter of nineteenth-century expressionism” (Katz 1945, 246). But Katz goes on to argue that it is not Wagner himself who paved the way for atonality; rather, it was the later interpreters of Wagner's music who, instead of seeing the “final conquest of diatonicism, . . . saw only the newly won gains of chromaticism and erected it as the standard to which they rallied” (246). For Katz, *Tristan* remains a thoroughly diatonic-tonal work, despite its many chromatic excursions. Her conclusion is almost apocalyptic: “This is the tragedy of Wagner—that in spite of his amazing extension of the older techniques, he invalidated their function; in spite of his adherence to tonality, his lesser deviations have led to its breakdown; and in spite of his use of chromaticism within the realm of diatonicism, he gave rise to a form of chromatic supremacy that resulted in atonality” (247).

Katz's adherence to a diatonic framework in Wagner is made clear in Figure 1, which reproduces her analysis of the opening twenty-four measures of the TP (the total scope of her analysis). Two factors are worth mentioning at this stage. First is the composing-out of the upper voice: a linear octave progression from a<sup>1</sup> to a<sup>2</sup> (mm. 1–17), followed by a more fundamental ascent by third from a<sup>1</sup> to c<sup>#2</sup> (mm. 17–24). Second is the way the bass line and accompanying harmonic *Stufen* form a cohesive expression of A major-minor, and do so through a twice-iterated bass motion by fifth: first as I–II–V–VI; and then as VI–II–V–I. The linking F major chord at m. 17 (VI) is of particular psychological and musical importance for Katz: “The F major chord is too strongly stressed, both as the goal of the top-voice ascent and through its motion to the B major chord [at m. 23], for it to be regarded as a harmonic prolongation or a chord of harmonic emphasis. It is so clearly the *deus ex machina* of the entire motion, the means of achieving the dramatic suspense, that we cannot deny its structural status as a submediant” (233). True

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6 A more detailed account of Katz's life and work can be found in Berry 2002.

to her word, then, Katz offers a simple diatonic framework for the opening of the TP, one that could accommodate any standard tonal work.

Like Katz, von Cube also sought to give his work a distinctly historical dimension. But his history, as told in his posthumously-published book, *Das Lehrbuch der musikalischen Kunstgesetze* (published 1988, but begun in the 1950s), was of a much wider scope than Katz's, as it attempted to seek a musical lineage from the Ancient Greeks to his own present day and age. His model, called "A Structural History of Music," incorporated broad stylistic changes, the development of theoretical ideas, the changing emphasis of vertical and horizontal relations, and even an ever-expanding use of the overtone series by composers (von Cube 1988, 219–29). Not only that, but quite unlike Katz and most every other postwar Schenkerian scholar, von Cube continued to couch his interpretations of musical masterworks in terms that gave his work a distinctly biological tinge, what he broadly called the "Entelechy and Biogenesis of the Musical Artwork" (the title of Part II of his book). As one of the few Schenker devotees to have remained in Europe after the Second World War, von Cube was largely cut off from the developments and debates that took place in the United States in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Among other things, he remained committed to the notion that the *Ursatz* was the final arbiter of musical genius, writing that "[a] demonstrable lack of one of [the] three *Ursatz* constructs in a piece of absolute music definitely rules out the application of the term 'musical artwork'" (Ibid., 208).

Wagner's music occupies but a small part of von Cube's book. Of the roughly sixty-five analyses that von Cube intended for publication, only one is devoted to Wagner's music, the TP (completed ca. 1953). As in most of his analyses, von Cube's textual comments on the TP are confined to just a few points, each point remarking on a specific level in the analysis followed by a brief conclusion. However brief, though, the points are telling enough as to how von Cube positions the TP within his historical account, which is not far from Katz's take on the matter. He notes that "it can be seen that we are concerned with easy to read, entirely tonal harmonic progressions. A 'destruction of tonality,' as proclaimed by the dodecaphonists to support their own activities of destruction, is not anywhere to be found" (von Cube 1988, 335).

Von Cube's graph is reproduced in Figure 2. Looking at the deepest level of structure (level a), one can see that von Cube ultimately reads the TP in C major, a reading largely based on the arrival of a supposed C tonality (with minor inflection) at the start of Act I. This structure involves a descending tetrachord from  $a^1$  to  $e^1$  (an augmented fourth) in the upper voice accompanied by an auxiliary harmonic progression VI–IV–V–I<sup>b</sup>. But while it is clear that von Cube is convinced about the structural and artistic integrity of the TP, he is ambivalent about its relation to other tonal masterpieces, seen in light of the above-cited quotation. He writes at level a, for instance: "No *Ursatz*, as one would expect in a piece of absolute music, but nevertheless a deep middleground fourth-line with the object of an 'inverted' preparation of the first scene" (von Cube 1988, 335). When he moves to the two middleground levels ("b" and "c"), von Cube replaces the overall key of C major with the tonicizing key of A minor. The entire Prelude is then read in this tonicizing key, which contains subsidiary linear progressions that compose-out the  $a^1$  of the top voice:  $a^1$ – $b^1$ – $c^{\sharp 2}$  (mm. 1–24), followed by  $c^{\sharp 2}$ – $b^1$ – $a^1$  (mm. 25–74).

Looking back on these two early accounts of the TP, we see that Katz and von Cube were both

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determined to position Wagner as an exponent of the tonal tradition, albeit one who infused his ultimately diatonic art with a high degree of chromaticism and dramatic content. It was, in their telling, the proponents of atonal and twelve-tone music who deliberately misread Wagner's use of chromaticism as a sign of tonality's decline. But despite agreeing on these broad historiographic points, we can already observe a divergence in Schenkerian-analytical strategy. To take just one example (by way of anticipating the broader strategies of Part II of this paper): even though both Katz and von Cube appear to read a rising line from  $a^1$  to  $c\sharp^3$  up to m. 24, the way in which each does so is not supported by the same conceits. Katz, we recall, saw this progression as distinct from the one in mm. 1–17, which implies that the rising third genuinely begins for her only at m. 17 (this is confirmed by her graphing of two separate As at m. 17). Von Cube, by contrast, finds the genesis of the motion already at the very opening (see his level “b”), which assumes a deeper role for the initial  $a^1$  than Katz is willing to admit. For him, the  $a^1$  is first expanded by means of a neighboring progression in mm. 1–17 ( $a^1$ – $b^1$ – $a^1$ ), which finds no home in Katz's reading of a rising linear octave. So, while both Katz and von Cube were deeply committed to proving Wagner's tonal tendencies, it becomes apparent that they were not in full agreement about what exactly those tonal tendencies were (not even about the underlying key). I will have more to say about these analyses as we become acquainted with other Schenkerian approaches to the TP.

## COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO THE TRISTAN PRELUDE: MITCHELL AND BORETZ

The efforts of Katz and von Cube to understand the TP from a Schenkerian point of view, while remarkable in themselves, did not receive a great deal of commentary: Katz's book was largely overshadowed by Felix Salzer's *Structural Hearing* of 1952, while von Cube's work was only published posthumously in the 1980s, and has received relatively little attention since his activities were first made known to a wider audience.<sup>7</sup> The case is rather different for William Mitchell, one of the leading figures in the American Schenkerian movement of the 1950s and 60s. Mitchell is known today mainly for his work with Salzer on *The Music Forum* (“MF”), a journal dedicated to the publication of extensive analytical and historical articles, especially as they pertained to Schenker studies. As a musicologist equally steeped in the history of chromaticism and in Schenkerian theory, Mitchell inevitably offered a detailed study of the TP, which was published in MF volume I (1967). Unlike Katz's and von Cube's analyses, Mitchell's work on the TP was to receive a wide range of responses, in part due to the wide circulation of the MF but also due to the boldness of Mitchell's approach in trying to come up with a comprehensive understanding of the TP from a Schenkerian point of view. In this sense, it is the first full-scale Schenkerian analysis of the TP, and as such set a benchmark for future analyses of the work.

Given the extensive nature of Mitchell's study, I cannot give a full account of all his analytical results. Suffice it to say that Mitchell provides his readers with both a synoptic graphic overview of the work as well as multi-layered graphs of each section. To orient the reader to Mitchell's global approach

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<sup>7</sup> See Drabkin 1984.



at this stage, I refer to two examples in the appendix that illustrate his voice-leading assessment of the whole (a discussion of mm. 1–17 will be undertaken in Part II). Figure 3 presents Mitchell’s deep middleground reading of the entire Prelude, which is offered at the beginning of his article. Figure 4 shows Mitchell’s derivation of the overall voice-leading structure, which Mitchell provides at the very end of his article in order to explain the “form” of the Prelude. Both figures reveal Mitchell’s conviction that the TP is firmly grounded in A major-minor. As Figure 4 makes clear, for instance, a simple and undivided diatonic framework  $\hat{3}-\hat{2}-\hat{1}$  over I–II–V–I generates the entire Prelude; through successive stages of elaboration, Mitchell shows the use of a structural neighbor  $d^3$ , the use of chromaticism, the unfolding of linear spans, and the introduction of subsidiary harmonic *Stufen*. When it comes to Wagner’s use of chromaticism, Mitchell largely employs theories of modal mixture at both local and global levels—note in particular the use of  $C^\sharp$  and  $C_b$  in the upper voice of Figure 4 (c–e), as well as the use of a deep middleground  $bII$  sonority at m. 79.

With both its wide scope and painstaking attention to detail, Mitchell’s analysis became *the* analysis of the TP against which all other analyses would have to position themselves, Schenkerian or otherwise. While it is certainly debatable whether Mitchell’s analysis should be classified as an “orthodox” or “non-conventional” adaptation of Schenkerian theory (opinions differ on the matter),<sup>8</sup> it is more apposite at present to observe how Mitchell gives his work an historical tinge: not by taking recourse in meta-historical narratives like Katz and von Cube, but by seeking out direct precedents for Wagner’s use of counterpoint and harmony in composers like Bach, Mozart, and Chopin, and by offering “proof” of Wagner’s monotonal thinking in A major-minor by reference to the 1859 concert ending to the work (which is largely a transposition of the ending of the entire opera). So, although he took a different tack than Katz and von Cube, Mitchell still considered Wagner’s diatonic-tonal propensities as beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Not too long after Mitchell’s article, another comprehensive analysis of the Tristan Prelude was published, this time not by a card-carrying Schenkerian but instead by someone who would readapt a number of meta-theoretical aspects of Schenker’s ideas and integrate them into a “super-syntax” for music, regardless of its tonal or non-tonal consequences. I am referring to the work of Benjamin Boretz, a pupil of Milton Babbitt and author of *Meta-Variations*, a dissertation divided into four parts and published in six installments of *Perspectives of New Music* (“PNM”) between 1969 and 1973. Boretz’s analysis of the TP and the “Liebestod” of Act III appeared as the first of five analyses in Part IV of PNM, entitled “Analytical Fallout.”

Figure 9 offers a glimpse of Boretz’s deepest readings of the TP, while Figure 10 shows his “foreground” reading of mm. 1–49. Few would label this approach “Schenkerian” in any strict sense of the term. But the Schenkerian traces are undeniable, even at a superficial glance. Boretz’s work, we could say, represents a creative synthesis of twelve-tone theory, pitch-class set theory, and Schenkerian prolongational strategies. In very simple terms, Boretz maps the single symmetrical pitch-class set [0369] onto the TP, locating linear and vertical instantiations of the set at various levels of structure.

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8 Cook 1987, 59–64; and Forte 1988, 324–26.

Smoothing out the edges of this symmetrical tetrachord (used in all three of its transpositions) are numerous “displacements” by intervals other than those inherent in the tetrachord itself—semitones and major thirds in particular—which play a role in moving from one [0369] complex to another. Boretz further generalizes his ideas with the theory of the “harmonic hexachord,” which consists of an [0369] tetrachord flanked by major thirds: e.g., the pc-array 0 4 7 10 1 5 (C-E-G-B $\flat$ -D $\flat$ -F).<sup>9</sup> The [0369] complex and the harmonic hexachord allow Boretz to account for both the primary harmonic entities and the hierarchical linear organization of the TP. It is, in other words, the atonal-structuralist response to Mitchell’s tonal-structuralist orientation.

Not only does Boretz aim to offer a counterweight to Mitchell using his theory of the harmonic hexachord, but he also takes a deliberately ahistorical tack in his study, as a way of focusing on the perceptual qualities of the music as seen through a first-person perspective. As an example of Boretz’s basic stance towards history, Schenker, Mitchell, Tristan, and analysis, it is worth citing one passage of Boretz at length:

Let us consider first some of the “evidence” with which Tristan confronts a “naive” observer, let us say one examining it in our own time who hasn’t a very good idea of when it was composed. If he knows the “Schenker model” but doesn’t consider its invocation in every case a moral imperative (so that for him, something can be “music” on other grounds, and even equally “highly developed” music), how likely is he to find it advantageous in interpreting this evidence? First, he may notice that virtually all the melodic contours in the piece are framed not in triadic fifths or octaves as in most tonal music, but in minor thirds, tritones, or minor sevenths. Triads, the models of sonority for tonal music, even most elaborately elaborated tonal music, appear rarely; in fact, the presented sonorities of the piece more often contain four distinct pitch classes than three; and although a familiar phenomenon, the intervallic conjunction whose homonym is the dominant seventh of tonal music, does occur frequently, its behavior as a dominant seventh is consistently curious. Even the big “structural dominant” itself appears (in Mitchell’s charts [Figure 3, m. 84]) after a “dominant preparation” that overlaps in the “basic structure” the basic “neighbor-note” prolongation whose “resolution” happens inside the initial tonic prolongation, which then proceeds directly to the cadence—except that the resolving tonic of that cadence is found only in another piece, the one with the concert ending. Altogether, this seems a pretty confused bit of tonal composition, and our observer is dissatisfied that he has to regard most of its peculiarities as barriers to rather than particularities of its coherence (in fact he is even sometimes obliged to regard them as things that have to be suppressed altogether in the explanation and hence rendered conceptually non-existent in the contemplation of the piece). And that final G [m. 110], coming right out of an obvious horizontalization of the first presented multiple-pitch sonority in the Prelude, leaves a disturbing question of just how capricious a composer Wagner could, plausibly, have been (Boretz 1972, 160).

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9 See Boretz 1972, 189ff.



## LATTER-DAY SCHENKERIAN APPROACHES: THE TRISTAN PRELUDE IN THE 1980S AND 90S

The 1980s and 90s witnessed a further proliferation of analyses of the TP, partly as a response to Mitchell and Boretz, and partly due to the continued importance of Wagner's opera for theorists and historians. By this point, the analytical discourse around the TP had changed considerably. For one thing, Wagner's tonal impulse was no longer taken as unequivocal amongst Schenkerians, as it was for Katz, von Cube, and Mitchell; many, in fact, were willing to accept that indeed Wagner himself (and not his atonal exegetes) had brought about the seismic shift from a tonal to a "post-tonal" world. For another, attempts to understand a single hierarchical structure in the TP in the manner of Mitchell or Boretz underwent more sustained scrutiny. Even the concept of unity itself was no longer taken for granted, which is no doubt due to the growing influence of post-structuralist thinking within musicological discourse at the time.<sup>10</sup>

Four analyses from this time stand out. The first of these was written by L. Poundie Burstein in 1983. Like Mitchell and Boretz before him, Burstein was to take a broad view of the Prelude. But unlike them, Burstein was also to consider the tonal ramifications of *Tristan* both in the Prelude and at the end of Act I. By offering a comparison of these two segments of the opera he was to propose that "the Tristan Prelude is best understood in the key of C major, and C major alone" (Burstein 1983, 24). Supporting his thesis was the notion of the auxiliary progression (i.e., non-tonic opening)<sup>11</sup> and what he called "bass cycles." Like Boretz, Burstein is less interested in the concert-ending version of the Prelude (Mitchell's smoking gun) than he is in how it connects to the main body of the opera. To be sure, it is his hearing of the Prelude as beginning *in medias res* and ending on an unfinished note that drives his analysis: "[t]he Prelude does sound as though it starts in the midst of something and ends uncompleted, and it is not surprising that an analysis of its background structure should substantiate this impression" (24).

Figure 11 reproduces Burstein's demonstration of bass cycles, and Figure 12 (a and c) his background and middleground readings of the Prelude. As his background reading shows (Figure 12a), the TP is governed by a single auxiliary progression,  $\text{III}^{\flat}_7\text{--IV--V}$ , whose upper voice does not take part in a conventional descending *Urlinie* but instead articulates the notes A and G (including their respective chromatic variants, A $\flat$  and G $\sharp$ ). The cycles themselves (Figure 11b), labeled "1<sup>st</sup>," "2<sup>nd</sup>," and "3<sup>rd</sup>," represent three types of structural bass motion in the Prelude, in each case generated from an initial bass E—through arpeggiation (1<sup>st</sup>), stepwise passing motion (2<sup>nd</sup>), and neighboring motion (3<sup>rd</sup>). The background structure and bass cycles are then brought to bear on the middleground (Figure 12c), where the various composings-out of the upper and lower voices work together through three rotations of the cycle—the first two as a way of expanding the  $\text{III}^{\flat}_7$  chord, the last (and incomplete) one by way of

10 The article most often cited to have initiated a challenge to the idea of organic unity in music analysis is Joseph Kerman's 1980 "How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get out." See Kerman 1980. A more pointed challenge to unity in analysis can be found in Street 1989.

11 In this article, Burstein does not explicitly use the term "auxiliary progression." For a more detailed exploration of the topic, see Burstein 1988 and 2005.

bringing the structure to its close on V. It is then for the end of Act I to complete the final harmonic motion to I, when the act closes in C major. On Burstein's account, the TP is a tonally-unified entity, only its unity is clarified through different tonal (yet still Schenkerian) processes.

Another author who was to weigh in on the TP around this time was Allen Forte, whose 1988 article "New Approaches to the Linear Analysis of Music" took direct issue with Mitchell's and Boretz's readings of the piece. As Forte argues, Mitchell and Boretz in their own way "[exhibit] an overly rigid adherence to a background model which determines virtually every aspect of the interpretation of the foreground and thereby [lose] contact with certain important and immediate musical apprehensions, most notably with the motivic features of the music that are so essential to both music and drama" (Forte 1988, 326–27). This is not to say that Forte is willing to give up structural linear progressions in *Tristan* entirely, only that he sees them as determined by factors beyond traditional tonal syntax or pure set-theoretical speculation. For Forte, the essence of structural voice leading in the TP lies in the composing-out of the TC itself and its inversional equivalent, the dominant seventh chord (whose tonal implications Forte quickly relinquishes). Figures 15a and b reproduce Forte's analysis of mm. 1–17 and 16–23, respectively. In mm. 1–16, a single linear projection of the TC takes place in the upper voice ( $g\sharp^1-b^1-d^2-f\sharp^2$ ), while vertical TC chords punctuate the surface ("Δ" represents the TC, "Δ'" its inversion, and "T" followed by an index number its level of transposition; "T<sub>0</sub>" is assigned arbitrarily to the first TC of the work, at m. 2). In approaching the TP in this manner, Forte straddles a fine line in articulating Schenkerian-inspired hierarchical voice leading combined with post-tonal collectional thinking and quasi set-theoretical strategies.

Although still largely removed from American music-theoretical discourse, European scholars too began to take an interest in Schenker studies in the last fifteen years or so of the twentieth century. One of these scholars was Annie Coeurdevey, who both sought to explain Schenker's ideas to a French audience as a kind of Gestalt theory, and who simultaneously aimed to show the historical boundaries of Schenker's approach. It comes almost as no surprise that, when she reaches the historical end point of applying Schenkerian analysis, she turns to the TP. Coeurdevey, like others, is aware of Mitchell's analysis, but she quickly casts it aside, since it relies on the concert ending for its overall structure, and because it pays in her opinion no regard to the role of the *Leitmotiv* within the structure as a whole (Coeurdevey 1993, 21, fn. 21).

Figure 16 reproduces Coeurdevey's sketch of mm. 1–45, which shows an interpretation that (*pace* Coeurdevey) is remarkably similar not only to Mitchell but even more so to Katz, who goes unmentioned in the article. The most obvious affinities lie in the rising octave of the opening seventeen measures, the subsequent rising third  $a^1-b^1-c\sharp^2$  up to m. 25 confirming the tonality of A major-minor, and the transfer of register of  $c\sharp^2$  to  $c\sharp^3$  from m. 24 to m. 45. But these graphic similarities could distort Coeurdevey's underlying point about the TP: that is, while Mitchell viewed mm. 1–45 as a large-scale ascent to the *Kopftón*  $\hat{3}$  ( $c\sharp^3$ ), Coeurdevey sees this same ascent as the end of the structural motion, the "ascending *Urlinie*" itself, with no obligation to return to  $\hat{1}$ . In her text, Coeurdevey admits to committing a type of "heresy" in asserting this ascending *Urlinie*. Though she grounds herself in a more classically-tonal Schenkerian reading of the music, Coeurdevey shares the same concern as Forte: that a totalizing background structure is unavailable in the TP.

Returning to American soil once again, the final primary author under consideration is John Rothgeb, whose 1995 article entitled “The Tristan Chord: Identity and Origin” in volume 1 of *Music Theory Online* sent the by-now fully professionalized discipline of American music theory into a frenzy of debate surrounding the TP and especially the TC. Formal reactions to Rothgeb in MTO were issued by Allen Forte and William Rothstein (the former of whom republished his graph of mm. 1–17 for the occasion), while an informal (and much more heated) debate took place in the recently-developed “MTO-talk.”<sup>12</sup>

In many respects, Rothgeb’s article is much more modest in its handling of the TP: it neither offers a complete analysis of the Prelude, nor does it broach the thornier issues of tonal unity, background structure, or large-scale linear/harmonic progressions in general. But the fact that Rothgeb questioned the ontological status of the TC showed just how much theorists still cared about this opera and its place in the history of tonality. Rothgeb proposed the radical idea that the TC, as a half-diminished seventh chord, was not a genuine sonority in itself, but was the outcome of a technique Rothgeb dubbed the “slide,” in which the upper-voice succession of mm. 2–3 ( $g^\sharp - a^1 - a^\sharp - b^1$ ) was a rhythmically- and chromatically-expanded version of an ornamental figure that occurs traditionally above a dominant sonority (see Figure 17). Instead of deciding whether the  $g^\sharp$  of m. 2 or the  $a^1$  immediately following it makes up the actual chord tone of the TC, Rothgeb places a different, implied  $a^1$  before the  $g^\sharp$ , and proceeds from there to offer what he calls a “prototype” for the opening seventeen measures of the Prelude (see Figure 18), which is the logical outcome of his slide theory.

It is perhaps this last detail of Rothgeb’s work that has the greatest consequences for just about any Schenkerian or post-Schenkerian analysis of the TP: namely, what note of the upper voice does the analyst take to be the structural starting point of the opening seventeen measures? And, what bearing does that decision have on the analyst’s outlook concerning the linear and harmonic events to come? Undoubtedly, it is the very obsession with the status of the chord of measure 2 that has put theorists at loggerheads with one another time and again. Rothgeb surely sought a way out of this “ $g^\sharp$  vs.  $a$ ” impasse in proposing his slide theory, but this too was met with a great deal of resistance—formally by Allen Forte, and informally by a legion of music theorists intent on re-asserting the TC’s ontological status. To be sure, the above-mentioned MTO-talk surrounding Rothgeb’s article is emblematic not only of the many positions one can take as regards the TC but also of the intensity with which many theorists have pushed their analytical readings of the chord onto one another and onto a wider readership. It now remains our task to determine the Schenkerian consequences of such readings.

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12 MTO-talk, 14 February 1995–5 April 1995 (typescript). So animated was this debate that another journal, the Dutch *Tijdschrift voor Muziektheorie*, reprinted Rothgeb’s article as the lead paper in their inaugural issue, on the assumption that it represented the current state of affairs in American music theory (see Schuijjer 1996). The reasoning behind republishing Rothgeb’s article as described in the text was related in a private correspondence with Michiel Schuijjer. See also Schuijjer’s commentary on Rothgeb’s text and on the ensuing MTO-talk (Schuijjer 1996). I would like to thank Michiel Schuijjer for sharing the 1995 MTO-talk typescript concerning Rothgeb’s article, which is no longer extant via the MTO or SMT websites.

**PART II: LISTENING TO THE ANALYSES: MM. 1–17 OF THE TRISTAN PRELUDE**

In Part I it was my task primarily to introduce the main threads of Schenkerian analytical discourse around the Tristan Prelude in chronological fashion, and to show the broad contours of each analyst's approach to this elusive piece. By way of summary, the analyses of Katz and von Cube seem driven principally by a historiographical issue—namely, whether Wagner's work still belongs to the tonal tradition or instead demonstrates the first steps towards an inexorable path to twelve-tone music. Mitchell and Boretz, operating within the heyday of both Schenkerian theory and twelve-tone theory, attempted to give totalizing accounts of the TP, for the most part in a top-down oriented fashion. And the potpourri of authors from the 1980s and 90s, aware of the potential pitfalls of such totalizing attempts, engaged to varying degrees with the newly-pressing concern of unity; at the same time, these authors reconsidered questions of tonal and historical awareness in Wagner's *oeuvre* in terms that avoided overarching meta-narratives. With this framework in mind, we now turn to a more detailed examination of the analyses, which I will divide into "traditional" and "non-traditional" readings for the sake of expediency.

**"TRADITIONAL" SCHENKERIAN READINGS**

I begin by looking at analyses that assume the TP to be in A major-minor—by Katz, Mitchell, Coeurdevey, and Rothgeb. Consider Katz's analysis once again (Figure 1). As mentioned above, Katz interprets mm. 1–17 with a middleground harmonic progression of I–II–V–VI, with an essential stepwise linear span from  $a^1$  to  $a^2$ . Katz believes, like many, that the TP begins on an implied A chord in m. 1 (including its upbeat). She was neither the first nor the last to propose this idea; she was, however, the first to sketch the hierarchical voice-leading consequences of such an interpretation. As she sees it, the initial  $a^1$  of the upper voice, like the opening harmony, is implied, while the literal  $a$  of the cello (upbeat to m. 1) is interpreted as an inner voice progressing to  $b$  in the bassoon in m. 2 (not shown in Figure 1).<sup>13</sup> The implied  $a^1$  also produces a secondary line leading into the inner voice ( $a^1$ – $c^1$ ), which provides a chromatic descending counterpart to the upper voice.

With these implied notes firmly in place, Katz can carefully coordinate the various essential voices of the passage. Each note of the rising line is given consonant support from the bass, which moves primarily by fifth. That is, Katz first slurs the implied bass from A to  $e$ , then from  $e$ —through an "auxiliary"  $g$ —to  $b$ ; from here, she descends back down to  $e$ .<sup>14</sup> Thus, it is the implied A chord and implied  $a^1$  of the opening that governs the harmonic and linear structure of the first ten measures, before the cadential progression (II–V–VI) and the rising line ( $f\sharp^2$ – $g\sharp^2$ – $a^2$ ) bring the phrase to a close. Without this implied opening tonic, Katz would not be able to achieve such a logical progression.

Mitchell begins with a number of similar observations as Katz, first and foremost the unequivocal nature of the A major-minor tonality. Like Katz, Mitchell relies on an implied A chord at the opening, as his graph of mm. 1–17 shows (see Figure 5). Mitchell even takes the trouble to explain the derivation

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<sup>13</sup> See Katz 1945, 230.

<sup>14</sup> The passage from mm. 17 to 24 shows a similar concern for fifth motions in the bass.

of this chord from an implied contrapuntal technique, a “6–5” shift, whereby  $f^1$  displaces  $e^1$  over an imaginary sustained bass  $a$ . However, instead of viewing a single ascending structural line through the opening measures, Mitchell analyzes a structural neighbor motion  $A-G\sharp-A$ , whereby the initial  $a$  is located in the opening cello line and is implied at a slightly deeper level an octave higher. Furthermore, instead of expanding the tonic through the opening measures as Katz does, Mitchell instead opts for a composed-out (and mixture-inflected) dominant sonority from mm. 3 to 16, thus framing the opening on an entirely different harmonic *Stufe*. It is now the  $g\sharp^1$  of m. 2 over the TC that begins the rising line by thirds:  $g\sharp^1-b^1$ ;  $b^1-d^2$ ;  $d^2-f\sharp^2$ ; and  $f\sharp^2-a^2$ . For Mitchell, the TC itself is imbued with purely contrapuntal significance, and is based on a fully-diminished seventh chord (in  $\frac{4}{2}$  position; see level c in Figure 5), whereby  $D\sharp$  replaces  $D\flat$  (at level a). The overall harmonic progression, then, is now I (implied)–V (expanded)–VI, the latter of which functions as the beginning, not the end, of a larger structural motion to m. 24.

One analyst to take issue with Mitchell’s reading of the opening was Arthur Komar, in a 1971 review of the MF vols. I and II. In the first place, Komar questions Mitchell’s derivation of the  $G^7$  chord at m. 7 from a composed-out E major chord with mixture inflection (see Figure 5, level b). Instead, Komar proposes that the chord of m. 7 is better understood as an augmented-sixth chord (G-B-D-E $\sharp$ ) respelled as a dominant seventh, in which the tones making up the augmented sixth (G and E $\sharp$ ) take part in an inward-moving chromatic wedge: from E/G $\sharp$  at mm. 2–3 to a unison F $\sharp$  at m. 10 (see Figure 7). Such a bold enharmonic re-interpretation of the  $G^7$  chord allows Komar to elevate the status of the B $^7$  chord at m. 11 while not undermining Mitchell’s large-scale prolongation of V in the opening phrase. The structural neighbor-note G $\sharp$  in Mitchell’s graph now appears to contain its own internal neighbor progression,  $G\sharp-F\sharp-G\sharp$  (see Komar’s graph b). So, following Mitchell and Komar, the audible rising line of the opening conceals structural neighboring progressions.

At this point it is worth leaping through the chronology of *Tristan* analyses to those of Rothgeb and Coeurdevey. Perhaps surprisingly, Rothgeb’s and Coeurdevey’s graphs bear a remarkable resemblance to Katz’s, not Mitchell’s, analysis, even though neither analyst expresses any knowledge of Katz’s book. The resemblance is seen most readily in the assertion of a single linear projection of an A chord from m. 1 to m. 17. As mentioned above, Coeurdevey produces more-or-less the same graph as Katz (Figure 16). She too uses an implied A minor chord with  $a^1$  in the upper voice to initiate an opening octave span of  $a^1-a^2$ , supported by the harmonic progression I–II–V–NV (“note voisine,” or “neighbor note”).

Rothgeb’s derivation of the ascending line, however, is much more subtle, as it takes a detail of the compositional surface (the “slide” figure, discussed above) and then uses that as a point of departure for a “prototype” of the opening phrase. Figure 18 shows how Rothgeb’s reading also implies an opening tonic A sonority and then projects the implied  $a^1$  through the octave, just like Katz and Coeurdevey. However, the derivation of Rothgeb’s line is entirely different. Two of the chords supporting the rising progression, on A and C, are not present whatsoever. They are offered as the implied resolutions of dominant seventh chords on E and G respectively (note the brackets in Figure 18). Using these implied resolutions (with similarly implied upper and inner voices) Rothgeb proposes a structural progression I–III–V $\sharp$ –VI, over which ascending linear-third spans compose out their respective chords:  $a^1-c^2$  (over

A),  $c^2-e^2$  (towards C), and  $e^2-g^{\sharp 2}$  (towards E), concluding with a “resolution” to  $a^2$ .

Remarkable about Rothgeb’s analysis, however, is the fact that after proposing his sophisticated slide theory and the resultant prototype as shown in Figure 18, he actually takes a step back from his graph and notes that it “cannot be claimed to represent the structure of the finished product” (Rothgeb 1995, ¶20). In a footnote, Rothgeb concedes that Mitchell’s use of a prolonged V chord comes closer to representing the actual state of the music. In addition, Rothgeb’s graph continues to acknowledge the “real” progression of rising thirds in the music with dotted slurs in Figure 18a ( $g^{\sharp 1}-b^1$ ,  $b^1-d^2$ ,  $d^2-f^{\sharp 2}$ ) but avoids giving this more literal line itself any structural status. In fact, given his theory of the slide, Rothgeb cannot take any sounding notes of the upper voice other than those that complete the slide figure, namely  $b^1$  of m. 3,  $d^2$  of m. 7, and  $f^{\sharp 2}$  of m. 11—each of which acts as a passing tone in the prototype. And finally, Rothgeb has to deny the opening  $g^{\sharp 1}$ ’s status as the progenitor of the line (it is ultimately an inner voice), putting it in a curious relationship to Mitchell’s graph, which relies heavily on the  $g^{\sharp 1}$ ’s chordal and structural status as the initiator of the ascending line. It suggests that his proposed prototype and Mitchell’s analysis are ultimately incompatible with one another.

The inherent tension built into Rothgeb’s slide vis-à-vis Katz’s and Mitchell’s readings becomes all the more apparent when we take a quote from the above-mentioned MTO-talk exchange on the Tristan Chord. Rothgeb, in responding to one comment celebrating conflicting readings of the TC (by Stephen Soderberg), writes the following:

I vigorously dispute that it is *ever* true that “conflicting readings can be taken as simultaneously informing the text” in the greatest art music. If it *were* true, the music being interpreted would be genuinely ambiguous, and therefore, I believe, utterly uninteresting. I have become firmly convinced by my own experience and by observing such great *readers* of music as Ernst Oster, Oswald Jonas, and a few others, that ambiguity of this kind is entirely alien to the greatest art music—that, indeed, clarity is precisely what the great art music is about. Time and time again I have had the experience of either being taught or struggling successfully to discover for myself the one and only one reading that really represents how the music sounds once I have learned to hear it. (Another way to put this would be that only one reading makes the music ‘all it can be,’ to quote Milton Babbitt.) THAT is what, to me, is truly fruitful, beautiful, and exciting. I believe the attribute of music that is mistaken for ambiguity is actually the *difficulty* that necessarily attends complexity of organization (Schumann: ‘Vielleicht versteht nur der Genius den Genius ganz’). I think it is exactly the clarity of music that elicited Mendelssohn’s famous statement about music as something not at all vague but ‘almost too definite’ to be expressed in words (Rothgeb, MTO-talk [25 February 1995], italics and capitalized letters his).

As it turns out, there is a way to understand (though perhaps still not resolve) Rothgeb’s approach vis-à-vis Mitchell’s. It comes through a passage of music that both Schenker and Mitchell heard as based on a similar procedure as the opening of the TP: Chopin’s Mazurka, op. 30, no. 2 (mm. 24–32). Schenker implicitly acknowledged the connection between the passage in Chopin’s Mazurka and the opening of the TP in §152 of the *Harmonielehre*, entitled “The Psychology of Alteration.” As shown in Figure 6a, Schenker cites the first three measures of each fragment side by side in order to show how



an altered “II” sonority in minor can simultaneously function as an applied dominant, thus creating a “suspended atmosphere” around the original tonic (note Schenker’s labelling “II + V”). This comes as no surprise, given the similarities of these passages in articulating the dual effect of the local harmonic progression and the ensuing sequence by ascending third. From his analysis of mm. 1–3 of the TP it is thus clear that Schenker views the  $g^{\sharp 1}$  of the TC as a non-chord tone, or at the very least that it does not affect the underlying step progression I–II–V (Schenker, too, views m. 1 and its upbeat as an implied A chord).

Mitchell, it turns out, also cites the passage from the Mazurka in his *Music Forum* article, using it to compare Chopin’s and Wagner’s distinct usages of the local harmonic succession and resultant sequence (Figure 6b). A number of features of both the music and Mitchell’s analysis can shed a different light on the foregoing discussion. First, Chopin’s Mazurka presents an ideal adaptation of Rothgeb’s “slide” in the hands of another nineteenth-century composer—note its immediate placement over every sonority from mm. 25–30, in each case with the feeling of a local dominant-to-tonic succession. Second, Mitchell’s analysis of the passage (levels “b” and “c”) conforms precisely to Rothgeb’s understanding of the structural ramifications of the slide figure and the sequencing in the TP. And third, even the underlying structural harmonic progression of the Chopin excerpt reinforces Rothgeb’s prototype. The crucial difference of interpretation, however, involves the upper line. In Mitchell’s reading, the underlying prototype for the Chopin passage results in a traditional Schenkerian *Ursatzform*,  $\hat{3}\text{--}\hat{2}\text{--}\hat{1}$  over I–V–I, whereby the rising line serves to connect  $a^1$  with  $g^{\sharp 2}$  (i.e., a descending step by means of an ascending linear seventh).

With this example in mind, one could propose another prototype for the opening of the TP, as shown in Figure 19a. This new model would still accommodate Rothgeb’s slide and represent a more normative Schenkerian prototype. With this new model one might even reconsider the structure of the opening, and simultaneously use it as a way of shedding a different light on Rothgeb’s analysis. Figure 19b thus provides my own reading of the opening seventeen measures. Crucially, it assumes the closure of the passage in the upper voice as B–A, but does not impose an implied tonic at the opening. Instead, it embraces the composing-out of the V chord by means of rising thirds (just like Mitchell), but instead of using  $g^{\sharp 1}$  as the initiator of the passage, it takes  $b^1$  of m. 3 as the primary structural upper voice (following Rothgeb’s slide theory). This analysis removes the need for assuming an implied tonic sonority at m. 1, and it creates the effect of an auxiliary progression V–VI.

The final closure of this line can be thought of in two ways (as shown in Figure 19b). The first way is to view the initial register as the obligatory one, which is seen through a careful consideration of Wagner’s orchestration of the passage. That is, as the rising chromatic line echoes in different registers at mm. 12–13 and undergoes a process of fragmentation in mm. 14–15, the music gives way to a fuller texture as it approaches the cadence (mm. 16–17). Among other things, the horns and the oboe reiterate the opening third motive,  $g^{\sharp 1}\text{--}b^1$ , and duly resolve on the downbeat of m. 17 to  $a^1$ , a resolution which is covered by the tension of the high register appoggiatura  $b^2\text{--}a^2$ , played by the first violins.<sup>15</sup> At the same

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15 Though his graph is lacking in detail, von Cube similarly analyzes the opening seventeen measures in the one-line

time, considering the aural salience of the rising line and the play of registers from m. 12 onwards, one could similarly propose the activation of two different upper-voice Bs, and close the phrase with a register transfer to b<sup>2</sup>. This reading would conform more closely with Mitchell's analysis of the Chopin excerpt and with the revised prototype.

Either way, the refinements to both Mitchell's and Rothgeb's analyses as proposed here still do not fully reconcile the relationship between prototype and finished product. Such an analytical aporia is due primarily to the differing significance imparted in each case to the various harmonies and upper-voice tones, as well as to the use or non-use of implied notes/chords. In other words, each graph relies upon factors that are unable to resolve one another, barring major modifications either to the prototype or to the analysis, which would sacrifice too much to either, in my opinion. And neither do these modifications cancel out the readings of Katz and Coeurdevey, which straddle somewhere between the prototype and the analytical reading based on a composed-out V chord.

### “NON-TRADITIONAL” READINGS

I have now taken pains to describe some of the contingencies upon which even the most “conservative” Schenkerian readings of the opening of the TP are based: the dependency on traditional tonal voice leading, monotonicity, prototypes, and transformational hierarchy. Importantly, all of these readings have assumed A major-minor as the governing key, if not for the whole Prelude at the very least for the opening measures. This network of analytical interplay becomes all the more complex as we consider other linear-hierarchical interpretations, which make use of Schenkerian-based strategies but which draw entirely different conclusions. They too will privilege certain harmonic, contrapuntal, and motivic factors that result in radically different readings of the same passage.

First, we will consider Burstein's analysis, which by most accounts would still be considered a *bona fide* Schenkerian interpretation, if it were not for the fact that it departs so substantially from all the other views of the TP discussed thus far (refer again to Figure 12c). Since Burstein is committed firmly to the idea that the TP is structured around an auxiliary progression in C major, almost every single line and chord is interpreted differently than in the analyses of Katz, Mitchell, Coeurdevey, and Rothgeb. However, Burstein was not alone in his reading of C major as the underlying tonic to the TP. Von Cube, we recall, similarly thought that C major represents the overarching tonality. But here too there are global differences of perspective between Burstein's and von Cube's readings. The most important of these lies in Burstein's use of recurring bass cycles over the entire Prelude, which allows him to read every middleground passage in C major and account for chromatic alterations where needed (hence the opening “III<sup>7</sup>” chord). Von Cube, however, only shows the C major progression at the background (Figure 2); when he reaches the first middleground (level b) he resorts to a large-scale tonicization of A minor, and then notes a pivot modulation to C to begin the first act.

Clearly, then, Burstein and von Cube read the significance of C major differently. The most obvious

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register, and privileges b<sup>1</sup>–a<sup>1</sup> as the structural line. However, von Cube also reads an implied a<sup>1</sup> in the upper voice, which forms the neighboring progression a<sup>1</sup>–b<sup>1</sup>–a<sup>1</sup> in the opening.



difference lies in their background readings of the TP—while von Cube notes a descending augmented fourth that “resolves” to E $\flat$  when the first scene begins (as a minor third above the tonic C), Burstein leaves the Prelude open-ended on V (Figure 12a). On a more conceptual level, Burstein and von Cube have differing ways of relating the background C major to the later (i.e., more local) levels of structure. Burstein, for instance, makes it clear that the retrospective reading of an overarching tonic (where all keys are ultimately relatable to a single key, even if its tonic is not asserted directly) is different than hearing a genuine shift from one tonal center to another. Furthermore, Burstein warns his readers against attributing local aural salience to global hierarchical structure—he points for instance to the opening dominant seventh chords on E and G (mm. 3 and 6) as having an entirely different significance when read against the entire TP.<sup>16</sup> We might think that von Cube’s reading (Figure 2a) concurs with this view, since he interprets the opening implied A minor chord as VI on a deeper level, were it not for the fact that his reading of C major all but vanishes when he approaches the middleground levels b and c, which rely more on local chordal significance. Von Cube, it seems, has not committed himself as completely as Burstein has in reading C major throughout the entire Prelude.<sup>17</sup>

Given such a thorough commitment to C major, what effect does Burstein’s reading of the global structure have on the opening? As Figure 12c shows, mm. 1–17 present the first of the three bass cycle segments (the arpeggiation e–g–b) followed by the onset of the second segment, E–F (up to the downbeat of m. 17). Because Burstein reads a deep-level auxiliary (and incomplete) progression in C, he has no need for an implied A chord at the opening, and he can easily read the bass note F of m. 2 as an upper neighbor to the structural III $\sharp^7$  chord. He can also look beyond the “deceptive” cadence at m. 17 and offer a larger unfolding: from g $\sharp^1$  at m. 2 to b $\flat^1$  at m. 19. It is at this point that Burstein completes the second bass cycle segment which, in its third and final appearance in the Prelude, will complete the structural motion to V/C (see Figure 11, Burstein’s “bass framework”). The opening nineteen measures are thus a microcosm of the global harmonic motion, III–IV–V. The rest of the upper line follows Burstein’s reading of the composed-out III $\sharp^7$  chord. The literal rising thirds (Figure 12c) are shown as arpeggiations from g $\sharp^1$ , whereby d $^2$  at m. 10 is interpreted as the seventh of the underlying III $\sharp^7$  chord. And the resolution to a $^2$  at m. 17, so important for every other analyst up to this point, is viewed as a passing motion for Burstein, forming a larger progression of parallel tenths between the outer voices:

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16 A similar view has been proposed by Matthew Brown in analyzing Isolde’s Narrative from Act I of *Tristan und Isolde*. See Brown 1989.

17 In a private correspondence, Burstein has qualified his statement about the TP being “in” the key of C major. As he has written, “[i]f I wrote the article today, I would be more cautious with the use of the metaphorical preposition ‘in’ when referring to keys. These days, I am leery about the metaphor of being ‘in’ a key, whose spatial implications I find too restricting. I feel it is more fruitful to think of leading toward a tonal resolution. Thus, when we say we are ‘in’ the key of C, for instance, what is meant is that the music seems to be leading toward a resolution in the key of C. . . . In short, the problems I see with my analysis (or any Schenkerian or tonal analysis) is that to say that a piece is ‘in’ a key is a bit too pat. Thus to say that the Prelude is ‘in’ the key of C is not as nuanced as I would like—though to say that it is ‘in’ the key of A is even more problematic.” (private communication, October 2018).

E/G $\sharp$ –F/A–G/B. All told, Burstein offers us an entirely different kind of model from which to understand the TP.

While one might object to Burstein’s decision to read the entire Prelude in C major instead of in A major-minor, we should bear in mind three things. First, Burstein’s analysis as it stands here is a completely “rules-based” Schenkerian approach, as it grounds itself in strict counterpoint, composed-out harmonic *Stufen*, and transformational layers. Second, Burstein’s prototype corresponds neatly to the structure of the finished product in a way that neither Rothgeb’s nor my own reading does. And third, there are undoubtedly points of correspondence between Burstein and other Schenkerian analysts—take, for instance, the simple fact that Burstein, like Mitchell, privileges the opening g $\sharp$  in the upper voice as the initiator of the composed-out thirds (even if Mitchell ultimately reads this G $\sharp$  as subsidiary to the implied a<sup>1</sup>), and reads the TC in a purely contrapuntal fashion (note Burstein’s label “UN” above the initial chord).

To be sure, the one “traditional” element we are missing in Burstein’s account is a genuine *Urlinie*—but, this being an incomplete auxiliary progression, an *Urlinie* might not only be unavailable but even unnecessary. It speaks, on the one hand, to the relationship between structural melody and tonal unity in the TP, and on the other hand tells us something about the way a Schenkerian perspective can interact differently when dealing with a composer like Wagner. Thus, in reading the TP in C major instead of A major-minor, Burstein applies a wholly different significance to the harmonic and linear framework, with a resultant structure bearing almost no similarity to other Schenkerian readings of the piece.

Burstein’s analysis did not go unnoticed in its time. Two scholars responded formally to Burstein, to whom Burstein then responded in turn. The first of these was Arthur Maisel (Maisel 1983). While admiring many aspects of Burstein’s analysis, Maisel nonetheless took issue on a number of fronts, first and foremost the idea that the Prelude and end of Act I be read in C major. In both cases, Maisel defends the conventional view that a simple shift from A to C takes place towards the end of the Prelude. From the sketches he provides (two are reproduced here, Figures 13 and 14) it is clear that he concurs with Mitchell about the structural significance of V in the opening measures, in which the outer-voice combination E/G $\sharp$  is sustained until m. 17, when it “resolves” to F/A. But more crucially, Maisel attempts to undo Burstein’s reading of the second bass cycle (E–F–G, mm. 16–19) by representing the G of mm. 18–19 as an inner voice (Figure 13). At a deeper level (Figures 14b and c), he asserts a motion from F to D $\sharp$  via E from mm. 17 to 29, thus completing a hidden motivic repetition of the opening chromatic line in the celli, F–E–D $\sharp$ .

In his response to Maisel, Burstein picked up on the obvious consequences of Maisel’s reading. Burstein counters him by arguing for a different hidden motive—the initial E–G motion in the bass (mm. 3–7)—which plays out on a larger scale as III $\sharp$  to V in C. Burstein also throws Maisel’s own reading into question when he points out the shifting structural significance for Maisel of the bass G in analogous passages in the Prelude: as shown at mm. 18–19 in Figure 13a, G is read by Maisel as part of a motion into the inner voice, while at m. 33 (Figures 14b and c) it is interpreted as a note that plays a more substantial role in a chromatic rising line to A. The difference here hinges on the way one reads the significance of the G chord—for Burstein, it is an early indicator of the overarching tonality (as the

dominant), while for Maisel it has more of a passing significance.

The second response to Burstein came from Bruce McKinney (McKinney 1983). McKinney's objection to Burstein's article lay not in the details of the analysis (which he does not address), but rather in the idea of tonal unity in *Tristan* more generally. McKinney sees no reason to search for unified tonal structures in Wagner, and in fact he believes such a search to be antithetical to Wagner's total conception of the musical drama. In his view, the totalizing effect of *Tristan* is one that can only lead to the twilight of the tonal system. "If," he writes, "one reads tonal unity into a hearing of this piece, [Wagner's] great act of rebellion against the tonal system is denied" (McKinney 1983, 67). Though he does not point to any specific passages or offer any technical support for his argument, McKinney clearly believes that Wagner began the march to atonality by combining musical and dramatic forces in ways hitherto unseen in Western music: through the abandonment of authentic cadences ("rebellion against authority"), the avoidance of resolution of dissonance ("love which shall not be consummated"), and the preponderance of deceptive cadences ("deception and trickery") (66).

In his response to McKinney, Burstein fails to understand how the notion of tonal unity could in any way undermine the inventiveness of Wagner's compositional approach. For him, it is the very fact that these sections of *Tristan* are unified that an understanding of the dramatic course of Act I can emerge. While certain passages in Wagner may bring us to the limits of tonality (Burstein notes this himself in his discussion of mm. 21–63 of the TP), or even go beyond it, we should not rule out tonal unity in *Tristan* "prima facie" (Burstein 1984, 127–28). What is revealing about this brief exchange, taking place in the early 1980s, is that it underscores how deeply ingrained *Tristan* remains in conceptualizations of the history of tonality throughout the twentieth century, and how heated the debate remains about the TP's status vis-à-vis that history. It is merely the terms of the debate that have shifted to more general questions of unity in Wagner, something that would have been virtually unthinkable just fifteen to twenty years earlier (taking Mitchell's article as a rough benchmark).

What happens, then, when an even more radical reconfiguration of Schenkerian ideas takes place? Here we turn our attention to the final two figures in this account: Forte and Boretz. Lest we think that these authors have nothing to do with the history of Schenkerian approaches to *Tristan*, we would well be reminded how deep an impact Schenker's ideas had in post-WWII America, especially in the intellectual environments of Yale and Princeton. Forte, working out of Yale for most of his career, is one of the primary figures (if not *the* primary figure) responsible for the academic pursuit of Schenkerian theory (his 1959 article "Schenker's Conception of Musical Form" is often cited as a landmark text in this regard). To be sure, over the course of his long and illustrious career he explored Schenkerian theory in all its facets, including its relationship to contemporary music (his first book, *Contemporary Tone-Structures* of 1955, bears witness to this).

As mentioned earlier, Forte interprets the opening measures of the TP as based on the linear unfurling of the TC, albeit one transposed up a minor third (labelled "T<sub>3</sub>," see Figure 15a). In contrast to most other Schenkerian analysts, who show the opening rising line as concealing some deeper voice-leading pattern or prototype, Forte takes the surface gesture itself as the basis for the linear projection. And because Forte relinquishes any kind of harmonic-functional significance to the passage (which

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he sees as the great trapping of all Tristan analyses), he can continue to acknowledge the arpeggiated bass e–g–b as possessing structural significance without having to account for a precise contrapuntal coordination of outer voices. The opening passage, in Forte’s reading, culminates at m. 16 (NB, not m. 17), when both the TC ( $\Delta$ ) and its inversional equivalent ( $\Delta'$ ) coalesce in a single sonority ( $\Delta + \Delta'$ ). Forte finds a reading of the sonority at m. 16 as an E dominant ninth chord to be not only gratuitous but even detrimental to the hearing of the opening passage, in a similar way that it would be detrimental to hear every major-minor seventh chord as some kind of functional dominant. The more fruitful way of hearing the passage, Forte argues, is as the climactic moment of the opening gesture, in which the full forces of the orchestra are released, the first linear projection of  $\Delta$  is completed, and the  $\Delta$  and  $\Delta'$  chords come together in a single sonority.

On what basis can we judge Forte’s analysis vis-à-vis other Schenkerian analyses? Or should we concede that it is not related to them in any way (Forte himself says as much when discussing Mitchell’s article)? I would resist isolating Forte’s work from other Schenkerian readings, since it is clear that Forte is in direct dialogue with other Schenkerian approaches to the TP. Even if we would never call his analysis “conventional” in any sense, it still takes part in a discourse that locates itself within a general Schenkerian worldview. It is worth mentioning, for instance, that Forte’s thinking and “hearing” of this music is not as far removed as we might think from that of other Schenkerian analysts. Consider most obviously Forte’s consideration of the nature of surface harmonic-functional salience vis-à-vis the structural significance of a chord. Like Burstein, Forte warns his readers against hearing local harmonic function as indicative of deeper structural processes; in fact, he sees this mistake as one of the major impediments to hearing the deeper linear processes of the TP. So, it is not simply the fact that Forte uses the notational technology of Schenkerian theory that puts him in dialogue with other Schenkerian analysts; it is also some of the underlying musical conceits that bear witness to another kind of Schenkerian trace.

Since Forte’s analysis eschews a local harmonic-functional reading—while simultaneously arguing for the direct audibility of other salient musical phenomena like the TC—it is worth considering some of the potential imaginative-aural effects of Forte’s graph on the reader. Firstly, like any Schenkerian analyst, Forte regards the interaction of registers crucial to his reading—observe, for instance, the way he connects the essential outer and inner voices with slurs, unfoldings, and other directionally oriented lines. These notations suggest a type of imagined hearing whereby motions within, to, and from outer and inner voices constantly take place. Without this type of listening approach, Forte would be unable to retrieve the linear manifestations of the TC saturating the middleground of the music (mm. 16–23, shown in Figure 15b, are particularly rich with interactions of essential inner and outer voices).

A second observation on Forte’s aurality concerns the bass line in mm. 1–17. Note how the bass of each separate  $\Delta$  chord (on f, a $\flat$ , and c) is flagged as an auxiliary (i.e., neighbor) note to the  $\Delta'$  chord that follows it (e, g, and b respectively). In most Schenkerian analyses, such a neighboring function would be so obvious as to not even warrant discussion. Mitchell certainly saw the relationship in this way, since the opening is based for him on an arpeggiation of the E chord. In this sense, Forte follows Mitchell’s lead in prioritizing the three dominant seventh sonorities over the half-diminished

sonorities that precede each of them. Given Forte's relinquishment of tonal function, there is in theory no obligation to regard a hierarchical differentiation between the  $\Delta$  and  $\Delta'$  verticalities of the opening, except by sheer musical intuition. There is also no need to grant an equal status to all three dominant seventh chords: both Katz's and Burstein's analyses, for instance, show a subordination of the G chord at m. 7 to the flanking E and B chords (though for different reasons). In fact, one could just as easily posit a reading that regards the  $\Delta$  and  $\Delta'$  chords as contributing to another type of linear unfurling in the bass (see Figure 15c). This reading has the benefit of showing how not only  $\Delta T_3$  (in the upper voice) but also  $\Delta' T_7$  (in the lower voice) can manifest itself as a linear projection of the TC up to m. 16. The essential point is that Forte's reading of the opening bass, as different as it might seem at first glance, in fact takes part in a complex negotiation with other Schenkerian readings using a novel (yet not wholly unrelated) methodology.

The upper voice of Forte's analysis is even more complex to describe when reflected off of other Schenkerian thinkers. Consider the presence of  $g^\sharp$  as the progenitor of the upper-voice line in Forte, Burstein, and Mitchell. Each of these authors understands this  $g^\sharp$  in a structurally oriented way, but the reasoning for choosing this  $g^\sharp$  over  $a^1$  takes a completely different orientation in the hands of each analyst. Mitchell hears  $g^\sharp$  as a structural neighbor note (and leading tone) to  $a^1$ , coupled with  $g^\sharp$  through the rising line that is broken up in thirds. Burstein understands this same  $g^\sharp$  as the primary tone (perhaps almost as a *Kopftone*) of the entire passage, which only later in the Prelude moves onto  $a^1$ , not as a leading-tone resolution but instead as embodying the next move in the global auxiliary progression. This  $g^\sharp$ , moreover, is strictly-speaking a tone derived from secondary mixture within C major, not a leading tone in the minor key. And although Forte does not use  $g^\sharp$  to initiate a deeper linear progression as Mitchell and Burstein do, he nonetheless imparts structural status to the note by bracketing  $g^\sharp$  and  $b^1$  as a motive (labelled " $\alpha$ ") and then locating this motive at key junctures in the Prelude (it is the only such motive he identifies). In this way, he imbues the gesture (always at the same pitch level) with a significance not given to any other theme or motive. So, while it is not structural from a linear point of view,  $g^\sharp$  marks a structural motivic repetition. The role of motive, as cited earlier, is one of Forte's primary motivations in analyzing the linear aspects of the TP (Forte 1988, 326–27; see above).

Two final aspects of Forte's analysis are worth mentioning. The first of these is Forte's implicit historical outlook in relation to his analysis of the TP, which informs many of his analytical decisions. Rather than looking for precursors to the TC or TP, like most analysts do, Forte takes a different tack entirely by projecting his reading of the TC forward in time. In both the 1988 and 1995 articles, he cites a host of twentieth-century composers who made use of the TC as a referential sonority, largely removed from the remaining musical context of the TP. Forte's fascination with the compositional reception of the TC thus derives from the way these composers have isolated the chord and thereby imbued it with its own significance (Forte mentions Bartók, Debussy, Berg, Scriabin, Porter, and Kern, to name just a few). Instead of reading the history of the TP backwards, Forte reads it forwards. It is this strategy, I would argue, that sits behind his unique Schenkerian-inspired interpretation of the TP.

Secondly, it should be recalled that Forte not only published his 1988 article for the *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, but that he also used the ideas expressed in that article to respond to

Rothgeb's work on the TC (Forte 1995). Forte did this in part as a way of reinforcing the views he put forward in 1988, which argued that the TC of m. 2 is not only a "real" chord but is responsible for the linear organization of the TP as a whole. As further evidence of his stake in Schenkerizing the TP, Forte reproduces his 1988 graph of mm. 1–17 in his response to Rothgeb. Although he utilizes this graph as a way of reiterating his own thinking about the ontological status of the TC and its linear consequences, Forte actually retreats somewhat from his interpretation in light of Rothgeb's article, writing that "I am obliged to admit that, once again, as John Rothgeb would remind me, I disregard the notational and aurally experienced voice-leading implications of the fateful G# in the original context of the TC" (Forte 1995, ¶11). In his own way, then, Forte divulges a slight anxiety about the hierarchical and linear organization of the opening, just as Rothgeb did regarding the relationship between his prototype and the "finished product" of the music.

The final analysis to consider is that of Boretz, whose work predates the analyses of Burstein and Forte. Not only is Boretz's work of a much greater scope than any other author discussed up to now, but it also bears the most complex relationship to history and to Schenkerizing the TP. Working from what he sees as the "musically-crucial" data obtained through close phenomenological investigation, and eschewing any and all tonal significance to the TP, Boretz's work demonstrates the imaginative heights to which a Schenkerian-inflected interpretation can be taken.

Boretz's particular brand of analysis is emblematic of the other flagship academic institution of music theory in the second half of the twentieth century, Princeton, symbolized most readily in the personage of Milton Babbitt.<sup>18</sup> Many have in fact described the Princetonian brand of Schenkerism of the 1960s and 70s as "neo-Schenkerian," meaning crudely that their work aspires to give Schenkerian theory a rigorous, systematic, and even positivistic image. In the words of Eugene Narmour, a harsh critic both of conventional Schenkerians and of Babbitt and his followers: "The neo-Schenkerians attempt to classify Schenkerian theory as an axiomatic system, since structures are generated from a 'base component,' the *Ursatz*" (Narmour 1977, 12). While the designation "neo-Schenkerian" is problematic on many fronts (the sheer inconsistency of its application across the literature being one of them),<sup>19</sup> Boretz is surely working within the backdrop of "axiomatic system" building, for which Schenker's theory stands at the forefront.

Boretz's desire, therefore, to move beyond Schenkerian approaches to the TP is thus complicated by such "neo-Schenkerian" tendencies. To begin with, I would conjecture that, were it not for Mitchell's analysis, Boretz may never even have come to his basic thesis that the TP is structured around interlocking [0369] tetrachords. The reason for this has to do with the fact that Mitchell, unlike any analyst before him, regarded the TC as a fully-diminished seventh chord in  $\frac{7}{4}$  position (thus, F-G#-B-D), whereby D is chromatically altered to D#. Mitchell's reason behind this has to do with the voice exchange between G#

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18 It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the specific place of Schenker studies at Princeton at that time or within Babbitt's work. For one discussion of Babbitt's particular adaptation of Schenkerian theory in post-WWII America, see Snarrenberg 1994.

19 See Koslovsky 2020.



and B in mm. 2–3 (which gives G $\sharp$  a chordal status) as well as with the minor-third span f $^1$ –e $^1$ –d $^1$  in the inner voice (which shows D $\sharp$  as passing to D $\flat$ ; see Figure 5, level a). It even partly motivates Mitchell’s global reading of the deeper upper-voice neighbor-note d $^3$  from m. 53 to m. 67 (Figure 3), at which point a restatement of the opening motive occurs over a literal diminished-seventh chord.

Boretz’s own strategy is to deplete this modified TC of its tonal-contrapuntal derivation but to continue to argue for the chromatic alteration of D to D $\sharp$ . It recalls Forte’s method in viewing the TC and the dominant seventh chord as inversionally equivalent, but instead of taking the actual sounding of the vertical entity at the downbeat of m. 2 as a structural basis, it reasons that the whole complex of mm. 2–3 is derivable from [0369]. Boretz writes that “each of the outer chords of the two-measure segment [mm. 2–3] contains just three of its four pitch classes, with one pitch ‘contrapuntally’ displaced by a semitone; for only the D $\sharp$  ‘spoils’ the first chord of m. 2, and when it ‘resolves’ to D, the F of the complex is ‘displaced’ to E” (Boretz 1972, 163). So, while Mitchell takes the TC (as  $\frac{9}{2}$ ) as a contrapuntal neighbor to the structural E chord, Boretz flips the hierarchy on its head by imbuing the TC (now as [0369]) with the utmost structural significance.

Having established his theory of the TC, the next step in Boretz’s analysis is to demonstrate the projection of [0369] in the opening measures. As mentioned above, Boretz takes the idea of “interlocking” tetrachords as his starting point, and his analysis of mm. 1–16 (the same span as Forte’s linearized D and Burstein’s first bass cycle) shows the rising chromatic upper voice as representing two of these interlocking chords (see Figure 8a, Boretz’s “Exs. 4–6”). While this figure bears a direct resemblance to Forte’s analysis (especially given the beaming to f $\sharp^2$ ), note how Boretz simultaneously slurs d $^2$  to e $\sharp^2$  with an overlapping d $\sharp^2$  to f $\sharp^2$ . It is here in this slight alteration of minor-third span (mm. 2–3 and 6–7) to major-third span (mm. 10–11) where Boretz finds the first pivot point between one [0369] complex and another, the semitone e $\sharp^2$ –f $\sharp^2$  acting as the juncture between the complexes.

Boretz’s handling of the rising line of mm. 1–17 demonstrates yet another possible reconfiguration of Mitchell’s analysis, specifically in the way Boretz discusses the relationship between G $\sharp$  and A. Mitchell, we recall, saw the opening as framed by the structural neighbor motion A–G $\sharp$ –A (Figure 5), whereby a rising line g $\sharp^1$  and g $\sharp^2$  extends the deeper neighbor G $\sharp$ . In Figure 8b a similar maneuver is made by Boretz to connect A with G $\sharp$  at the middleground level, except now it is the G $\sharp$  that is structural, and the A embellishing. He writes with regard to this figure that:

If . . . we look ahead to the end of the ‘introduction’ [mm. 16–17], we find not only that the last configuration of the upper line is framed in E $\sharp$ –G $\sharp$ –B, with the G $\sharp$ –B at the end giving the *whole* upper-line span as a temporally immediate succession of its first to its last pitch classes in the intervallic relation they have as the first and last pitches of the *first* upper-voice span, but we also find that the final A (in the upper voice) associates with the G $\sharp$  in the same way that those pitches were associated as the first to second pitches of the initial upper-voice span . . . , suggesting an analogous G $\sharp$ –A macrosuccession in the passage as a whole (Boretz 1972, 164–65).

While the method and explanation through which he makes his analytical points are highly elaborate, it is clear that Boretz was determined to penetrate recursive levels of structure in the TP, not by using

a tonal-hierarchical approach but an uncompromisingly non-tonal one (or even “twelve-tone” one, as Boretz himself describes it).<sup>20</sup> In this sense, Boretz’s work at once departs from Forte’s ubiquitously middleground approach to the music and comes in closer contact with Mitchell’s and Burstein’s global strategies. As a final step, it is worth briefly considering what potential points of contact exist between these global readings. Figure 9 reproduces the three deepest levels of Boretz’s analysis of the TP as a whole (Boretz’s “Exs. 7a, 7b, and 8”). Each graph indicates at least three layers of structure emanating from the opening dyad (F/G#), as indicated by the beams. Each note of this dyad generates its own deeper linear unfolding based on semitonal motion: in the upper voice, a rising minor third (g#–a–a#–b); in the lower, a chromatic neighboring semitone (F–F#–F).<sup>21</sup> This progression occurs on the first of the two beamed levels (moving outwards from the staff), while the deepest level (the outermost beams) demonstrates the background shift from F/G# to E/G.

Though in many ways far removed from Boretz’s approach, Burstein’s analysis also privileges middleground-level projections of the upper-voice span G#–B and lower-voice neighboring motions (see Figure 12c). In the upper voice, the G#–B linear progression takes place over the first and second cycle segments in parallel tenths against the bass E–F–G. In the lower voice, two large-scale neighboring progressions aid in expanding the III<sup>7</sup> chord throughout most of the Prelude. The first of these is a lower neighbor D sonority, occupying mm. 21–63; the second is an upper neighbor on F, between mm. 77 and 84. Both of these neighboring progressions express the third segment of Burstein’s cyclical model.

Reflecting on potentially deeper points of contact between Boretz’s and Burstein’s strategies, one could even propose a slight emendation to Burstein’s background progression by expressing a rising line in the upper voice G#–A–B (mm. 84–100) for the third and final cycle of the Prelude, instead of the G#–A–G figure present in his analysis (see Figure 12b). This reading would parallel more closely the previous first and second bass cycle segments and prioritize the arrival of B<sup>b</sup> in the uppermost part at m. 100 (in the viola), when the structural V arrives. This B<sup>b</sup> is reiterated moreover at m. 103 in the oboe, the final time we hear the principal ascending minor third. This reading has the further advantage of expressing a deeper progression of parallel tenths at the background level, present already at Burstein’s middleground. Given Burstein’s own hearing of the rising bass third E–F–G for the second bass cycle segment as a microcosm for the whole (read through his response to Maisel), there is no reason not to do the same for the middleground upper-voice G#–A–B.

So, just as Boretz may have taken his cue from Mitchell in flipping an interpretation of the TC on its head, we can reflect Boretz’s global reading off of Burstein’s by projecting the one into the other and thinking through the potential consequences of such a juxtaposition, even when their analyses seem worlds apart. It can lead, in other words, to a disclosure of the many junctures and disjunctures present in competing analyses traversing the lines of a similar theoretical tradition and impulse.

20 “... Tristan as we have described it is not only ‘twelve-tone’ in a special sense but also ‘serial’ in a special sense, as radically precompositionally unique a work as any in the explicated literature” (Boretz 1972, 216–17).

21 It is important to mention that F<sup>b</sup> and F# as unique pitch classes, are for Boretz distinctive notes in structural fabric, and not chromatic alterations of a deeper diatony.



## CONCLUSION: EXPLORING THE SCHENKERIAN TRACES IN THE TRISTAN PRELUDE

I have taken this final step as a way of opening up our eyes and ears one last time to the Prelude as a whole, to show how the smallest trace of an idea can have larger ramifications for our understanding of a musical analysis. Clearly, the challenge is daunting, and the precise consequences unclear, since an approach such as this runs the risk of creating a never-ending network of comparative viewpoints. How we define the boundaries of such an inquiry thus becomes just as pertinent as undertaking the inquiry itself. While I hesitate to offer any definitive answer to this general conundrum, I would stress that its relevance is nowhere as apparent as it is through an examination of the analytical reception history of the Tristan Prelude. Schenkerian approaches are just one small part of that history.

As I see it, a more intertextually-sensitive approach to music analysis and its history can activate another kind of engagement with the analytical past—this paper proposes merely one way of doing so. It is our task as historians to define the meaningful boundaries of exploration, and at the same time to traverse the margins of interaction between author, reader, and listener. Boretz’s own words on the relational context we build around musical pieces can just as easily be applied to the many contexts in which an analysis is embedded: “. . . we compare individual pieces only to infer some terms whose interpreted transfer from one context to the other gives the attempt to ‘understand’ a particular piece the benefit of discoveries and insights that have emerged in the course of ‘understanding’ another (both ‘understandings’ being simply equivalent to ‘reconstructing’ or ‘constructing’)” (Boretz 1972, 148).

In any case, in this article I hope to have encouraged another way of thinking through this rich analytical past—not simply by way of summary, nor by dismissing it *tout court* (which we do at our peril), but rather by positioning it within a more relational field, and thereby enabling us to reflect perpetually upon the historiographical, perceptual, and even phenomenological consequences of our engagement with it. To be sure, there are an innumerable amount of tacit processes present in the course of doing a Schenkerian analysis (or any analysis, for that matter). These are the things that happen between the beams, the slurs, and all the other notational devices. If we agree that there is a similarly hidden process that takes place in reading an analysis, then it is our task to carve out some kind of path through that process. This paper has attempted to explicate what some of those processes might be.

If anything, the wanderings amongst the many Schenkerian encounters with *Tristan* as presented here are aimed at encouraging a more dynamic and even performative approach to the history of analysis. In the words of Kofi Agawu, “. . . analytical knowledge, whatever it is, is not necessarily cumulative, just as performance knowledge is not necessarily cumulative. By this I mean that analysis, like performance, entails a fresh engagement, a re-enactment, not an aggregation of facts about previous enactments, even if these provide hints for a current proceeding.” (Agawu 2004, 274). As I see it, the accumulation and apperception of analytical observations is crucial in understanding the ways music analyses can themselves activate a wider intertextual discourse. Perhaps Mitchell’s conclusion sums up the matter even better in this context, given the author’s formidable efforts to tackle virtually every note of the TP:

. . . This does not mean, however, that there can be only one exemplary linear-harmonic analysis of a work such as this. Clearly, when so many diverse, often competing, factors await evaluation,

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when a desired objectivity is constantly menaced by the limiting slants of personal musical experience, a resolute effort must be made to reduce arbitrary readings to the zero point, to eliminate purely capricious judgements. When these hampering conditions are overcome, the success of an analysis can be measured by the degree of musical insight that it provides. Some will fall short of the mark; others will approach the heart of the work. It remains idle, however, to speculate on the most viable of all viable analyses, for in the end the analytic conclusions reached are individual judgments, however rarefied, rather than mechanical derivatives. This is a source of strength for linear-harmonic analysis, for it suggests a constant matching of the musical maturity of the analyst with the elusive essence of the work analyzed (Mitchell 1967, 203).

To conclude with yet another commonplace (though one no less profound in its implications), the TP defies a singular analytical reading. Few other musical works press us so urgently to admit the dependencies of our approaches, or to concede the analytical subjectivities that analysts try so hard to overcome in devising tight-knit structures. But rather than giving up on structural-based interpretations altogether, or pushing for one at the expense of another, we should celebrate the play of perspectives they bring to the historical-analytical imagination, and delight in the forms of listening and contemplation they invite. The real challenge is to define the meaningful boundaries of such an exploration, while not losing sight of the principal task at hand: a deeper and more musically sensitive understanding of Schenkerizing the Tristan Prelude, past and present.

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## APPENDIX

Table 1: Schenkerian analyses of the Tristan Prelude, 1945–1995.

<b>Analyst</b>	<b>Publication title</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Scope of analysis</b>	<b>Musical Figures</b>
Adele Katz	<i>Challenge to Musical Tradition</i>	1945	mm. 1-24, annotated score + two middleground readings	Fig. 1
Felix-Eberhard von Cube	<i>The Book of the Musical Artwork: An Interpretation of the Musical Theories of Heinrich Schenker</i>	1988 [TP analysis from ca. 1953]	entire Prelude, background and middleground levels only	Fig. 2
William Mitchell	"The Tristan Prelude: Techniques and Structure" ( <i>The Music Forum</i> , vol. 1)	1967	entire Prelude, all levels	Figs. 3-6
Arthur Komar	Review of <i>The Music Forum</i> , vols. 1-2	1970	mm. 1-16; 74-84, middleground sketches	Fig. 7
Benjamin Boretz	<i>Meta-Variations</i> IV.1: "Analytical Fallout"	1972	entire Prelude, all levels	Fig. 8-10
L. Poundie Burstein	"A New View of Tristan: Tonal Unity in the Prelude and Conclusion to Act I" ( <i>Theory &amp; Practice</i> 8/1)	1983	entire Prelude and end of Act I, primarily background- and middleground-level oriented	Figs. 11-12
Arthur Maisel	"Tristan: A Different Perspective" ( <i>Theory &amp; Practice</i> 8/2)	1983	mm. 3-44, various middleground sketches	Figs. 13-14
Allen Forte	"New Approaches to the Linear Analysis of Music" ( <i>Journal of the American Musicological Society</i> 41/2)	1988	mm. 1-89, middleground-oriented	Fig. 15
Annie Coeurdevey	"L'analyse schenkerienne et ses frontières" ( <i>Revue de Musicologie</i> 79/1)	1993	entire Prelude, deep middleground	Fig. 16
John Rothgeb	"The Tristan Chord: Identity and Origin"	1995	mm. 1-17, "slide" figure and "prototype"	Figs. 17-19

Figure 1. Adele Katz's linear analysis of the Tristan Prelude, mm. 1–24.



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Figure 2. Felix-Eberhard von Cube's ca. 1953 analysis of the Tristan Prelude (complete).

a.)

C: VI IV V I<sup>b</sup>

b.)

Cl: I IV I# V# I# IX# VI C: [IX#] I<sup>b</sup>

M.


17	23	26	36	44	58	79	92	96	103
3	22	25	35	42	48	74	84	94	100
1	21	24	27	39	46	63	83	93	98

I. Scene.

c.)

Cl: IV# VII I# V# I# IX# V# bVI NH PH c: [IX#] I<sup>b</sup>

Figure 3. William Mitchell’s 1967 deep middleground reading of the Tristan Prelude (complete).



EXAMPLE 2 (continued)

Musical notation for Example 2 (continued). The notation is on a single staff. It shows a sequence of notes: a half note G4 (fingering 5), a half note B4 (fingering 9), and a half note G4 (fingering 5). Above the staff, there are three upward-pointing arrows with the numbers 5, 9, and 5 above them, corresponding to the notes. Above the first arrow is a circled 3, and above the second and third arrows is a circled 2.

Musical notation for Example 2 (continued). The notation is on a single staff. It shows a sequence of notes: a half note G4 (fingering 74), a half note B4 (fingering 77), a half note G4 (fingering 79), a half note G4 (fingering 84), and a half note G4 (fingering 95). Above the staff, there are five upward-pointing arrows with the numbers 74, 77, 79, 84, and 95 above them, corresponding to the notes. Above the first arrow is a circled 3, and above the second and third arrows is a circled 2.

Musical notation for Example 2 (continued). The notation is on a single staff. It shows a sequence of notes: a half note G4 (fingering VI), a half note B4 (fingering II), a half note G4 (fingering V), and a half note G4 (fingering I). Above the staff, there are four upward-pointing arrows with the numbers VI, II, V, and I above them, corresponding to the notes.

Figure 4. Mitchell's derivation of a diatonic background in the Tristan Prelude.

EXAMPLE 18

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

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Figure 5. Mitchell's analysis of mm. 1–17.



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





Figure 6a. Heinrich Schenker’s comparison of Chopin’s Mazurka, op. 30, no. 2 (mm. 25–27) with the Tristan Prelude, mm. 1–3 (*Harmonielehre* exs. 325 and 326).

325]

Vivace

Chopin, Mazurka, Op. 30 Nr. 2.

326]

Wagner, Vorspiel zu Tristan und Isolde.

Langsam und schmachtend

*pp* (II $\sharp$ 5 + V $\sharp$ 3)

I — II — V

Koslovsky 41

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Figure 6b. Mitchell’s analysis of Chopin, Mazurka op. 30, no. 2, mm. 24–32.

a)


b)

c)

I III

1

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Figure 7. Arthur Komar’s reading of mm. 2–16 (in response to Mitchell).

a)

Bar 2 3 6 7 10 11 16

b)

Bar 2 6 10 16

E $\flat$	E $\sharp$	F $\sharp$
G $\sharp$	G $\flat$	

Figure 8a. Benjamin Boretz’s linear unfolding of “interlocking [0369] complexes” in the opening of the Tristan Prelude [Exs. 4–6].






Figure 8b. Boretz’s reading of the “macrosuccession G $\sharp$ –A” in the Tristan Prelude, opening.




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
Figure 9. Boretz’s “background” and “middleground” sketches of the Tristan Prelude [Exs. 7–9].



Ex. 7a




Ex. 7b



Ex. 8



Figure 10. Boretz's "foreground" reading of the Tristan Prelude, mm. 1–49 (Ex. 10a (beginning)).




Ex. 10a (beginning)

Figure 11. L. Poundie Burstein’s theory of bass cycles in the Tristan Prelude.

Example 6  
Tristan Prelude


a) bass framework



b) bass cycle



Figure 12: Burstein's background and middleground readings of the Tristan Prelude.



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Figure 13. Arthur Maisel’s analysis of mm. 16–21 (in response to Burstein).

Example 2  
Wagner, *Tristan* Prelude

a)

b)

c)

a)



Figure 15a. Allen Forte’s analysis of mm. 1–17 of the Tristan Prelude.




Figure 15b. Forte’s analysis of mm. 16–23 of the Tristan Prelude.




Figure 15c. Alternate analysis of bass progression using Forte’s methodology, mm. 1–16.



Figure 16. Annie Coeurdevey's analysis of mm. 1–45.




Figure 17. John Rothgeb's "slide" figure (generated from a to d).




Figure 18. Rothgeb's "prototype" for mm. 1–17, Tristan Prelude.






Figure 19. A revised prototype and analysis of mm. 1–17.

a) revised prototype

b) revised analysis

mm. 2 3 6 7 10 11 16 17

V VI

# The Hegelian Schenker, the Un-Schenkerian Hegel, and How to Be a Dialectician about Music

## BRYAN J. PARKHURST

### INTRODUCTION

Is Schenker a Hegelian? Let me begin by drawing a distinction between two different kinds of questions one might be asking in asking this. And permit me the drollery of calling these “background” and “foreground” questions.

### BACKGROUND QUESTIONS

One kind of question about Schenker and Hegel concerns the philosophical background, or “ideological support structure” (Michell 1997, 374), or “categorical frame of reference” (Honneth 2009, 29), of Schenker’s *Gedankenwelt*. For instance: Does Schenker’s default manner of thinking run along tramlines laid down by the Hegelian philosophy? Is the Schenker project (to borrow Nicholas Cook’s term) an “adaptation” (Cherlin 1988) of Hegelian dialectics? Do Schenker’s analyses constitute a set of “méditations Hegeliennes” (Sellars 1963, 148) about tonal music and its laws?

Many think so. The secondary literature abounds with offhand and oftentimes unsubstantiated references to the likes of “Schenker’s Hegelian views” (Cook 1989, 124), the “resonance between [Schenker’s] theories and Hegel’s” (Cook 1999, 96), “the parallel between Hegelian sublation and the manner in which Schenker draws detail into his structural mode” (Cook 1999, 97),<sup>1</sup> the “full-on Hegelian epistemology that underlies . . . Schenker’s idea of the *Urlinie*” (Cook 2012, 193), the “Hegelian slant of Schenker’s theory” (Street 1989, 86),<sup>2</sup> “the organic, single tonal closure so vital to Schenker’s underlying Hegelian synthesis” (Hatten 1978, 27), the “Hegelian historical perspective in

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I gave earlier versions of this paper at a meeting of the University of Michigan Aesthetics Discussion Group (Ann Arbor, 2018) and at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Music Theory (San Antonio, 2018) and benefited greatly from the comments and criticisms I received. Special thanks are due to Sarah Buss, Suzannah Clark, Beth Genné, Kendall Walton, Allan Gibbard, Jamie Tappenden, John Koslovsky, Nathan Martin, Kevin Korsyn, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback and discussion. Thanks also to my Oberlin colleagues Megan Kaes Long and James O’Leary, who met with me several times during the 2018–19 school year to discuss revisions of the article.

1 Cook (1999, 97) also discerns the specter of Hegelianism in Schenker’s conception of musical coherence: “When Schenker speaks of ‘the tension of musical coherence,’ I take him to refer to the Hegelian tension between unity and diversity, whole and part.”

2 Street (1989, 86) continues: “[T]he dialectical color of [the theory’s] organization has attracted frequent comment, not least because of the Chord of Nature which, like [Hegel’s] Idea, ‘can only enter the artistic consciousness by the expansion and further mediation of [its] . . . particular aspects’ (Hegel, quoted in Solie 1980, 154). All the same, it is necessary to bear in mind the reconciliation of background (general) with foreground (particular) as the true idealist hallmark of his system. Indeed to accommodate this scheme, Schenker’s intellectual perspective on music underwent its own course of development away from perceptual progress in time towards conceptual progress in mind. Thus the life of the individual masterpiece and of musical history in general were both envisaged as the outcome of a Hegelian teleology, unfolding organically towards its inevitable end.” Carl Schachter (1981, 122) likewise detects Hegelian overtones in Schenker’s teleological thinking and in the teleological dimension of Schenker’s doctrine of analytical levels (*Schichtenlehre*): “An imbalance at one [analytical] level might help to determine the course of the next and, in that sense, lead to a ‘goal’—restoration of equilibrium. It is perhaps worth pointing out that Schenker begins his first chapter with a quotation from Hegel.”

Schenker” (Hatten 1979, 13),<sup>3</sup> the “foundational role of Hegelian historicism in Schenker’s thought” (Cook 2007, 266), Schenker’s “explicitly Hegelian . . . explicitly dialectical . . . thought” (Cherlin 1988, 121), Schenker’s “[use of] the Chord of Nature in much the same way that Hegel uses the Idea” (Solie 1980, 154), Schenker’s “Hegelian idealistic monism” (Monelle 1998, 117),<sup>4</sup> Schenker’s “very clearly . . . Hegelian tendenc[ies]” (Whittle 1993, 210), Schenker’s “notion of a theory of music analysis [that is] deeply Hegelian” (ibid.), Schenker’s “Hegelian framework of thought” (Cook 2007, 137), the “indisputable role in Schenker’s thinking of idealism of the Hegelian type” (Cook 2007, 266), and so on.<sup>5</sup> Evidently, the general philosophical tenor of Schenker’s works leaves a “quite specifically Hegelian resonance” (Cook 2007, 136) ringing in the ears of some members of Schenker’s audience.

As is indicated by the number of times he is cited in the previous paragraph, Nicholas Cook is the most vigorous and vocal proponent of the idea that a background of Hegelian dogma supplies the philosophical warp and woof of Schenker’s system. Cook puts his exegetical cards on the table near the beginning of *The Schenker Project*:

Although . . . I try to avoid the widespread error of turning Schenker into a philosopher . . . I do see the Hegelian concept of sublation, the subsumption of opposed entities within a higher unity, as central to Schenker’s thought. The point is that this idea is equally basic to Hegel’s political philosophy and his aesthetics: in this way it provides a framework within which to make sense of Schenker’s equation of musical and social structure. It is a key to understanding how Schenker’s theory is not just a theory of music but a theory of society—or to put it another way, not just a theory but a project. (2007, 14)<sup>6</sup>

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3 Roger Savage (2010, 15) associates Hegel’s view of world history not with Schenker’s view of music history but, oddly, with Schenker’s (by all appearances, ahistorical) view of tonal closure: “Schenker took a lead in justifying tonal music’s high art status by forging a link between aesthetic perfection and a popularized Hegelian view of history . . . The unifying principle of tonal closure accordingly assumed the force of a rational construct that was comparable to that of reason within the Hegelian system of thought.”

4 Monelle continues: “Just as Hegel found truth in systematic wholeness, and overcame the problem of unitary subjectivity by invoking the absolute subject, so Schenker advances a view of musical organic wholeness and gives it an absolute authority.”

5 William Pastille (1995, 3) thinks that Schenker’s understanding of music history (as distinct from his view of musical structure) was Hegelian: “Schenker’s conception of music history was greatly influenced by metaphysical idealism, and especially by the type of historical idealism that sees the course of history as the slow-moving development of an ideal entity—say, Civilization, Culture, or Knowledge—that evolves in the background, behind or above daily life. A pattern for the idealist project in nineteenth-century German thought was set by Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* [1807], which traces the dialectical stages through which Spirit passes on its way to full self-consciousness, both in human history and in the individual human life. Hegel also established a model for the particular study of history with his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* [1837 and 1840], which treat the great civilizations of the world as dialectical stages through which the World-Spirit evolves toward full self-consciousness.” Pastille evinces an awareness of the important distinction, discussed below, between dialectical thought and organicism. This distinguishes Pastille’s work from much of the rest of the secondary literature on Schenker and Hegel, which frequently conflates dialectics, organicism, idealism, and Hegelianism. This conflation can be observed in Street 1989 (86): “True to its idealist principles, Schenkerian theory is shot through with references to physical organic life; the importance of Nature for Hegel is translated into what Ruth Solie identifies as a conflation ‘of temporal and logical priority’ between the ontogenic (development of the individual organism) and phylogenic (development of the species) in Schenker’s own version.”

6 The self-assuredness of Cook’s pronouncement makes it easy to overlook its strangeness. Although it is true that Schenker from time to time draws analogies between musical structure and social structure (see Parkhurst 2017a, 179–82), it is a stretch

This thesis, which is developed over the course of *The Schenker Project*, can be distilled down to the proposition that Schenker treats musical notes as Hegel supposedly treated everything, to wit, as dialectical moments that get “sublated” into superordinate wholes. Accordingly, Schenker’s “approach...[should be] seen as an attempt to translate into musical terms the Hegelian notion of sublation, understood as the reconciling . . . of the interests of part and whole” (2007, 191). To spell things out more: according to Schenker’s theory of musical coherence, musical part and whole—note and complex of notes—are reconciled within

[t]he conceptual unity of a linear progression [that] signifies a conceptual tension (*Spannung*) between the beginning and the end of the progression: the primary note is to be retained until the point at which the concluding note appears. This tension alone engenders musical coherence. (Schenker 1996, 1)

Since Cook thinks that Schenker “means ‘tension’ (*Spannung*) in the sense of overcoming conflict in order to create a higher synthesis, that is to say of the Hegelian dialectic” (Cook 2007, 282), he is disposed to see Schenker as (for the most part, though perhaps not undeviatingly<sup>7</sup>) a Hegelian dialectician vis-à-vis music. Thus a claim about Schenker’s conception of mereology—the relation of part to whole and the relations of part to part within a whole—in music, and about the affinity this conception has with Hegelian *Aufhebung*, is offered as the justification for a definitive answer to questions about Schenker’s philosophical background: “Schenker’s basic construction of what it might mean to understand music . . . is deeply impregnated with Hegelian thought, or at least with German idealism” (2007, 34).

But other interpreters are reluctant to call Schenker a Hegelian so casually and so categorically.<sup>8</sup> For them, the obvious incumbency of Cook’s passing caveat (“or at least with German idealism”) tells against a specifically Hegelian reading of Schenker.<sup>9</sup> There is no denying that Schenker’s works

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to say that Schenker has anything that deserves to be called “a theory of society.” He has, at most, a confused hodgepodge of revanchist convictions about the decline of Western culture. One wonders, further, why adding a “theory of society” to a “theory of music” turns a mere “theory” into a less-than-mere “project,” and also what the difference between a theory and a project is supposed to be. And, finally, why is it an error to turn Schenker into a philosopher but not an error to turn him into a sociologist?

7 Cook admits that the purity of Schenker’s Hegelianism gets diluted by certain anti-Hegelian beliefs: “Despite the indisputable role in Schenker’s thinking of idealism of the Hegelian type, the profoundly un-Hegelian idea that there exist such things as eternal, unchanging ideas, removed from the circumstances of the world, is scattered throughout his writings” (Cook 2007, 266–67).

8 In addition to the authors cited in this paragraph, see also Blasius 1996, Peles 2001, Hubbs 1991, Duerksen 2008, and Morgan 2014 for either denials of a specifically Hegelian background in Schenker or affirmations of a pluralistic German idealist influence on Schenker.

9 Cook makes several similar caveats: “In this book I have repeatedly emphasized the dependence of Schenker’s thought on Hegelian principles, or at least generalized principles of German idealism that can be illustrated by reference to Hegel” (2007, 266, emphasis mine). But it is hardly fair to say that Hegel’s highly idiosyncratic method of sublation (*Aufhebung*), with which Cook emphatically and repeatedly associates Schenker’s analytical approach, is a “generalized principle of German idealism,” for it is neither generalized (in the sense of being widely practiced) nor a principle (in the sense of a fixed or predetermined rule or standard). In this connection, I would also mention that it is most un-Hegelian for Cook to depict Hegel’s dialectic as some kind of abstract recipe for philosophical examination that has ubiquitous applicability: “The point about the Hegelian framework in which I have attempted to situate Schenker is that it presents issues of whole and part, centre and periphery, unity and difference,

teem with German idealism's, and thus Hegel's, characteristic fixations and terms of art, such as *Geist*, organicism, historical necessity, *Bildung*, teleology, synthesis, *das Absolut*, and genius. But there is reason to deny that talking (what sounds like) the Hegelian talk is the same as walking (what in fact is) the Hegelian walk. After all, Hegel was the most prominent and important philosophical system-builder of his era. His *oeuvre* magisterially summarizes and incorporates the entire Western philosophical tradition as he knew it, and, in so doing, sets the agenda for much or most subsequent European thought (for good or for ill, and either positively as an inspiration or negatively as a foil). That being the case, Schenker cannot talk about the kinds of things he likes to talk about without thereby inviting comparisons with and reflections upon Hegel, and without thereby sounding like Hegel, at least to our comparatively untutored ears. For a modern reader of Schenker, a little knowledge of Hegel can be a dangerous thing, because it can lead one to fixate on relatively superficial similarities (of rhetoric, style, and topical interest) between Schenker and Hegel, and to overlook the more important matter of whether Schenker actually endorses Hegel's idiosyncratic views, most especially those views that Hegel maintained in opposition to other idealists. Undoubtedly, as Korsyn drily observes at the outset of an extended broadside against Hegelian interpretations of Schenker, "the conventional association of Schenker with German idealism makes Hegel an obvious enough choice for anyone investigating cultural contexts" (Korsyn 2009, 155). But German-idealist predilections do not an *echt* Hegelian make. Indeed many of Hegel's most antipathetic philosophical opponents (such as the later Schelling) were themselves German idealists. Ascribing Hegelianism to Schenker on the basis of the palpable but non-specific strain of aesthetic, metaphysical, and ethical post-Kantianism in Schenker's works is a bit like imputing an allegiance to Marxism to anyone who is on the political left. For that reason, Korsyn and several like-minded Schenker scholars recommend replacing unwarranted emphasis on Hegel, or on any one idealist figure, with more cautious acknowledgements of the "obvious presence of [German] idealism in Schenker's works" (Korsyn 1993, 86) and of "the evidence drawn from the totality of Schenker's works [that] indicates that he accepted unequivocally the German idealist tradition of his earliest education and background and knew in a fairly intimate way the works of Goethe, Kant, Hegel, and Schiller and, of course, many others" (Keiler 1989, 291).<sup>10</sup>

### "FOREGROUND" QUESTIONS

However, even if Schenker's broad-church idealism does not imply that he is, on the whole and in the main, a Hegelian, more so than or to the exclusion of any other kind of idealist, perhaps one can still pigeonhole as Hegelian some specific concepts and categories that Schenker brings into play. Then "Is Schenker Hegelian?" could be taken as a foreground question about local Hegelisms instead

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in such a stripped-down, abstracted manner as to be equally and simultaneously applicable to politics, the law, or music" (2007, 313). See Korsyn 2009 for an unsparing criticism of the way Cook brings together Hegel and Schenker.

10 Keiler, however, does impute generic Hegelianism to Schenker's early *Geist* essay: "It is [the] fusion of the evolutionary, teleological method and the insistence on musical faculties, or competence that gives the original stamp to the first half of Schenker's [*Geist*] essay. The presence of the first part alone would not call for so much comment, for, at least in its common Hegelian significance, this fusion of teleology with competence informed much historical writing about the arts in the nineteenth century" (1989, 282).

of global Hegelianism. This shift in focus would direct our inquiry away from whatever all-embracing worldview emerges from the totality of Schenker's works, if one does, and toward finer-grained details of authorial influence and intent at the level of individual terms and sentences. One may ask, from this more microscopic perspective: which of Schenker's utterances can we plausibly read as alluding to, or as music-theoretically repurposing, precise Hegelian words or claims? Can we view at least some circumscribed Schenkerian commitments and formulations, rather than the entirety of the Schenkerian enterprise, as deriving from, or as being grounded in an acceptance of, at least some circumscribed Hegelian commitments and formulations, rather than as arising from a wholesale acceptance of Hegel's system? Robert Snarrenberg's exegetical and philological work on Schenker pursues Schenker interpretation with this mindset and with this degree of nuance. His elucidation of Schenker's term *Auswicklung* is illustrative:

"Auswicklung" is one of several terms Schenker uses for "development" or "elaboration." His usage has much in common with Hegel's "Entwicklung" and "Entfaltung" (the first of these figures prominently in Schenker's *Harmonielehre*; the second occurs occasionally in his later writings, though its cousin "Ausfaltung" is found more frequently). In the *Introduction to Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, a text that I expect Schenker knew, Hegel uses "Entwicklung" to mean "the unfolding of inner potentiality (the *in itself*) into explicit actuality (the *for itself*)."<sup>1</sup> Though I cannot substantiate the claim that Schenker actually derived his idea of "development" from this particular text, it is fairly easy to substantiate the only slightly weaker claim that Schenker did adopt Hegel's idea. The clearest evidence lies in the very first chapter of *Der frei Satz*: "The origin of every Life in a nation, a race, and in the individual, is at the same time its Destiny. Hegel conceives Destiny as ' . . . the manifestation of that which the specific Individuality is in itself, as an inner, original qualitative determinacy.' The inner law of Origin then accompanies all later Development [*Entwicklung*] and is ultimately in every Present." (1996, 326)

Elsewhere, and in like manner, Snarrenberg argues that there is Hegelianism afoot in Schenker's employment of the terms "idea" (*Idee*), "realization" (*Ausführung*) and "whole" (*Ganz*). And Snarrenberg ventures the hypothesis that "the relevant context [for Schenker's Hegelian phraseology] is Hegel's presentation of the philosophical method of history, in the Introduction to the *Philosophy of History*" (Snarrenberg 1997, 65). This leads Snarrenberg to the conclusion that

. . . a Hegelian view of the artwork as the rational realization of an Idea is made explicit for the first time in [Schenker's] commentary on Beethoven's Piano Sonata op. 101. It is no coincidence . . . that this is also the text in which Schenker first introduced the idea of the Urlinie and gave his first and most explicit defense of this new feature of his interpretive practice: "A god and yet also a servant of the tones—Beethoven metes out to each individual tone the measure of justice to which it is due. He places them all in the service of one Idea [*Idee*], creates the higher and lower orders necessary for its realization [*Ausführung*] . . . and so achieves the euphony of an organic whole [*Ganz*]." Here is the rational agent of the sonata's historical development, Beethoven, ordering the activities of a just state of rational subjects. (1997, 72)

Korsyn (2009, 157–58) challenges the hypothesis that Hegel's late *Lectures on the Philosophy*

of *History* is the likeliest source of the several Hegelisms Snarrenberg notices, for the simple reason that the sole explicit Hegel quotation in all of Schenker's works—*Free Composition*'s allusion to “the manifestation (*Erscheinung*) of that which the specific Individuality (*bestimmte Individualität*) is in itself, as an inner, original qualitative determinacy (*innere ursprüngliche Bestimmtheit*)”<sup>11</sup>—comes from Hegel's early *Phenomenology of Spirit*.<sup>12</sup> That quibble notwithstanding, Korsyn's more basic point about the absence of a pervasively Hegelian background to Schenker's thought<sup>13</sup> is not necessarily at odds with Snarrenberg's interpretive tack. Even if there is no deep-seated background of Hegelian idealism that primordially conditions all of Schenker's theorizing, certain foreground expressions might still have a markedly Hegelian character as well as an ascertainable Hegelian provenance, or might be illuminated or explicated with the assistance of Hegelian conceptual resources. Correlatively, although it may be true that some commentators are “too eager to link individual Schenkerian concepts exclusively to a single author” (Lubben 1995, 46) such as Hegel, and too eager to link individual Hegelian concepts to implements in Schenker's analytical toolkit, such as *Auswicklung*, this problem is distinct from the problem of easygoing and uncritical ascriptions to Schenker of an omnidirectional, all-suffusive Hegelian background.

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11 Schenker explicitly references Hegel, though without quoting him, at least two other times. One reference is from a 1916 diary entry: “Hegel does not know that the truth of any art lies solely in the fulfilment of its own laws. All further circumstances have nothing to do with the inner truth of the work” (Federhofer 1985, 275, translated in Rothstein 1988, 235). Another is from an 1896 essay: “The first strength of the beginning only completely exhausts itself at the end . . . This particular, deeply internal drive of the thoughts—in a figurative sense one could grasp it with the Hegelian term as their self-movement [*Selbstbewegung*!—is named in the conventional sense with the playful word ‘form’ . . . Thoughts without such a drive, that is without ‘form,’ can never retain their vitality” (Federhofer 1990, 202–3, quoted and translated in Cook 2007, 78).

12 The quote is taken from Hegel's musings on chiromancy, which are worth quoting at length: “Certainly the hand seems less to be an exterior factor (*etwas Äußeres*) with respect to destiny and instead seems more to relate to destiny as something inward (*als Inneres*). This is because destiny, again, is merely *the appearance* (*Erscheinung*) of *what the determinate individuality* (*bestimmte Individualität*) *as inner originary determinateness* (*innere ursprüngliche Bestimmtheit*) *is in itself*. Now, to know what this individuality is in itself, the palm reader as well as the physiognomist takes a shorter path than, for example, Solon, who thought he could only begin to think about this on the basis of and after the course of the whole life. Solon studied the appearance (*Erscheinung*) whereas those others study the in-itself (*das An-sich*). However, that the hand must exhibit the in-itself of individuality as it is related to its fate is easily seen from the following. After the organ of speech, it is by and large the hand by which a person brings himself to appearance and actualizes himself. It is the ensouled artisan (*beseelte Werkmeister*) of his fortune; we may say of the hand that it is what a man *does*, for in the hand, as the active organ of his self-accomplishment (*tätigen Organe seines Sich-selbst-vollbringens*), the person is present as an ensouling principle, and since he is the origin of his own fate, the hand will thus express this in-itself” (Hegel 2018, 182–83). It is not farfetched to surmise that Schenker's interest in Hegel's ideas about the hand (as an outward manifestation of an “ensouling principle”) is related to his interest in hand position and fingerings as outward expressions of the aesthetic “soul” of keyboard works. In the *Art of Performance*, Schenker opines that “the free mobility of the ‘soul’ of a work of art ever will demand total freedom of fingering” (34). Echoes of Hegel's idea that the hand is shaped by the agent's inner motivational principles and practical involvement with the world can be heard in Schenker's remark that “the freedom in the masterworks of our Classical composers encouraged unfettered fingering as well . . . It was the creation of their works that gave rise to the art of fingering in the first place” (33). Schenker even draws a parallelism between the hand and what Hegel calls “the organ of speech” that could conceivably be an allusion to the chiromancy passage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “Fingering must also be honest; the hand—like the mouth—must speak the truth; it must correspond to the voice-leading” (34).

13 “Trying to turn Schenker into a (real or pseudo-) Hegelian may obscure the influence of other thinkers who have left more definite traces on Schenker's works” (Korsyn 2009, 158).



## FROM QUESTIONS OF INFLUENCE TO QUESTIONS OF AUTHENTICITY

Needless to say, background questions and foreground questions are inseparable from one another. Interpreters impute a Hegelian background to Schenker's writings partly because of the cumulative effect of many Hegelian shibboleths on the textual surface; and they may feel moved to hunt down the Hegelian origins of this or that foreground turn of phrase because of the heightened significance it takes on when considered in light of a presumed background of Hegelian doctrine. This exegetical bootstrapping is a variant of the familiar problem, or pseudo-problem, of the hermeneutic circle. Here I want to pose a question that is hypothetical enough to keep us at a safe distance from the hermeneutic circle, if danger there be: is whatever Hegelianism one finds in Schenker, in the background or in the foreground, *authentic*? Could Hegel himself regard Schenker as a philosophical ally? My answer is no.

To be clear, I do not think that this speciousness is a sin. Neither did as monumental a thinker as Karl Marx, who was candid about the inauthenticity of his Hegelianism: "Here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value [in the first volume of *Capital*], I coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to [Hegel]" (Marx 1976, 102–3).<sup>14</sup> As far as I am concerned, Schenker can "coquette" with Hegelian modes of expression and conceptual schemes as much as he likes. My intention is not to blame Schenker for what he "got wrong" about Hegel, as though Hegelian orthodoxy were intrinsically desirable, or as though it was Schenker's stated aim and thus a standard against which his work should be judged. My intention, instead, is to compare and contrast what Schenker was up to, which is one thing, and what Hegel was up to, which is another thing entirely; I have no settled opinion about what Schenker ought to have been doing.

## WHAT SCHENKER WAS UP TO

As I understand it, and as I think Schenker understood it, the theoretical undertaking that reaches its apex in his mature graphic analyses is meant to provide exhaustive explanations of tonal content in music. That is to say that Schenker's chief theoretical aspiration is to account for, to answer "why" questions about, and to engender knowledge of all the pertinent facts concerning, a piece's tonal structure, down to the smallest sonic detail that counts for him as relevant (the individual note). To be sure, Schenker's writings are also replete with material that is not straightforwardly explanatory: figurative language, fanciful imagery, allegory, metaphors, poetic conceits, invective, humor, etc. What's more, reasonable people can probably agree that the most defensible reconstruction of Schenker's analytical practice is one that openly confesses its ineliminably and thoroughly subjective, prescriptive, and evaluative character (on which see Cook 1989), instead of one that obstinately insists on its status as an entirely and unqualifiedly data-gathering, fact-finding, reality-modeling, cover-law-invoking, predictive, or (in whatever other sense) scientific affair. But none of this alters the fact that Schenker conceived of his theoretical and analytical activities as contributing to, or as establishing, a *Wissenschaft* the task of

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14 In fact, Marx's Hegelianism is not just inauthentic, but explicitly anti-Hegelian: "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell" (1976, 103).

which was to uncover the objective rationale for why and how the sonic architecture of tonal music, as singularly instantiated in individual works, is as it is and must be as it is.<sup>15</sup>

That said, it is no mean feat to pin down exactly what kind of rationale Schenker sought. Sometimes, as at the beginning of *Harmony*, he seems to want a physical or acoustical principle *à la manière de* Rameau.<sup>16</sup> Sometimes, as in some parts of *Counterpoint*, he seems to view his project as a branch of empirical psychology—as what Blasius (1996, 34) characterizes as a “descriptive psychology” that is “fundamentally introspective”—perhaps owing to the influence that Ernst Mach’s writings exerted on him (Korsyn 1993, 109 *et passim*).<sup>17</sup> Sometimes, as in other parts of *Counterpoint*, he sounds like he is drawing on the transcendental faculty psychology of Kant’s first *Critique* (Korsyn 1988 *passim*). Sometimes he looks to be working within the groove of Kantian teleology, as set out in Kant’s third *Critique*, as he devises an investigatory heuristic for adequately apprehending the *sui generis* form of “life” that music exhibits (Parkhurst 2017b). Sometimes, as in some parts of *Free Composition*, it seems like he is trying to construct a *metaphysica specialis* of music, i.e. a purely rational deduction, proceeding from first principles, of the constitutive essence of purely musical entities.<sup>18</sup> And sometimes he seems to want to unite this essentialism with, or derive it from, a pronouncedly theistic *metaphysica*

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15 Evidence of Schenker’s obsession with musical necessity, and of his scientific attitude toward the investigation of it, can be found in virtually all his mature (post-1900) writings. Already in his earliest essays, Schenker is prepared to affirm that the true “nature of music” is revealed by, and only by, “musically natural events” (*musikalische Naturereignisse*) in which “the order of the tones, apart from the dictates of a human intellect, wills itself to be thus rather than any other way [*sich selbst nun einmal so und nicht anders wollte*]” (Schenker 1990, 342). In one of his first major music-analytical contributions, his monograph on Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, Schenker characterizes music analysis as an activity aimed at unearthing obscure or non-obvious musical necessities: “The analysis of the content gave me the desired opportunity to reveal those necessities of tonality, which have remained hidden until now, that gave rise to exactly this content and none other” (1912, vi / 1992, 4). The *wissenschaftlichkeit* of Schenker’s approach to necessity is summed up, with quaint fervor, by one of Schenker’s lesser-known proponents, the pianist and composer Israel Citkowitz: “[Schenker’s] position consists in the belief that the configuration of harmonies, melodies, phrases, etc. that go to make up a musical form can neither be regarded as a series of adventitious or arbitrary events, nor strung on the thread of some preconceived schema. These events must obey their own laws; and to bring these laws to light is the task of the theorist . . . The fact that there were no grounds in previous theory for such a belief, the fact that the motive power of his tremendous activity was solely in his deeply-rooted and inexpugnable belief that all the detailed occurrences in a master-work could be related organically, does not in any way impair the objective validity of his conclusions. In just that same way a faith in the order of nature made possible the growth of science” (Citkowitz 1985, 20).

16 Cook (2002) speaks of “Schenker’s simplification of Rameau’s generative approach” (87) and of his “reinterpretation, [at the beginning of the] *Harmonielehre*, of Rameau’s derivation of musical art from nature . . . based on precisely Helmholtz’s distinction of ‘means’ [i.e. the overtone series] from what he elsewhere refers to as ‘goals’” i.e. aesthetic objectives or purposes (89).

17 Schenker’s original title for *Counterpoint* was *The Psychology of Counterpoint* (1906, vii / 1954, xxvi). As Larson 1994 (37) notes, it is not the case that “[Schenker’s] desire to explain music psychologically is something that Schenker associated only with counterpoint. On the contrary, it seems to be a general concern of his. One earlier example appears in *Harmony*, where Part II begins with a section entitled ‘On the Psychology of Contents and of Step Progression.’”

18 Schenker (1956, 18 / 1979, xxiii) suggests that the necessity of linear progressions, the basic triad, and foreground, middleground, and background can be deduced from conceptual principles. Moreover, “philosophers and aestheticians will be able to establish a general theory of music as an art only after they have absorbed [these] concepts. Ultimately it will be possible to set forth the highest principle which is common to all arts: the principle of inner tension and its corresponding outward fulfillment, a principle which manifests itself differently in different material” (1956, 19 / 1979, xxiv).

*generalis* or universal ontology, i.e. an account of the nature and ground being as such, as in other, wackier parts of *Free Composition*.<sup>19</sup> It is not altogether clear which of these represents Schenker's most pressing, ultimate, or all-things-considered theoretical concern, or if only one of them does. But it is tolerably clear that he sought to lay bare the sovereign truths of musical structure, to discover the truth-makers of these truths,<sup>20</sup> and to thereby make possible robust explanations of the form and content of canonical pieces of the common-practice repertory.

Schenker's conception of how explanation is to be carried out when the *explanandum* in question is an individual musical "organism"—a masterwork—is anchored in the Enlightenment-era idea that a scientific explanation just is a specification of how and why one object or event is made necessary by another object or event in accordance with a law.<sup>21</sup> Robert Brandom clarifies that

[u]nderstanding and explanation are coordinate concepts. Explanation is a kind of saying: making claims that render something intelligible. It is a way of engendering understanding by essentially discursive means. There are . . . different operative conceptions of what counts as doing it—that is, of what one needs to do to have done it . . . For the original [eighteenth-century] Enlightenment, explaining a phenomenon (occurrence, state of affairs, process) is showing why what actually happened had to happen that way, why what is actual is (at least conditionally) necessary. (Brandom 2004, 2)<sup>22</sup>

Belatedly keeping faith with this eighteenth-century model of necessitarian explanation, Schenker cleaves to the principle that musical explanations of works and their constituent parts, if they are to count as both musical and as an explanation,<sup>23</sup> (1) must reveal how certain "purely musical" objects or events—sonic entities whose features can be fully and adequately specified using a vocabulary that possesses no nonmusical terms<sup>24</sup>—necessarily exist or happen, and also (2) must reveal how these

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19 "All that is organic, every relatedness belongs to God and remains His gift, even when man creates the work and perceives that it is organic. The whole of foreground, which men call chaos, God derives from His cosmos, the background. The eternal harmony of His eternal Being is grounded in this relationship" (1956, 18 / 1979, xxiii). For an account of Schenker's theism see Arndt 2017.

20 A truth-maker is that (situation or state of affairs) in virtue of which a truth-bearer (such as a proposition) bears truth. See MacBride 2018.

21 On "the importance of natural law and necessity" in Schenker's monographs see Morgan 2014 (100 ff.). On "Schenker's praise of his own scientific law-like approach" see Alpern 2013 (23).

22 As Brandom explains, the successor to necessitarian explanation is statistical explanation: "[T]he nineteenth century [by contrast] was 'the statistical century,' which saw the advent of new forms of explanation in natural and social sciences. In place of deducing what happens from exceptionless laws, it puts a form of intelligibility that consists in showing what made the events probable. Accounts in terms both of natural selection and of statistical likelihood show how observed order can arise, contingently, but explicably, out of chaos—as the cumulative diachronic and synchronic result respectively of individual random occurrences" (2004, 2).

23 For a perspicacious criticism of Schenker's necessitarianism see Dubiel 1990.

24 I do not mean to suggest that Schenker actually operates at this level of what W. V. O. Quine (1953) calls "semantic ascent," i.e. the level at which one talks not about aspects of the world itself (such as music) but instead about a particular vocabulary (such as one that possesses no nonmusical terms). I do mean to suggest that Schenker's theory can be aptly characterized by us

objects or events necessarily exhibit certain features, given the presence, properties, and activities of certain other purely musical existents.<sup>25</sup> For example, it is for Schenker a matter of necessity that resolutions follow dissonant suspensions, and that they be stepwise and descending (1910, 376 / 1987a, 291). Schenker's belief in what we can call the *conditional necessity of purely musical events*—a view that is unambivalently manifested in all of Schenker's writings from around 1900 and onward<sup>26</sup>—is the belief that some purely musical events have to take place, and have to be as they are, provided that other purely musical events do take place and are as they are.<sup>27</sup>

On top of this, Schenker thinks that every component part of a masterwork possesses conditional necessity, in that everything in a piece is rendered necessary by something else in it. More precisely, he is persuaded that all articulated parts of a musical work function within, and so as to jointly institute and constitute, an organic totality. In the Schenkerian *Musikanschauung*, a masterwork is an interdependent economy of sounds within which reciprocally determinative, mutually conditioning organic “moments” interact (both cooperatively and also conflictually or contradictorily) in such a way that they bring about the actualization of the piece's intrinsic (inlying, inherent, and essential) concept or goal, through a temporal process of growth, change, evolution, self-cancellation, self-transcendence, and self-completion.<sup>28</sup> Now, if that's not an idea that sounds Hegelian, advocates of a Hegelian reading of

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his readers from the point of view of this level of semantic ascent.

25 An anonymous reviewer of this essay correctly observes that “there is an important distinction . . . between more speculative theories, as in the case of Schenker's musical organicism (and its metaphors to nature) and conditional necessity, and theories developed from compositional practice regarding musical elements, such as harmony, counterpoint, tonality, and so forth.” My own view, which I defend in Parkhurst 2017b, is that Schenker's “speculative theories” are distinct but not separable from his theories of harmony, counterpoint, etc. The doctrine of the all-inclusive necessity of musically organic parts is a methodological postulate that Schenker's analytical commentaries and graphic analyses are motivated by, conform to, and (to the extent that the analyses are successful and compelling) serve to validate. The reviewer goes on to note that “one could argue that whatever aesthetic and philosophical ideas underlie Schenker's interpretive practice and the development of his analytical apparatus, they are occurring in dialogue with previous conceptions of harmonic and contrapuntal theory, and previous analytical traditions.” My contention that Schenker's analyses methodologically comply with and practically implement certain philosophically-derived principles and maxims is in no way meant to challenge the idea that Schenker's analytical tools derive historically from inherited Western European music-theoretical models (e.g. *Stufentheorie*, species counterpoint, figured bass, and analytical reduction), as described in Morgan 1978, Wason 1984, and Drabkin 2002.

26 As William Pastille (1984) and others have pointed out, Schenker's “Spirit of Musical Technique” essay from 1895 appears to repudiate, or at least complicate and problematize, the “necessitarianism” (Parkhurst 2017b) that Schenker later embraces.

27 Schenker states this position most clearly in *Counterpoint*, where he argues that a work of music can be conceived of as an integrally unified “world of causalities” (1922, 7 / 1987b, 6), specifically a world of “purely musical causality”—elsewhere Schenker calls this a “*Tonwelt*” (1906, 6 / 1954, 6)—that is thoroughly suffused with “strong and elevated necessities...that are specific to music alone...[in virtue of which] music possesses . . . logic” (1910, 376 / 1987a, 291).

28 *Free Composition* contains a clear formulation of Schenker's conception of musical part-whole interdependence: “Every diminution must be defined by its determinate membership within the whole, membership which is rendered organically authentic and precisely verifiable through the dictates of voice-leading. In each diminution, even one of the lowest order, the whole lives and moves; not even the most minuscule part exists apart from the whole. The chief difficulty, not only in fashioning the diminution out of the background and middleground, but also in reconstructively tracing the diminution back to its relation to the middleground and background has to do with the necessary relation of the part to the whole” (Schenker 1956, 153 / 1979, 98). A succinct description of the mutual conditioning of musical part by musical part appears in one of Schenker's *Tonwille*

Schenker might justifiably say, nothing is. For, notoriously, Hegel's signature philosophical move—the ratiocinative manner of proceeding referred to by “dialectics”—involves tracking and cataloging the ways in which higher-level unities (of both thought and being) emerge from the interplay, give-and-take, antagonism, and enmeshment of lower-level disunities (or counterparts, non-identities, opposites, etc.). In this light, one can see the sense it makes, at least *prima facie*, for Michael Cherlin to claim that Schenker is a practitioner of “Hegelian dialectics” inasmuch as Schenker brings “teleological organicism” (Cherlin 1988, 118) to bear on the study of musical works. Schenker thinks he can show how particular musical matters of fact, seemingly contingent configurations of notes, reveal themselves—often retrospectively, from the perspective of an attained tonal-structural *telos*—to be essential to the working-out of a piece's organic destiny.<sup>29</sup>

### WHAT HEGEL WAS UP TO

But this appearance of Hegelianism is defeasible. We should bear in mind that Hegel's position is *not* that every last aspect of mind and world behaves and develops in an organic, teleonomic manner. In fact, he explicitly denies this when, in his *Logic*,<sup>30</sup> he differentiates between *mechanism*, *chemism*, and *teleology*—the first two of which are non-organicist forms of apprehension—as distinct modes of empirical judgment each of which is uniquely suited to exploring and explaining a different dimension or department of what is real. Hegel does not think that every object of experience whatsoever (such as a musical work) should be judged as though it manifested the teleological functioning of a living creature.<sup>31</sup> Very differently, he adheres to a general regulative premise whereby philosophical consciousness is enjoined to view the whole interrelated ensemble of possible investigatory modes and manners of conceiving of the world, and to view the natural and social phenomena to which these thought-forms pertain, as belonging to a totality that has the structure of a systematic whole (the Absolute, as known by Absolute Knowing). This totality, he thinks, unfolds dialectically across the history of nature and humanity. But just as not every part of a living thing is itself a living thing (though some parts, such as cells, are), not every part of the progressively self-realizing world-whole is itself a teleological structure (though some parts, such as the state and civil society, are<sup>32</sup>). In short: Hegel is not some pan-organicist

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pamphlets: “In breadth, direction, and internal motion, in repetition of subdivisions and key and so on, all the parts of the line mutually condition one another, with the power and blessing of organic life coursing through every vein. Motive and diminution, as offshoots of the line, color the *Urlinie* segments, individual scale steps, and modulations, and relate the parts to one another so the whole is bound together all the more securely” (Schenker 1921–24, 2:17 / 2004–5, 1:64).

29 It goes without saying that there are as many interpretations of Schenker's organicism as there are interpreters of Schenker, not all of which are wholly consonant with the précis of it that I give here. References to all of these interpretations, and a more fleshed-out version of my own take on Schenkerian organicism, may be found in Parkhurst 2017b (71 *et passim*).

30 §194–§212 of the so-called “Lesser” or “Encyclopedia” logic (Hegel 1975, 260–74).

31 “What Hegel shows in his logic is that being necessarily entails a whole range of different ways of being: being something, being finite, being causal, being mechanical, being alive, and so on. Not every object in the universe will exhibit each way of being, since not every object is, for example, *alive*; but every object will incorporate some of the ways of being discussed in each of the three parts of Hegel's logic: the logics of ‘being,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘concept’” (Houlgate 2008, 133–34).

32 “The social order . . . must itself be a self-determining entity, that is: a living, self-reproducing system that has the structure of what Hegel calls ‘the Concept’” (Neuhouser 2008, 220).

who thinks that every single thing is, or deserves to be looked at as though it were, alive.

Hegel's philosophical wager, rather, is that if thought is allowed to dialectically develop itself, through the reflection of consciousness upon consciousness, a fundamentally social and historical process of cognitive maturation will be set in motion. This voyage of *Bildung* commences with thought's most vacuous, presuppositionless starting point, Pure Being, and is consummated in the maximally rich and contentful self-reflexivity of speculative (i.e. Hegelian) philosophy itself, with its culminating enshrinement of freedom and self-knowledge as the fitting ends of humanity. On the basis of the conceptual deliverances of this pilgrimage of *Geist*, Hegel is convinced, it is possible to retrospectively perceive the orderliness of the major precincts of reality. The world (nature and society) and thought's institutional forms of confrontation with the world (science, history, ethics, aesthetics, religion, philosophy) together form a self-supporting, self-directing system that both constitutes, and—through religion, art, and philosophy—provides an intelligible account and explanation of, the sum and substance of all that is (*das Ganze*).

Without question, this bold (maybe insane) claim strains both credulity and intelligibility. But it is important for us to keep track of what, for all its audaciousness, it does *not* presuppose: as far as Hegel can see, there is no guarantee, and in fact no expectation at all, that the features of mind and world that get ordered and systematized by philosophical reflection will in every case individually and internally exhibit the purposive organicism characteristic of, at an “empirical” level, plants and animals and, at a “metaphysical” level, the system-totality of reality as a self-enclosed whole. I'll belabour the point by making it once again: it is not the least bit Hegelian to insist on examining each and every isolable phenomenon through an organicist lens, if what this means is committing oneself to taking and treating every empirically encounterable thing (including works of music) as a necessary object all of whose parts stand in relations of necessity to one another.<sup>33</sup> What *is* Hegelian is to sort out the manifold ways in which things can be looked at, or cognized, or conceptually subsumed, and to order these manners of knowing, and their correspondent intentional objects, into a progressively developing, hierarchical, and to that extent organism-like system.

It is therefore a misprision to think that anyone who is a teleological organicist with respect to some arena of experience is ipso facto a Hegelian. Neither Schenker nor anyone else is being especially Hegelian by viewing musical notes as implicated in a “the process of becoming”—to use Janet Schmalfeldt's (2011) phrase—that is characteristic of things that live.<sup>34</sup> In point of fact, in tirelessly imputing necessity

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33 Schenker uses a profession of his belief in global organicism or universal necessity as an opportunity to express some of his famously noxious sexist, classist, and elitist sentiments: “Today, even the simplest things are not understood: everything in the world has its place and is necessary, to be sure, but it does not follow from this necessity that everything is of equal value. Despite their mutual dependency—in terms of necessity of existence, they remain equal!—the man ranks above the woman, the producer is superior to the merchant or the laborer, the head prevails over the food, the coachman is more than the wheel of the wagon he steers, the genius means more than the people who represent merely the soil from which he springs” (Schenker 1910, xi / 1987a, xix).

34 Pastille (1995, 3) distinguishes dialectics from organicism and maintains that Schenker's early dialectical phase was followed by a mature organicist phase: “Hegel's dialectical development proceeds according to the dictates of Reason in the



to individual tonal events, and in attempting to provide organicist justifications for this way of talking, Schenker stakes out a path that is, if not directly at odds with Hegel's, at least orthogonal to it. One way in which this is so is that Hegel holds that philosophical inquiry always eventually runs up against a layer of contingency that is refractory to explanation. Hegel warns philosophers against trying to force recalcitrant contingencies into the procrustean bed of rational systematization:<sup>35</sup>

Philosophy has to start from the Notion, and even if it does not assert much, we must be content with this. The Philosophy of Nature is in error when it wants to account for every phenomenon; this is what happens in the finite sciences, which try to trace everything back to general conceptions, the hypotheses. In these sciences, the sole verification of the hypothesis lies in the empirical element and consequently everything must be explained. But what is known through the Notion (by philosophy) is clear by itself and stands firm; and philosophy need not feel any embarrassment about this, even if all phenomena are not explained . . . (Hegel 1970, 33)

To put the point as starkly as possible: Things like which note belongs where in a Classical-era instrumental sonata, which Schenker feels an overpowering need to treat as a matter of strict necessity, are the exact sorts of things that Hegel sees as lying outside the purview of his preferred method of philosophical stock-taking. Hegel's views on this topic are thrown into bold relief by polemical remarks he directed at the philosopher Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–1842), Kant's successor as chair of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg.<sup>36</sup> Krug, in a hostile review article attacking “the newest idealism” of the day, challenged idealist philosophers to “deduce” his quill pen. The gist of his

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realm of Ideas—that is, according to logical, causal chains of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Organic growth is compatible with dialectical development—it may in fact be the archetypal metaphor for dialectical development in the material world—but Hegel's dialectic is the governing rational movement that supports everything that happens in all realms of being, and is therefore different from, and more inclusive than, organic growth . . . Schenker's early ideas on music history, as expressed in ‘The Spirit of Musical Technique,’ seem to tend toward dialectical idealism rather than toward organicist idealism . . . The title identifies the developing ideal entity in Schenker's scheme of things: ‘musical technique’ . . . The history of music, for Schenker at that time, was the dialectical development of a purely rhetorical practice: the skill of feigning wholeness in music.” While I do not think that Schenker's early views on music history exemplify “dialectical idealism” in any deeply Hegelian sense, and while I do not know what is meant by “logical, causal chains of thesis-antithesis-synthesis” (the word “causal” will seem especially puzzling to those acquainted with Hegel's argumentative style), I agree that Schenker's organicist phase, and the organicism of his analytical technique, should not be automatically equated with Hegel's dialectics.

35 The question of whether or in what sense Hegel's logic is a logic of necessity is much too large to adequately address here. It is not clear that Hegel thinks that the categorical scheme he formulates in his *Logic* is transcendently necessary in the sense of being a condition for the possibility of any coherent experience whatsoever, which was what Kant thought about the categories of the first *Critique*. Nor is it clear that Hegel thinks that all later stages of the dialectic are strict logical entailments of earlier stages. In my view, Hegel's dialectic is meant to demonstrate the powerful—and perhaps in certain special cases absolutely irresistible—dispositions that rational creatures have to engage in certain kinds of concept-applying activities. It is also meant to demonstrate the tendencies these conceptual activities have to adapt themselves (to their own internal requirements and standards, and to their external environmental context) and to evolve in certain directions. At the limits of the (self-)development of concept-using activity, Hegel thinks, the world is fully knowable by the categories thought finds itself in possession of. Hegel appears to reject skepticism about whether these categories allow us to grasp the world as it truly is—“in itself” (*an sich*), as Kant would say—and seems to take it for granted, or to regard it as an obvious inference to the obviously best explanation, that the categorical forms of thought are just identical to or commensurate with the objective, inherent forms of things in the world.

36 See Henrich 1959 for a classic account of the Hegel-Krug debate.



provocation is that idealism—Krug’s target was Schelling—has ridiculously immodest pretensions of *a priori* omniscience. Krug insinuates that idealists wrongly think it possible, and perversely think it desirable, to give a derivation of all empirical facts using dialectical logic alone. In Krug’s caricature, idealism aspires to show the necessity of all observables, even things as minute as quill pens, and to do so prior to any act of observation.

In his *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel dispenses with the quill pen objection summarily:

The infinite wealth and variety of forms and, what is most irrational, the contingency which enters into the external arrangement of natural things . . . sets limits to philosophy and it is quite improper to expect the Notion to comprehend—or as it is said, construe or deduce—these contingent products of nature. It is even imagined that the more trivial and isolated the object, the easier is the task of deducing it. Undoubtedly, traces of determination by the Notion are to be found even in the most particularized object, although these traces do not exhaust its nature . . . One must, however, be careful to avoid taking such trace of the Notion for the total determination of the object . . . (Hegel 1970, 23)<sup>37</sup>

“Traces of determination by the Notion” are present in every object because “the Notion” (the fully-developed, interrelated network of categorial concepts) contains such general determinations as *being an object that has features* and *being an entity that is subject to and that also possesses causal powers*. Compared to these universalistic determinations, *being a quill pen* is “contingent”: not construable or deducible by purely logical means, but also not unreal, or outside the bounds of scientific investigation. As Paul Redding interprets it, Hegel’s response to Krug illustrates the view that

[r]ather than ‘deducing’ the entire content of empirical reality, philosophy of nature takes as its subject matter the results of the natural sciences and tries to find within these results the sorts of categorial structures deduced in the logic. Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s intuition-concept dichotomy was not meant to imply that there is no place for the contingencies of the actual world that Kant had tied to the contribution of intuition. (Redding 2015, 59–60)

Thus, while philosophy does attempt to discern the conceptuality (rationality, systematic orderliness, formal organization, logical articulation) of empirical appearances (and of ways of grasping those appearances in thought and perception) in accordance with the categories antecedently elaborated by dialectical logic, the conceptual structures dialectical logic constructively generates do not and cannot exhaust all of what there is to conceptualize about the Real (*das Reale*):

The contingency which enters into the external arrangement of natural things . . . sets limits to

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37 Hegel adds a footnote that mentions Krug by name: “It was in this—and other respects too—quite naive sense that Herr Krug once challenged the Philosophy of Nature to perform the feat of deducing only his pen. One could perhaps give him hope that his pen would have the glory of being deduced, if ever philosophy should advance so far and have such a clear insight into every great theme in heaven and on earth, past and present, that there was nothing more important to comprehend” (Hegel 1970, 23). The last sentence of the quotation seems to imply that the pen *is* in principle (if not in actual philosophical practice) deducible, but since this would directly contradict Hegel’s preceding assertion about the limits of philosophy, the comment should be read as pure sarcasm.

philosophy and it is quite improper to expect the Notion to comprehend—or as it is said, construe or deduce—these contingent products of Nature . . . Undoubtedly, traces of determination by the Notion are to be found even in the most particularized object, although these traces do not exhaust its nature . . . One must, however, be careful to avoid taking such trace of Notion for the total determination of the object. (Hegel 1970, 23)

To be sure, Hegel is far from self-effacing in his estimation of the scope and power of his dialectic. He thinks he can demonstrate *a priori* that there is a necessary or rationally elucidatable niche in the world for, e.g., a constitutional state that enforces the norms of private property with the rule of law, as he argues in his *Philosophy of Right*. But that quill pens would be used to write those laws is a contingency that lies below the threshold of philosophy’s rather more Olympian sphere of preoccupations. Similarly, Hegel is prepared to affirm that it is rationally foreordained, given the intrinsic directionality and trajectory of the human social endeavor—“the march of Reason through History” (Hegel 1956, 17)—that at a certain historical juncture a “Romantic,” expressive art of sound—the music of the common-practice era, more or less—would emerge into heightened aesthetic prominence and cultural salience. But Hegel’s reply to Krug indicates that he would think it frivolous to declare that the forward movement of Spirit also demands that the Schenkerian *Uralinie* should always go down instead of up, or that the major scale should have seven notes rather than eight, or that the *Eroica* symphony should be in E-flat rather than D. “[Hegel’s] categorial claim only claims that there is a rational aspect or ‘kernel’ in reality, not that the entirety of the real is rational” (Chaffin 1994, 145). Therefore philosophy, as he conceives of it, has neither the desire nor the capacity to provide an account of the necessity of reality that goes “all the way down,” even if it does possess the resources, and does make it its goal, to provide an account of the structure, function, and historical development of the special sciences, which *do* attempt to reach the asymptotic limits of empirical inquiry into particulars. Stephen Houlgate makes the quip that “in Hegel’s day, apparently, over sixty species of parrot were known; it is certainly not the task of philosophy, however, to explain why this should be the case” (Houlgate 2011, 10). This is not to say there is no reason at all for why there are as many species of parrot as there are; biology surely owes us a *biological* explanation of this fact. But while philosophy may have an opinion to register about why there should be such a thing as biological inquiry as such, and about why there should be something out there in reality for biological inquiry to be about in the first place, there is nothing of a distinctively philosophical nature to add to a zoological disquisition on psittacine diversity.

### IS SCHENKER A HEGELIAN?

We do not need to hazard any guesses about whether Hegel thinks these arguments concerning contingency apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to artworks. In his *Logic*, Hegel explicitly draws a connection between the empirical investigation of the contingencies of nature and the empirical investigation of the contingencies of artworks, and distinguishes both of these tasks from the task of philosophy:

Although contingency, as it has thus been shown, is only one aspect in the whole of actuality, and therefore not to be mistaken for actuality itself, it has no less than the rest of the forms of the idea its due office in the world of objects. This is, in the first place, seen in Nature. On the surface of Nature, so to speak, Chance ranges unchecked, and that contingency must simply be

recognised, without the pretension sometimes erroneously ascribed to philosophy, of seeking to find in it a could-only-be-so-and-not-otherwise. Nor is contingency less visible in the world of Mind. The will, as we have already remarked, includes contingency under the shape of option or free-choice, but only as a vanishing and abrogated element. In respect of Mind and its works, just as in the case of Nature, we must guard against being so far misled by a well-meant endeavour after rational knowledge, as to try to exhibit the necessity of phenomena which are marked by a decided contingency, or, as the phrase is, to construe them *a priori*. Thus in language (although it be, as it were, the body of thought) Chance still unquestionably plays a decided part; *and the same is true of the creations of law, of art, &c.* (Hegel 1892, 265)

To all of the above, it may be replied that Schenker is not guilty of attempting to “exhibit the necessity of phenomena which are marked by a decided contingency” in the sense that he tries to give an *a priori* rational deduction of how individual works of music are, and must be, configured, down to the very last note. Instead, in good scientific fashion, and without any real speculative-philosophical pretensions, he strives to reach the asymptotic limits of empirical inquiry into the tonal organization of music by showing how it conforms to perfectly worldly and empirical—rather than metaphysical, transcendental, or categorical—laws. I think this might be the right reply. But if it is, the response would be: what’s so Hegelian about that? Hegel does not think that there is some special “dialectical” way of doing “finite science” that he figured out.<sup>38</sup> Quite to the contrary, he thinks that empirical science must be “worked out on its own account”:

[S]o that the knowledge of the universe, of nature, may be cultivated—for this, the knowledge of the particular is necessary. This particularity must be worked out on its own account; we must become acquainted with the empirical nature, both with the physical and with the human... Empiricism is not merely an observing, hearing, feeling, etc., a perception of the individual; for it really sets to work to find the species, the universal, to discover laws... But in order that this science may come into existence, we must have the progression from the individual and particular to the universal—an activity which is a reaction on the given material of empiricism in order to bring about its reconstruction. The demand of *a priori* knowledge, which seems to imply that the Idea should construct from itself, is thus a reconstruction only. (Hegel 1896, 175–76)

By Hegel’s own lights, then, there is no such thing as Hegelian biology or Hegelian chemistry, even if the findings of biology and chemistry do furnish essential material for a retrospective philosophical systematization of the finite sciences and their attainments. By parity of reasoning, there can be no such thing as Hegelian musical analysis in the sense of a Hegel-ordained method of empirical investigation into the behavior, structure, or lawful disposition of musical works. Interpreters of Schenker are consequently faced with a dilemma. If they cast Schenker as a speculative philosopher of music then they must add the qualification that his philosophical efforts are decidedly un-Hegelian, or defectively Hegelian, for Schenker would be trying to do something with philosophy that Hegel thinks simply

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38 The un-Hegelian view that all of nature and science operates dialectically is propounded by Friedrich Engels in his *Dialectics of Nature*.

cannot be done, which is to give a “necessitarian” dialectical account of musical particularity and contingency. Or they could try saying what Hegel himself would probably say about Schenker (and thereby give a “Hegelian interpretation” of Schenker in a different sense than the usual one), which is that Schenker is occupied with “working out the empirical sciences on their own account” in the area of musical stylistics, just like the biologist is in the area of organic life. But then they must also say that Schenker’s activities do not belong to speculative philosophy proper—even if such activities might later be properly systematized by a properly speculative philosophy (which is one way to go about being a dialectician about music)—and are thus not Hegelian in any deep or interesting sense, even if the superficial trappings of Hegel’s manner of expression are “coquetted” with in Schenker’s presentation of his empirical findings.

### CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON HAUPTMANN

This is an opportune place to briefly mention the work of Moritz Hauptmann (1792–1868), the “Hegelian music theorist” (Bent 1994, 56), so as to draw a contrast with Schenker and sum up. In his main treatise, *The Nature of Harmony and Meter*, Hauptmann uses dialectical logic to derive a familiar system of musical categories: tones, intervals, chords, keys, metric schemes, and the like. Hauptmann says that his intention in doing this is not to expound a novel form of musical analysis, but instead to systematize a time-honored, self-evidently warranted body of musical thought-determinations.<sup>39</sup>

[Musicians] rarely find time, and have little inclination, to reflect upon principles for the truth of which it seems to them that instinctive feeling is a sufficient assurance. Occasionally, however, a desire is manifested for information as to the ground of certain inevitable axioms; and we are asked to assign a reason for rules whose validity is unquestioned, but which for the most part remain without demonstration. To such desire the present treatise is designed as the appropriate response. (Hauptmann 1888, v)

Note that in this passage Hauptmann uses “truth” in its Hegelian acceptation, which does not signify, as it usually does in analytic philosophy, a correspondence between fact and assertion. Instead it signifies a correspondence between outer manifestation (i.e. a verbally communicable musical concept or “rule,” and the musical sounds conformant thereto) and inner principle (i.e. the rule’s issuance from the self-propelled thought-motions of dialectical rationality).<sup>40</sup> “Truth,” in the mouth of a Hegelian, is very close in meaning to “actuality” (*Wirklichkeit*), which is the condition approached by human institutions and

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39 Hegel (1970, 11) speaks of his use of logic to chart out the “full range (*Umfang*) of universal determinations of thought (*Denkbestimmungen*); as it were, the diamond net in which we bring everything (*allen Stoff*) and thus first make it intelligible.” Hauptmann is more inclined to talk about “rules” (*Regeln*) and “principles” or “laws” (*Gesetzen*), but his goal is the same as Hegel’s: to set out the logical foundation of the modes of thinking by which music is first rendered intelligible.

40 “We must however in the first place understand clearly what we mean by Truth. In common life truth means the agreement of an object with our conception of it. We thus pre-suppose an object to which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself. This meaning is quite different from the one given above. At the same time the deeper and philosophical meaning of truth can be partially traced even in the ordinary usage of language. Thus we speak of a true friend; by which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion of friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of Art” (Hegel 1892, 51–52).

customs as they

. . . conform more faithfully to the rational principles already implicit in . . . existent practices . . . Actuality, as Hegel conceives it, is not to be identified with whatever exists [*Realität*]; it is, instead, the unity of existing reality [*Existenz*] and its rational essence. (Neuhouser 2008, 228)

Hauptmann uses “actuality” this way throughout the *Nature of Harmony and Meter*. For example:

The outer shape of every harmonic combination can only proceed from inner determinations; and if a chord is to be theoretically grasped, it must never be regarded as a mere aggregate of tones . . . but in every case only as a moment in the unfolding of concepts of organic actuality. (32, translation mine)

By “concepts of organic actuality” (*Begriffe organische Wirklichkeit*), Hauptman does not mean that notes themselves are formed (or form themselves) into an organic tonal entity whose teleological unity is open to music-analytical examination. Instead, Hauptmann means that a corpus of interconnected music-ontological concepts assumes the form of an organic, self-developing system, and that music approximates to “actuality” the more pervasively it instantiates, and gains intelligibility the more it is interpretable in terms of, the classifications (“moments”) contained within this organic conceptual system.<sup>41</sup>

In W. E. Heathcote’s excellent introduction to his less-than-excellent translation of *The Nature of Harmony and Meter*, he underscores the point that Hauptmann’s goal is to codify a set of basic categories whose validity for thought and hearing is, and should be, taken for granted:

The final result [of the historical development of musical style] was a body of rules, consistent indeed and not arbitrary, inasmuch as they formed in the aggregate a system, but still only gathered from experiences and not illuminated or governed by any philosophic or scientific explanation.<sup>42</sup> Various attempts have been made to supply such an explanation; but the doctrine of harmony, though empirical, is simple, and the explanations mostly added intricacy without helping practice . . . [Hauptmann’s] treatise is written in the Hegelian philosophy. It may be compared to the *Logic* of Hegel, which it resembles in method and in plan. In both works a large body of received rules and principles, recognized as forming a system, but inadequately explained hitherto, are established upon a philosophical basis and shown to depend on a law. Both start from a simple beginning, from which the more complicated conceptions are shown

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41 A rough-and-ready, and no doubt overly charitable, reconstruction of the Hegelian reasoning that Hauptmann uses to lay out this system of concepts at the opening of *The Nature of Harmony and Meter* might go like this: (1) the hearing of a single, pure musical tone “is sublated” (*ist aufgehoben*) into the hearing of musical intervals, since individual determinate tones are rendered individual and determinate, and thus take on their particular meaning, only through concrete relations with other individual determinate tones; (2) intervallic hearing is sublated into triadic hearing, since intervals and their constituent tones necessarily order themselves into hierarchies of stability and combinability; (3) triadic hearing sublates into scalar hearing, since diatonic collections are the frame of reference within which individual triads assume their individual identities; and (4) scalar hearing sublates into the hearing of key relationships, since diatonic collections, too, are defined by the other collections which they wholly or partly exclude and with which they are to differing degrees non-identical.

42 Heathcote here uses “science” to mean “Hegelian philosophy.” As we have seen, Hegel typically uses the qualified term “finite science” to mean the sorts of things we now mean by “science” (like chemistry, etc.).

branching out. This development . . . is seen to follow a uniform law, by the operation of which the process of development is separated into stages; and each stage is marked by the accomplishment or completion of some particular notion, which then appears as including within it all previous notions completed in previous stages.” (Hauptmann 1888, xvi–xvii)

There is confusion in the secondary literature on this point. Contrary to what some of his American commentators have hoped, Hauptmann did not dream up a ground-breaking way to analytically conceive of pieces of music.<sup>43</sup> Nor does Hauptmann portray himself as having any unprecedented or surprising revelations to make about what can be said to musically exist (along the lines of, e.g., Schenker’s positing of the *Ursatz*). Instead, Hauptmann accepts the conventional interpretive categories bequeathed to him by tradition, accepts the boundaries of the domain of discourse and space of description defined by this traditional scheme, and accepts its conventional wisdom about how tonal music works. His sole claim to our attention, he thinks, is that he can show that the transmitted, accustomed *Musikanschauung* can be unfurled in a radically non-dogmatic way, through a sequence of dialectical movements that sets out from the most basic and irreducible forms of thinking-in-music.

This *modus operandi* is quite Hegelian, and quite authentically so, and is therefore, as is implied by what I have contended here, quite un-Schenkerian. Regrettably, unlike both Schenker and Hegel, at least Schenker and Hegel at their best, Hauptmann offers up little in the way of genuine insight—musical, philosophical, or otherwise. Even if one were persuaded that Hauptmann’s is a sensible philosophical and music-theoretical project, it would be mulish to maintain that he pursued it with any great élan or success. Most of Hauptmann’s dialectical transitions, such as the almost incomprehensible progression from physical vibration to the phenomenology of intervallic hearing at the beginning of *The Nature of Harmony and Meter* (Hauptmann 1888, 2–5), strike one as either patently unmotivated, hopelessly turgid, or so elliptical as to seem lazy or hand-wavy—though, to be fair, this is sometimes the case with Hegel’s own categorial progressions. A tendentious and rather Wildean thing to say about these matters, by way of closing, is that whereas Hauptmann does a bad job of being a good Hegelian, Schenker does a good job of being a bad Hegelian.

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43 Lewin (1981) puzzlingly claims that “Moritz Hauptmann introduced to Western music theory the idea that the philosophical principles underlying metric structure are the same as those underlying the harmonic structure of tonality” (261) and that a passage of Johannes Brahms’s *Capriccio* in C, op. 76 “strongly exemplifies just this idea” (264). But if, as Heathcote says, Hauptmann’s Hegelian speculative derivation of musical rules is “non-empirical,” it makes little sense to say that a specific piece “exemplifies” anything about how the laws of harmony are dialectically derivable from the same principles as the laws of meter. Take a parallel case: Hegel dialectically derives the “rules” of chemism, mechanism, and teleology as rule-governed modes of scientific inquiry. And the human body has aspects that can be investigated by each of these three modes of inquiry. However, the fact that one thing (the human body) can be judged according to three different rules is not an “exemplification” of the shared dialectical derivability of those rules; the success we have in judging bodies chemically, mechanically, and teleologically shows that the rules have overlapping application, not that they have a common dialectical origin. Like Lewin, Harrison (1994) and Caplin (1984) both depict Hauptmann as, in certain respects at least, a theoretical or analytical innovator. But if Hauptmann is an innovator, he is an innovator in spite of himself.



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## The Tour-of-Keys Model and the Prolongational Structure in Sonata-Form Movements by Haydn and Mozart

NICHOLAS STOIA

In *Classical Form*, William Caplin describes the general deficiency of interpretations of sonata form that focus primarily on the “initial dramatic conflict of two keys,” or the tonal-polarity model. This characteristically Schenkerian view “says little about the tonal plan of the development,” because the various keys explored in that section are simply subsumed into a large-scale prolongation of the dominant (1998, 195–96). Example 1 shows more or less typical Schenkerian reductions of development sections of major-key sonata-form movements, borrowed from Allen Cadwallader and David Gagné (2007, 338).<sup>1</sup> In Examples 1(d) and (f), for instance, the prolonged dominant encompasses an apparent motion into the key of the submediant—signaled by the augmented sixth expanding to E—and in Example 1(e) it encompasses an apparent motion into the key of the flat submediant. “In all cases,” the authors observe, “V—the secondary key of the exposition—is prolonged across the double bar and serves as the harmonic foundation of the development” (339). Caplin proposes that we “complement our understanding of sonata form’s tonal organization” by recognizing the tour-of-keys model, which “sees the subordinate key of the exposition as the first of various keys to be explored throughout the entire movement” (1998, 195–96). In the development section, a sonata-form movement frequently explores one or more “development keys,” which are tonal regions—other than the home key or subordinate key—that are confirmed by a cadential function or by an arrival on the dominant (1998, 139–41, 254). Also common are “tonicized regions,” key areas that convey the potential for confirmation as development keys but fall short of achieving it through cadential confirmation or dominant arrival.<sup>2</sup>

The main goal of this article is to offer an alternative to one of the fundamental concepts of standard Schenkerian practice: namely, the primacy of a tonic-dominant polarity underpinning all levels of tonal structure. Though various Schenkerian techniques are applied in the analytical graphs that follow, the deep-level structures that frame my analyses do not involve the motions from tonic to dominant and back that Schenker and many of his followers regard as a vital feature of tonal works. Rather, the deep-level structures presented in my graphs rely heavily on the keys that play a pivotal role in a tour-of-keys model of tonal structure. Naturally, my appeal to keys likewise departs from Schenker and many

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1 Edward Laufer shows comparable “development section paradigms” (1991, 70–76, Figures i–iv, vii–b, and viii).

2 Caplin notes that a “vestige” of the tour-of-keys model “can also be found when the recapitulation emphasizes the subdominant” (1998, 196). In Caplin’s taxonomy, which I mostly follow here, an authentic cadence requires an authentic cadential progression running through the successive harmonic functions of tonic, pre-dominant, dominant, and tonic, with the last two harmonies in root position (253); a half cadence requires a half-cadential progression running through the successive harmonic functions of tonic, pre-dominant, and dominant, the last harmony in root position and without a dissonant seventh (255); and a dominant arrival is a “noncadential articulation of formal closure marked by the appearance of a dominant harmony near the end of a theme-like unit,” frequently found at the end of a development section (254). L. Poundie Burstein offers a critique of this taxonomy, notably the requirement for the absence of a seventh in a half cadence (2014, 210–15). In a departure from Caplin, I distinguish more sharply between progressions that have both a tonic and concluding dominant (what I call a half-cadential progression) and passages that have a concluding dominant but no preceding tonic (what I call a dominant arrival, but which Caplin calls an incomplete half-cadential progression [1998, 29]).

of his followers, who often downplay the importance of keys within a work's larger structure. Indeed, some might understandably question whether my analyses should be classified as Schenkerian at all. Nonetheless, I feel that the approach I propose here illuminates some vital aspects of sonata form that may otherwise be overlooked in standard Schenkerian analyses.

Example 1. Cadwallader and Gagné's development patterns for the major mode (2007, 338).

In pursuit of this idea of development sections that run through a tour of keys independent of dominant prolongation, I explore sonata-form movements by Franz Joseph Haydn and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart whose development sections are particularly resistant to a reading of large-scale dominant prolongation—all end on a development-key dominant rather than the home-key dominant, and then proceed directly to the home-key tonic in the recapitulation. In all of these movements, the “dominant-ness” of the final development-key dominant provides a satisfactory and persuasive dominant goal for the development section, and supplies the requisite compulsion to move toward the “tonic-ness” of the home key, even though the specific dominant and tonic belong to different keys. Example 2 lists the movements under consideration, with the concluding harmony of each development section.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> I include these particular movements primarily because, as a group, they demonstrate well what I hope to convey about the tour-of-keys model and prolongational structure within the limited space of an article; the overrepresentation of slow movements is coincidental, because many other fast movements exhibit similar attributes and might have been included but for limited space. Examples of other faster-tempo sonata-form movements whose development sections end on a development-key dominant include Haydn's String Quartet Op. 64 No. 6, i; Symphony No. 50, iv; Symphony No. 85, i; Symphony No. 103, iv;

Example 2. List of movements surveyed, with the concluding harmony of each development section.

Movement	Concluding harmony of development section
Haydn, String Quartet Op. 33 No. 1, iii	V/iii (VII#)
Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 283, ii	V/vi (III#)
Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 280, iii	V/vi (III#)
Haydn, Symphony No. 99, ii	V/vi (III#)
Mozart, String Quartet K. 590, ii	V/vi (III#)
Haydn, Symphony No. 54, ii	V/vi (III#)
Haydn, String Quartet Op. 54 No. 3, i	V/vi (III#)
Haydn, Piano Sonata No. 25, i	V/iii (VII#)

Another object of this study is to achieve—at least for the pieces under consideration—some sort of reciprocity and balance in the complimentary relationship between the tour-of-keys model and the Schenkerian approach to prolongational structure. Part of reaching this balance involves acknowledging the structural importance of cadential confirmation in a development key, the same way we recognize its significance in the home key and subordinate key (Caplin 1998, 97–99, 257), and reflecting this structural weight in the voice-leading graphs.<sup>4</sup> Also central to achieving this balance is to incorporate into the tour-of-keys model the concept, explored mostly in Schenkerian analysis, of a tonal area’s dominant (or even occasionally its pre-dominant) assuming syntactical and structural primacy over its tonic. Indeed, the dominant of a development key is often more structurally important than its tonic and plays a more important role in the tonal design—a factor that contributes to the characteristic generation of tonal instability in development sections. My application of the tour-of-keys model therefore involves much more than simply assuming that the tonics of those keys—some of which never appear—are the most significant harmonies in a tonal region. As Carl Schachter observes, the dominant of a key may have “a higher syntactic value than its tonic,” and “the elements of linear structure in music are pitches, not keys” (1999, 142).

and Symphony No. 104, iv, among others.

4 Some other Schenkerian studies also strongly consider formal punctuation when assigning structural weight in their voice-leading graphs, e.g. Murtomäki and Jackson (2018).



Other aims for this study include exploring the ways in which tonicized regions function in relation to development keys; and examining the ways in which motivic content that first appears in the exposition can play a crucial role in determining the tonal regions of the development section's tour of keys.

The following section of the article explains the limitation of the study to major-mode movements, describes the differences between development keys and tonicized regions, both of which figure prominently in my interpretation of the tour-of-keys model, and explains how the voice-leading graphs incorporate and emphasize the importance of cadential confirmation. The section after that explores both the tour-of-keys model and the prolongational structure in the development sections of eight sonata-form movements that demonstrate various tours of keys, and all of which, as mentioned, conclude on a development-key dominant. Finally, I briefly consider some of the implications this study may have for more typical development sections that close with a home-key dominant.

### MAJOR-MODE MOVEMENTS, DEVELOPMENT KEYS, AND TONICIZED REGIONS

This essay explores only major-key movements, for two reasons. One is that major-mode sonata-form movements more readily accord with the tonal-polarity model, because the exposition usually modulates to the dominant key that the development section—in this reading—then prolongs (Ex. 1). In a typical minor-key sonata-form movement, the exposition modulates to the mediant and the movement reaches the dominant key only in the course of the development section (Ex. 3), a design in which at least part of the development section moves toward the dominant instead of prolonging it.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, advancing the tour-of-keys model for major-key sonata-form movements means questioning the tonal-polarity model in the context where it is arguably most established.<sup>6</sup>

Example 3. Cadwallader and Gagné's development pattern (b) for the minor mode (2007, 339).

<sup>5</sup> Cadwallader and Gagné observe that “the motion III–IV–V is common in ...[minor-mode] sonata movements,” and that the “passing subdominant leads to the goal of V” (2007, 340).

<sup>6</sup> Caplin observes that “in most minor-mode movements, in which home and subordinate keys share the same basic scale, the sense of genuine tonal polarity is less palpable” than in major-mode movements (1998, 195).

Another, more practical reason for using exclusively major-key movements concerns the limitation of the study to movements whose development sections conclude on a development-key dominant and which then move directly back to the home-key tonic. Haydn and Mozart wrote a considerable number of major-key movements with such a design. Many scholars have noted that a common alternative to the home-key dominant for the conclusion of the development section is the dominant of the submediant vi, and, much less often but not without some frequency, the dominant of the mediant iii.<sup>7</sup> I indicate the former as V/vi or as III#, and the latter as V/iii or as VII#. Both of these harmonies work well as dominant goals that proceed by agreeable contrapuntal motion directly to the home-key tonic.

Like the home-key dominant, V/vi contains the home-key leading tone, a common tone with I (in this case  $\hat{3}$ ), and another note that (like the home-key leading tone) leads by step to a member of the tonic triad—here  $\hat{5}$ , which leads to  $\hat{5}$  in a motion that enharmonically resembles a  $\hat{b6}-\hat{5}$  descending resolution. Additionally, direct motion between major triads a major third apart, especially over a formal boundary, has an established historical and practical precedent dating back to at least the middle and late Baroque, notably demonstrated by the thoroughbass theorist Francesco Gasparini in his *L'Armonico Pratico al Cimbalo* [*The Practical Harmonist at the Keyboard*] of 1708 (Gasparini [1708] 1963, 39).<sup>8</sup> V/vi also has the potential to reestablish  $\hat{3}$  as the principal melodic tone, or *Kopftön*, before the onset of the recapitulation—often quite forcefully, because it is the root of the concluding dominant of the development section.

V/iii has no common tone with I, but it does contain the home-key leading tone, and the progression VII#–I is analogous to the familiar V–VI progression of a deceptive cadence in minor. Development sections that end on the dominant of the mediant (on V/iii) conclude with a harmony that supports a neighbor to the principal melodic tone; in both such examples discussed in this study, the neighbor is  $\hat{2}$ , which returns to the principal tone  $\hat{3}$  with the onset of the recapitulation and the return of both the home key and the home-key tonic.

In a major key, the remaining potential development-key dominants—V/ii and V/V—both lack the home-key leading tone and move to the home-key tonic by rather awkward harmonic progressions and contrapuntal motions. V/IV, in addition to having no home-key leading tone, is of course the home-key tonic itself, making it a doubtful goal for the conclusion of the development section (Caplin 1998, 141).<sup>9</sup>

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7 See, for example, Leonard Ratner (1980, 225–27); Harold Andrews (1981, 468–69); David Beach (1983); David Bushler (1986, 19–20); Charles Rosen (1988, 267–72); Joseph C. Kraus (1990); Laufer (1991, 72, 92); James Webster (1991, 134–45); Jan LaRue (1992); Caplin (1998, 141); Mark Anson-Cartwright (2000, 181); James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy (2006, 198–205). The eighteenth-century theorist Heinrich Christoph Koch describes comparable designs in the opening allegro movements of major-key symphonies ([1793, §102] 1983, 200–1).

8 Ratner (1980, 226), Beach (1983, 20–21), Kraus (1990, 232–33), Webster (1991, 142), and LaRue (1992, 59–61) also note Gasparini's description of this progression. Many scholars have examined comparable chromatic third motions in nineteenth-century music, including David Kopp (2002), William Rothstein (2008), and Suzannah Clark (2011, 228–46).

9 Closing a development section with these harmonies is not unheard of, however: Burstein, for instance, discusses development sections that end on these and even more “exotic” harmonies—including other development-key dominants, development-key tonics, and even the home-key tonic—especially in pieces from the Galant period but also in movements by Haydn (Burstein 2017); and Wayne C. Petty analyzes several sonata-form movements by C. P. E. Bach in which the

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The following list summarizes the possibilities for the dominants of diatonic triads in major moving directly to the home-key tonic, with the advantages of V/I, V/vi, and V/iii underlined:

V/I home-key leading tone, descending fifth progression,  
common tone  $\hat{5}$

V/ii no home-key leading tone, ascending third progression,  
common tone  $\hat{3}$

V/iii home-key leading tone,  
progression analogous to deceptive cadence, no common tone

V/V no home-key leading tone, descending step progression,  
no common tone

V/vi home-key leading tone, descending third progression,  
common tone  $\hat{3}$

By contrast, Haydn and Mozart wrote exceedingly few minor-key sonata-form movements in which the development section closes on a harmony other than the home-key dominant and then moves directly back to the home-key tonic.<sup>10</sup> The scarcity of such examples seems to be related at least in part to the limited potential of development-key dominants in the minor mode to resolve directly to the home-key tonic through agreeable contrapuntal motion and a convincing harmonic progression. If both Haydn and Mozart typically require a home-key leading tone in the final sonority of the development section—as suggested by the harmonies that they employ in this position and exclude from it—this requirement immediately rules out the dominants of all the triads diatonic to a minor key, except the home-key dominant.<sup>11</sup>

In analyses of major-key sonata-form movements, some Schenkerian theorists interpret the conclusion of a development section on V/vi or V/iii in the context of the home-key dominant: David Beach, for example, interprets V/vi as part of a large-scale bass arpeggiation between the home-key

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development section ends with a perfect authentic cadence on vi, which Petty interprets as either a large-scale upper neighbor to V (1999, 160–61, 165–66) or as a long-range third-divider between I and IV (169–72).

10 For several examples by Haydn that have such a design—notably the first movement of Symphony No. 49 and the fourth movement of Symphony No. 52—see, for example, Webster (1991, 139–41).

11 Caplin notes that the leading tone of the home key is “a necessary condition of dominant functionality” (1998, 141). See also Hepokoski and Darcy (2006, 201).

dominant and tonic, rather than in the context of the submediant region, and argues that “the emphasis on III $\sharp$  must eventually be understood in relation to the tonal area of the dominant that encompasses it” (1983, 1, 28). Similarly, Carl Schachter argues that the “putative” V/vi at the end of a development section “turns out to have a very different function: it leads by downward arpeggiation from V to I in the progression V–(III $\sharp$ )–I” (1999, 140–42). And L. Poundie Burstein refers to V/iii as a “substitute dominant” that is “connected (by means of voice leading) to an earlier V chord at the end of the exposition” (1998, 296–97).<sup>12</sup>

There are of course many times when a development-key dominant feels palpably connected to a preceding home-key dominant. For example, in the first movement of Haydn’s String Quartet Op. 20 in D major (Ex. 4), chromatic stepwise motion connects the home-key dominant at the end of the exposition to V/iii partway through the development (mm. 112–32); V/iii then transforms into the home-key dominant, and the function of VII $\sharp$  as part of a home-key-dominant expansion is quite tangible (Burstein 1998, 304). But often such a connection between the home-key dominant and a development-key dominant seems forced, and meant to demonstrate a pre-conceived model of home-key-dominant expansion that is rather far removed from the listener’s experience.

Example 4. Haydn, String Quartet Op. 20, i, mm. 112–132, reduction; after Burstein (1998, 304).

exposition                      development

112                      113                      120                      121                      131                      132

A: I                      e: V                      f#: V

Home Key: V — VI — VII — V<sup>6</sup><sub>5</sub> — I

James Webster, conversely, observes that “V/vi is often the structural goal of the entire development” and that “the reprise in the tonic follows a structural half cadence on the dominant of the relative minor” (1991, 142). My position is close to Webster’s, which, I believe, gives proper emphasis to the music’s actual setting in a development key at the conclusion of the section, and greater acknowledgement of the listener’s tangible experience of this key, rather than presupposing that all development sections must expand the home-key dominant.

<sup>12</sup> See also Heinrich Schenker ([1935] 1979, 69–70) and Channan Willner (1988, 79–83).

\* \* \*

Here, I follow Caplin in distinguishing between development keys and tonicized regions. Development keys are tonal regions, other than the home key and subordinate key, confirmed in the development section by a cadential function—most often an authentic cadence or half cadence—or by a dominant arrival.<sup>13</sup> Tonicized regions, as mentioned, are key areas of the development section that convey the potential for confirmation as development keys, but fail to achieve it through a cadence or dominant arrival. A tonicized region typically includes at least one full statement of a phrase, and a clear shift in texture and thematic material frequently marks its beginning. Although tonicized regions fall short of achieving cadential confirmation, they frequently take on considerable importance in the tonal structure of a development section and figure prominently in the tour of keys. Tonicized regions frequently pivot between development keys—they tonicize a region whose tonic triad is diatonic to both the preceding and following development keys—and in such cases might be called pivoting tonicized regions, or simply “pivot regions.” As Caplin observes:

Although it lacks a cadence, a region can still acquire considerable structural importance if it is associated with an initiating formal function, such as a basic idea, a presentation, or a compound basic idea. If a new theme (or themelike unit) begins in a tonal region as yet unconfirmed as a key, we recognize the potential of the prolonged tonic supporting that function to become confirmed cadentially as the tonal center of a new key. But if the music then takes a different tonal direction, this *initiating region*, as the region of the opening tonic prolongation can be termed, must ultimately be understood as a tonicization in some other key. (1998, 140)

In this study, I distinguish between development keys and tonicized regions, but it falls outside the scope of this essay to explore the distinctions between primary and secondary development keys.<sup>14</sup>

The most common development keys and tonicized regions in the eight movements discussed in the following section are vi, appearing in seven of the development sections explored, and ii, appearing in five. Other regions include IV (which appears three times) and iii (twice). Regions whose tonics are borrowed from the parallel home key include v (two times), bIII (twice), and bVII (once). In these major-mode movements, I distinguish the major dominant region—the subordinate key—from a minor dominant region appearing in the core of the development section: whereas the former may involve extensive modal mixture but eventually concludes with a cadence in major, the latter represents a true minor region. When the minor dominant initiates the development section, right after the conclusion of the exposition on the major dominant, the connection between the two is more palpable.<sup>15</sup>

We can draw a further distinction between tonicized regions and more transitory tonicized harmonies in the development section. The latter tonicizations typically fall within a broader motion between more

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13 Deceptive, evaded, and abandoned cadences may also occasionally confirm development keys (Caplin 1998, 140).

14 Caplin writes, “If multiple development keys appear in a movement, it is sometimes helpful to distinguish one as *primary* and the other(s) as *secondary*” (1998, 140).

15 In this study, I attempt to follow Caplin’s concept of the pre-core/core technique, where applicable (1998, 141–55).

firmly established tonal areas like tonicized regions and development keys—often in the context of a sequence—and fail to convey the sense of a key with the potential for cadential confirmation. As Caplin observes, “Less structurally important are tonicized regions arising from sequential activity in a continuation phrase or a development core... Since such regions participate in a broader, ongoing process of tonal change, they have less potential than do initiating regions for receiving cadential confirmation” (1998, 140).

The first twenty measures of the development section of the first movement of Haydn’s String Quartet Op. 54 No. 3 in E major illustrate well the differences between development keys, tonicized regions, and more transitory tonicizations (Ex. 5). The section begins with a complete statement of the main theme, a period, in the key of G major,  $\text{bIII}$  of the home key (mm. 59–66), which is confirmed as a development key first by a half cadence (m. 62) and again by a perfect authentic cadence (m. 66). The following sequence (mm. 66–72) briefly tonicizes A major, but this harmony is clearly transitory, embedded within the sequence leading from G major to B minor, and never conveys the potential for confirmation as development key, because it is not associated with any initiating formal function. B minor constitutes a tonicized region because it combines with a four-measure presentation that conveys the sense of a key with the potential for confirmation as a development key (mm. 72–76), but that potential fails to materialize in the form of a cadential progression or dominant arrival. Additionally, this tonicized region combines with a pronounced shift in texture and thematic material. After the passage in B minor another sequence begins—which includes the more transitory tonicized harmonies E minor and A major (mm. 77–78)—leading to the next tonicized region of D major. In the more detailed discussion of this development section later in this study, I propose that the tonicized regions of B minor and D major function as pivot regions between the development keys of G major and F# minor.

Development keys often overlap the formal boundaries and points of cadential punctuation within a development section. For example, a development key frequently begins with a half cadence or dominant arrival at the end of the pre-core and continues into the beginning of the core. The development section of the G-major second movement of Haydn’s Symphony No. 99 (Ex. 6), for instance, opens with the tonicized region of D minor (mm. 35–37) and then modulates to C major, concluding the eight-measure pre-core on a dominant arrival in the latter key (m. 42). The subsequent core of the development begins in C major, and this region thus overlaps the boundary between these two sub-sections of the development. There is no subsequent authentic cadence, half cadence, or dominant arrival in the key of C major, but I consider the dominant arrival at the end of the pre-core enough to establish C major as a development key.

Example 5. Haydn, String Quartet Op. 54 No. 3, i, mm. 59–78.

Allegro

development section

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

*f* *HC* *fz* *PAC* sequence:

G: development key: (HK:  $\flat$ III)

67 68 69 70 71 72 73

*fz* *p* *f* *b: V* *i* *iii* *f* *tonicized region: (no cadence or dominant arrival)* (HK: *v*)

74 75 76 77 78

*fz* *p* *f* *b: V* *i* *iii* *f* *tonicized region: (no cadence or dominant arrival)* (HK: *v*)

sequence: *V*<sup>6</sup> *iv* *VII* *D: V*



Example 6. Haydn, Symphony No. 99, ii, mm. 35–43.

Adagio pre-core

35 36 37 38 39

*p* *cresc.* *piu f* *ff* *p* *dim.* *pp* *I...*

d: tonicized region  
(HK: v)

development key overlaps formal boundary between sub-sections

(pre-core) core

40 41 42 43

*ff* *p* *dim.* *pp* *I...*

vii V

C: development key: dominant arrival  
(HK: IV)

In development sections that end on the home-key dominant, the home key itself overlaps formal boundaries in a similar way, beginning (or rather returning) with the end of the development and continuing into the recapitulation, even if the tonic harmony itself appears only at the beginning of the recapitulation. In the development sections discussed in the following section—in which the development concludes in a development key—the home key and the home-key tonic return at the same time with the onset of the recapitulation.<sup>16</sup>

\* \* \*

The following section examines the tour of keys in eight development sections that end on V/vi and V/iii. Like Examples 5 and 6 above, many of the examples below are reduced transcriptions of the score, in which I occasionally shift some of the registers and omit some of the inner voices in order to keep the music readable on one staff. In general, I try to keep the melody and bass as close as possible to the original. The graphs include indications of formal functions including main theme (MT), subordinate theme (ST), exposition, development, and recapitulation, and also show the tour of keys, including both development keys and tonicized regions. Because of my focus on development sections, the expositions and recapitulations are shown with less detail, and only to contextualize the developments. Some examples include a graph showing the tonal polarity model, which is given for comparison.

The tour-of-keys model, as presented here, involves much more than merely identifying a succession of keys whose tonics are prolonged; rather, it shows how harmonies marked by cadential syntax frequently emerge as structurally important *Stufen* in a development section. These harmonies include

<sup>16</sup> Schachter observes that the boundaries of a key area need not coincide with those of a formal section (1999, 138).

root-position triads confirmed as development-key tonics by a cadential progression or dominant arrival; root-position half-cadential dominants that appear at the beginning or end of a development key—as opposed to those embedded within a prolonged development-key tonic; and root-position dominant arrivals. Furthermore, in all of the examples discussed in the next section, a regional dominant *Stufe* concludes the development section, and gains structural parity with or even primacy over the local tonic, a circumstance more common to developments than to expositions or recapitulations, and one that undoubtedly contributes to their comparatively unstable character. The following section begins with the simplest tour of keys and moves through the more complex.

### THE TOUR-OF-KEYS MODEL AND THE PROLONGATIONAL STRUCTURE IN DEVELOPMENT SECTIONS ENDING ON V/vi OR V/iii

#### *Tour of keys with one development key*

The D-major third movement of Haydn’s String Quartet Op. 33 No. 1 demonstrates the simplest tour of keys, in which the development section has only one development key, in this case the mediant F# minor (iii)—approached as the relative minor of the subordinate key, A major, which concludes the exposition (Ex. 7). The overall structure of the section is relatively straightforward: the beginning of the main theme appears in F# minor in a slightly varied form (mm. 41–44), and then a sequence leads to a half cadence (m. 51), confirming F# minor as a development key. The section ends on this dominant, which is VII# in the home key, and the recapitulation begins on the home-key tonic D major without any intervening harmony.

A conventional Schenkerian reading might show VII# at the end of the section as a “substitute” dominant that connects back to the home-key dominant at the end of the exposition (Ex. 8[b]). In this interpretation, the F#-minor region recedes substantially in importance, and the C#-major harmony is more significant for its third relationship to A than for its dominant function in F# minor. The advantage of this reading is that it demonstrates the governance of the home-key dominant over the entire development section, but it does so at considerable cost, disregarding the listener’s tangible experience of the F#-minor region throughout the entire section.

The tour-of-keys model considers this region independent of home-key dominant prolongation, with the tonal-polarity model confined to the exposition and the “dominant-ness” of the concluding development-key dominant providing the necessary compulsion to resolve back to the “tonic-ness” of the home-key tonic, even though the dominant and tonic belong to different keys (Ex. 8[a]). The regional root-position tonic and dominant both play an essential role in the half-cadential progression that establishes F# minor as a development key, and the corresponding degrees, F# and C#, emerge as the main structural notes in the bass.

Example 7. Haydn, String Quartet Op. 33 No. 1, iii, mm. 41–55.

development

Andante 41

*p*

*sf*

*p*

*sf*

42 43 44 45

*poco f*

sequence

*sf*

$\sharp$ : i...

(HK: iii)

$\delta^{1\frac{1}{2}}$

46 47 48 49 50

$\delta^{1\frac{1}{2}}$

Ger. 6

recapitulation

51 52 53 54 55

*p*

standing on the dominant

( $\sharp$ ): V ( $\frac{6}{4}$ )

HC

D: I

(HK: I)

Example 8. Haydn, String Quartet Op. 33 No. 1, iii, reductions.

(a) Tour-of-keys model

(b) Tonal-polarity model

The half cadence in the development key supplies a type of localized interruption, cutting short the  $\hat{3}\text{--}\hat{2}\text{--}\hat{1}$  descent in F# minor before it reaches  $\hat{1}$ , and concluding instead on the regional  $\hat{2}$ .<sup>17</sup> Here the concept of interruption is adapted to the tour-of-keys model: just as the dominant-ness of the development-key half cadence compels a return to the tonic-ness of the home-key tonic, the interruption of the development-key descent likewise compels a return to the primary tone and the resumption of the fundamental line, but in the home key, so that the development-key  $\hat{3}\text{--}\hat{2}$  is followed by the home-key  $\hat{3}\text{--}\hat{2}\text{--}\hat{1}$ . If one considers only F# minor, then the I–V progression in that key is a dividing dominant, but considering the whole development and recapitulation, the interruption in the development key is answered by the full descent in the home key, the same way that the dominant of the development key is answered by the tonic of the home key.

V/iii is a useful concluding harmony for the development section because it is a development-key

<sup>17</sup> Schenker asserts that “only the prolongation of a division (interruption) gives rise to sonata form,” but, as Charles Smith observes, Schenker himself was inconsistent with the concept, explicitly locating the interruption in only a fifth of his graphs of sonata-form movements in *Free Composition* (Schenker [1935] 1979, 36, 134; Smith 1996, 231, 236–37). On the evolution of Schenker’s concept of interruption, and the closer proximity of his earlier theory to traditional *Formenlehre*, see for example Hooper (2017); the author observes, for instance, that “in the early issues of *Der Tonwille*, Schenker would often present a voice-leading sketch and demarcate large sections of form according to key areas (*Stufen als Tonarten*) and thematic resemblances rather than melodic factors based on the *Urlinie*” (300).

dominant that moves by smooth voice leading, analogous to that of a deceptive cadence, back to the home-key tonic. Similarly, the presence of the home-key leading tone in V/iii is more significant for its local voice-leading usefulness than for a connection back to the home-key dominant at the end of the exposition.

*Tour of keys with opening tonicized region and one development key*

This slightly more complex but still relatively simple design appears in the C-major second movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata K. 283 (Ex. 9). The development section opens in the region of D minor (ii) (mm. 15–17), and the statement of most of the main theme's antecedent phrase (mm. 16–17) suggests the possibility of confirmation as a development key, but no cadence or dominant arrival materializes, meaning that D minor is a tonicized region. The briefly tonicized C major that follows (mm. 18–19) initially suggests a possible (false) recapitulation, but is ultimately too brief to suggest potential confirmation as a development key, because even the basic idea that begins in this key concludes with vii of A minor (m. 19), moving toward the following tonal region. A half cadence, followed by a standing on the dominant, confirms A minor (vi) as the only development key (mm. 22–23). The section ends on the development-key dominant, and once again its “dominant-ness” provides the necessary compulsion to resolve back to the “tonic-ness” of the home-key tonic.

A more traditional Schenkerian approach (Ex. 10[b]) most likely reads the entire section in the context of the home-key dominant, perhaps with the bass notes D, A, and E relating back to G as a series of ascending fifths. In this reading, the regions of D minor and A minor diminish substantially in importance, and the E-major harmony that concludes the section has more meaning as the third divider between G and C than as the dominant of A minor. The main benefit of this reading is again that it demonstrates the preeminence of the home-key dominant throughout the entire development, but it does so despite the palpability of D minor and A minor as the governing regions of the section.

The tour-of-keys model, too, incorporates the series of ascending fifths (Ex. 10[a]), but confines the tonal-polarity model to the exposition and interprets D minor and A minor as regions independent of dominant prolongation. These two prolonged harmonies are not of equal structural weight, though, because D minor is ultimately understood as a tonicized region within the development key of A minor. In the concluding region both the root-position tonic and root-position dominant participate in the half-cadential progression that establishes the development key, and—as in the Haydn quartet explored above—the regional tonic and dominant emerge as the most structurally important *Stufen*. This regional half cadence again supplies the localized interruption, this time in the submediant region, breaking off a  $\hat{5}-\hat{4}-\hat{3}-\hat{2}-\hat{1}$  descent and concluding on the local  $\hat{2}$ .

Example 9. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 283, ii, mm. 15–24.

development section

Andante

15

16

17

d: tonicized region

(HK: ii)

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

recapitulation

standing on the dominant

(a.) HC

(HK: I)

Example 10. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 283, ii, reductions.

(a) Tour-of-keys model

exposition development recapitulation

MT ST

17 19 22 24

a:  $\hat{5}$   $\hat{4}$   $\hat{3}$   $\hat{2}$

tour of keys: d (ii) ton. reg. a (vi) dev. key "dominant-ness" "tonic-ness"

(b) Tonal-polarity model

I V (div.) III# I V I

As mentioned, when the development section ends on the dominant of the submediant (on V/vi), this harmony potentially reestablishes the *Kopftón*  $\hat{3}$  before the onset of the recapitulation and the return of both the home key and the home-key tonic: in this particular movement the home-key  $\hat{3}$  is first reestablished in the bass at the half cadence (m. 22) and then transferred into the upper voice during the subsequent standing on the dominant (mm. 22–23). Like V/iii, V/vi is an effective final harmony for the section because it is a development-key dominant that allows smooth voice leading directly back to the home-key tonic: the direct harmonic motion between the development-key dominant and home-key tonic is smoothed by the common tone  $\hat{3}$ , the  $\hat{7}-\hat{1}$  and  $\hat{5}-\hat{5}$  contrapuntal motions, and the descending third in the bass. And as with V/iii in the Haydn Quartet Op. 33, the home-key leading tone in V/vi in the Mozart Sonata K. 283 is more important for its local voice-leading expedience than for a connection back to the home-key dominant that closes the exposition.



*Tour of keys with two development keys separated by a pivot region*

Both tours of keys that we have seen so far have only one development key, which is established by a half-cadential progression and whose regional tonic and dominant degrees both represent structural bass notes. But in a tour of keys with more than one development key, an authentic cadential progression often establishes the first development key (or keys), and the regional dominant is embedded within the prolonged tonic; and only the final development key is established by a half-cadential progression, exposing its dominant as a structural bass note that provides the requisite “dominant-ness” needed to close the section.

Such is the case, for instance, in the F-major third movement of Mozart’s Piano Sonata K. 280 (Ex. 11). The development section begins with eight measures of subordinate theme material leading to a perfect authentic cadence in the development key of G minor (ii) (mm. 78–85). The subsequent passage in the tonicized region of F major (I) (mm. 90–93) begins with a repetition of the material presented in G minor but then falls short of achieving a comparable cadential confirmation. (I identify the tonicization of F major beginning in measure 90 because of the tonal ambiguity of the preceding four measures.) The development then moves into the region of D minor (vi) (mm. 94–107), and a half cadence, followed by a standing on the dominant, confirms the region as a development key (mm. 105–7), the last of the section.<sup>18</sup>

Because a perfect authentic cadence confirms the first development key, G minor, the dominant of the region is embedded within the prolonged tonic that spans the authentic cadential progression, and thus fails to emerge as one of the main structural notes in the bass (Ex. 12). By contrast, a half cadence establishes the second development key, D minor, exposing the dominant at the end of the cadential progression, and indeed at the temporal limits of the tonal region, where it does emerge as one of the main structural notes in the bass. The F-major region constitutes a pivot region between the two development keys: the listener first perceives the pivot region as VII in G minor, but retrospectively reinterprets it as III in D minor, after Mozart modulates to the latter region. This ultimate function of a tonicized region within the final development key is reflected in the graph. Like a tonicized pivot chord, the pivot region conveys the sense that the music is moving away from the previously established key, but falls short of achieving cadential confirmation, instead functioning in a transitional role between two cadentially established keys.

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18 Beach, in his analysis, relates the development’s conclusion on III<sup>♯</sup> to the movement’s motivic content (1983, 7–9).

Example 11. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 280, iii, mm. 78–108.

development section

78 Presto

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

*p*

*f*

*g: V*

*i...*

**PAC**

(HK: ii)

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

*f*

*d: V*

*i...*

*p*

*F: tonicized region*

(HK: I)

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

*f*

*standing on the dominant*

*F: I...*

(HK: I)

recapitulation

(d:)

**HC**

Example 12. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 280, iii, reduction.

exposition MT ST development 83 93 96 105 108 recapitulation

tour of keys: g (ii) dev. key F (I) ton. reg. g: VII d: III d (vi) dev. key "dominant- tonic-ness"

"pivot region"

*Tour of keys in which the dominant of the final development key assumes primacy*

In the three tours of keys that we have seen thus far, the root-position tonic of the final region of the development plays a role in establishing that region as a development key—it forms part of the half-cadential progression—and the corresponding tonic degree represents one of the main structural notes in the bass. But in some development sections the dominant of the final development key arguably assumes greater structural importance than its tonic, because the tonic of that region, while still participating in the half-cadential progression that confirms the region as a development key, nonetheless appears only in six-three position and falls in a relatively weak syntactical position. Such is the case, for instance, in the G-major second movement of Haydn's Symphony No. 99.

As mentioned above (Ex. 6), the development section begins with a tonicized region, D minor (v), and then moves to the development key C major (IV), which is confirmed by a dominant arrival in the pre-core. In this first development key, the regional root-position tonic figures prominently, resolving the previous dominant arrival and opening a four-measure presentation of the material from subordinate theme 2 (Ex. 13, mm. 43–46; this example begins where Ex. 6 left off). A sequence follows, modulating to the region of E minor (mm. 47–50), and a half cadence, followed by a standing on the dominant (mm. 52–53), confirms E minor as the final development key of the section (mm. 50–53). But the development-key tonic figures much less prominently in this final region than it does in the other development keys discussed so far, appearing only in six-three position as part of a sequence in the passage leading from C major to the dominant of E minor (m. 50). The concluding B-major dominant harmony, through its root position, cadential position, and subsequent pedal (mm. 52–53), receives far more emphasis and carries more structural weight than the tonic, and therefore achieves the highest structural prominence within the region. The graph conveys the greater structural importance of the root-position development-key dominant in comparison to the six-three tonic (Ex. 14, mm. 50 and 52).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Example 14 shows a reduction of the first theme in the subordinate-theme group—indicated by the underlined 1 above the staff.

Example 13. Haydn, Symphony No. 99, ii, mm. 43–54.

Adagio development (continued)

43 core

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54 recapitulation

pp

C: I...

(HK: IV)

(C:) ii<sup>6</sup>

vii

iii<sup>6</sup>

e: i<sup>6</sup>

(HK: vi)

standing on the dominant

HC

(e:) Aug. 6

G: I

(HK: I)

sequence: vii

The core of the development (mm. 43–53) corresponds to the motion from the development key C major to the conclusion on the dominant of E minor, and the graph shows how, despite the change of key, the C *Stufe* is prolonged over the border between the two regions (mm. 43–51), transforming from the tonic of one development key to the augmented-sixth chord of another over the course of the prolongation. Although the E-minor six-three tonic represents the beginning of the half-cadential progression that confirms the region as a development key, it is still nonetheless syntactically and inversionally weak enough to allow a prolongation of C in the bass that crosses the border between two tonal regions. This development core is therefore comparable to passages that Carl Schachter describes in which “the tonal center of a passage...change[s] during the prolongation of a single harmony” (1999, 137–39).<sup>20</sup> The initial G4 of the interrupted  $\hat{3}-\hat{2}(-\hat{1})$  line in E minor is established with the I<sup>6</sup> in measure 50, and what follows might be considered an “auxiliary half cadence”—auxiliary because the initial tonic of the cadential progression is inverted, as often happens in an auxiliary cadence (Burstein 2005, 161–64), but half-cadential because the progression concludes on the dominant instead of the tonic, a departure from the standard type.

As mentioned in the opening, the idea of assigning greater structural weight to the dominant of a key than to its tonic has a basis in Schenkerian analysis, and this concept can usefully refine the tour-of-keys model, so that it shows not only a succession of keys and cadences but also which specific harmonies within a region are most important to the linear structure. For instance, in the reading of Symphony No. 99, the identification of the dominant as the most important structural harmony in the region of E minor—and the corresponding de-emphasis of the six-three tonic—brings out the D–C–B stepwise connection between the root-position tonics of the subordinate key D major and first development key C major, and the dominant of the following development key, E minor (Ex. 14).

Example 14. Haydn, Symphony No. 99, ii, reductions.

<sup>20</sup> Schachter further notes that “the boundaries of a prolonged harmony need not coincide with the often indistinct boundaries of a key area” (1999, 138).

The main difference between the two approaches is that the tour-of-keys model interprets the C-major and B-major harmonies in the context of the development keys, whereas the tonal-polarity model interprets them in the context of the home-key dominant. To be sure, the opening in D minor feels palpably connected to the subordinate key D major, because of its placement at the beginning of the development, but to interpret the entire section in the context of home-key-dominant prolongation is also to largely disregard the much more emphatic syntactical confirmations of C major and E minor.<sup>21</sup>

*Tour of keys in which the dominant alone articulates the final development key*

In the first three movements explored in this section, the regional root-position tonic plays a role in establishing the final development key by initiating a half-cadential progression, and the corresponding regional tonic degree represents one of the main structural notes in the bass. But in the Haydn symphony just discussed, the regional dominant arguably assumes structural primacy in the final development key, because the regional tonic, while still part of the half-cadential progression that confirms the region as a development key, nonetheless appears only in six-three-position with relatively weak syntactical placement. In some other development sections the structural prominence of the final development-key dominant seems completely beyond doubt, because the region is confirmed by dominant arrival alone, and the tonic of the region never appears at all. When the dominant alone articulates a region, this contributes to the tonal instability so characteristic of development sections, because the totality of unresolved “dominant-ness” corresponds to a complete absence of stable “tonic-ness.” These dominant-only regions demonstrate even more compellingly how a synthesis of the tour-of-keys model with the Schenkerian concept of dominant prolongation within a development key enriches both approaches.

Such a region appears, for instance, at the end of the C-major second movement of Mozart’s String Quartet K. 590 (Ex. 15). The movement has only two development keys: E♭ major (♭III) (Ex. 15, mm. 47–53), which begins the section, and A minor (vi) (mm. 58–62), which closes it. The root-position tonic of the E♭-major region is prolonged at the beginning of the section (mm. 47–52), and a deceptive cadential progression confirms it as a development key (mm. 52–54).<sup>22</sup> A rising sequence follows (mm. 54–58), leading to a dominant arrival in A minor that establishes the region as a development key (m. 58), followed by a five-measure standing on the dominant that concludes the section (mm. 58–62). The dominant alone, then, articulates the A-minor region, the “tonic” sonority appearing only in the form of a neighboring six-four chord above the dominant pedal (m. 59).

---

21 The development’s opening D minor also functions somewhat like a pivot region, as the parallel minor of the subordinate key and as ii of the following development key C major.

22 Occasionally, an authentic cadence is implied but a deceptive cadence occurs instead, and the cadential “function” rather than the cadential “arrival” confirms the development key (Caplin 1998, 140). One might also consider the passage in E♭ to conclude with a half-cadential progression, moving as it does through the harmonic functions of tonic, pre-dominant, and dominant in root position. The half-cadential progression would also confirm E♭ as a development key, but the sense of a deceptive cadence here seems quite pronounced.

Example 15. Mozart, String Quartet K. 590, ii, mm. 47–63.

[illegible]



The absence of the final development-key tonic illustrates especially well how the tour-of-keys model entails much more than simply cataloging a procession of keys whose tonics are prolonged. In this development section, the dominant of A minor clearly has “a higher syntactic value than its tonic” (Schachter 1999, 142), and the bass notes  $E\flat$  and  $E\sharp$ —rather than the keys  $E\flat$  major and A minor—represent the most important elements of the linear structure in the bass (Ex. 16). Moreover, when the final development key is established by dominant arrival alone, the interrupted upper line appears in an especially unstable tonal environment, as befits the comparatively volatile character of a development section. Here, for instance, the initial degree of the concluding descent ( $C5$ , or  $\hat{3}$  of A minor) never appears with its corresponding tonic harmony, or even within the tonal region in which the line eventually concludes. Instead,  $C5$  is established with the deceptive cadence in the first development key,  $E\flat$  major—at the beginning of the sequence leading to the A-minor region—and only  $\hat{2}$  ( $B4$ ) of the interrupted line appears in the context of the final development key.<sup>23</sup>

Example 16. Mozart, String Quartet K. 590, ii, reduction.

exposition MT      ST (1, 2, 3)      development      (a:) 3      recapitulation

tour of keys:  $E\flat$  ( $bIII$ ) dev. key      DC      a (vi) dev. key dominant only

Another dominant-only region appears at the end of the C-major second movement of Haydn’s Symphony No. 54 (Ex. 17). Here the development section moves through three development keys, D minor (ii), F major (IV), and A minor (vi). The pre-core (mm. 50–56) leads to a dominant arrival in D minor (m. 56), and the subsequent statement of the main theme material (mm. 57–60) leads to a perfect authentic cadence in the key, both of which confirm D minor as a development key. The subsequent statement of main theme material in F major leads to another perfect authentic cadence, this one establishing F major as a development key (mm. 63–66). Finally, a dominant arrival alone, followed by standing on the dominant, confirms A minor as the concluding development key (mm. 73–74).

23 In his analysis of the movement, Kraus relates both  $bIII$  at the beginning of the section and  $III\sharp$  at the end to the enharmonic reinterpretation of chromatic elements (1990, 233–37).

Example 17. Haydn, Symphony No. 54, ii, mm. 50–75.

Adagio assai

development section

pre-core

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

core

dominant arrival

d:

(HK: ii)

59 60 61 62 63 64 65

(d)

PAC

VI<sup>6</sup>

F: IV<sup>6</sup>

V<sup>6</sup><sub>5</sub>

(HK: IV)

I...

66 67 68 69 70

(F:) PAC

71 72 73 74 75

recapitulation

a: V<sup>7</sup>

(HK: vi)

vii

V

dominant arrival—standing on the dominant

C: I...

(HK: I)

In both D minor and F major, the root-position tonic forms part of a cadential progression confirming the region as a development key, and, in both cases, the regional tonic degrees, D and F, stand out as important *Stufen* (Ex. 18[a]). But in the final key area of the section, A minor, dominant arrival alone establishes the region as a development key: the dominant degree, E, is the region's only structural bass note, and the tonic triad itself never really appears at all, except in the form of a cadential six-four chord (m. 73). Because the final development key is articulated only by a prolongation of its dominant, the concluding upper line once again appears in a comparatively unstable tonal environment: C5, the opening degree of the interrupted  $\hat{3}-\hat{2}(-\hat{1})$  line in A minor, is established in an earlier development key (F major) and never appears as a consonance in the final one (A minor).

That the dominant alone articulates the key of A minor has important implications for the prolongational structure, because E rather than A constitutes the most important element of the linear structure in the bass in the final development key, and connects through stepwise motion to the F and D prolonged earlier in the section, resulting in the bass progression D–F–E (Ex. 18[a]). The bass first reestablishes the principal melodic tone E (m. 73) before it transfers into the upper register prior to the beginning of the recapitulation.

Example 18. Haydn, Symphony No. 54, ii, reductions.

(a) Tour-of-keys model

(b) Tonal-polarity model

For both of these movements, the tour-of-keys model, as presented here, attributes sole structural weight to the dominant of a tonal region, an approach with considerable precedence in Schenkerian theory. Carl Schachter, for instance, describes comparable passages that are in “keys’ without tonics,” and in which the local tonic is an “absentee tonic” (1999, 140–41). Similarly, Channan Willner describes

a situation in which the dominant of a development key “has perforce taken over and established itself as the true goal of the voice leading” (1988, 103).<sup>24</sup>

But, once again, the tour-of-keys model differs from the tonal-polarity model by interpreting the final dominant of the development section in the context of the final development key, emphasizing the listener’s experience of that tonal region. In the second movement of the Haydn symphony, for instance, a more orthodox Schenkerian reading (Ex. 18[b]) might take the E-major harmony that concludes the section as a large-scale third divider, relating directly back to the G-major harmony that concludes the exposition. In this reading, the F-major region recedes in importance, functioning primarily as a stepwise connection between G and E. The D-minor region recedes even more, functioning essentially as a large-scale voice-leading corrective that breaks up the stepwise motion from G major to F major. Again, the appeal of this tonal-polarity reading is that it demonstrates the presupposed primacy of the home-key dominant over the entire development section, but it largely downplays the tangible experience and syntactical emphasis of D minor, F major, and A minor.

*Tour of keys that concludes with two development-key dominants*

In some movements, dominant function alone articulates not just the final development key but the last two development keys, and the feeling of “dominant-ness” extends unbroken through two tonal regions rather than just one. Such is the case, for instance, in the first movement of Haydn’s String Quartet Op. 54 No. 3.

There is an impressive tour of keys in the opening movement of this E-major quartet, whose development section runs through the regions of G major (♭III), B minor (v), D major (♭VII), F♯ minor (ii), and C♯ minor (vi). As mentioned above, G major is a development key with cadential confirmation (Ex. 5, mm. 59–67), and B minor is a tonicized region, conveying the potential for establishment as a development key without actually realizing such confirmation (mm. 71–76). Similarly, the tonicized region of D major (Ex. 19, mm. 78–85; this example resumes where Ex. 5 left off), which is marked by a change in texture and thematic material, includes a four-measure presentation (mm. 81–84) and suggests a potential development key, again without confirmation. The last two regions, F♯ minor (mm. 86–94) and C♯ minor (mm. 98–106) are both confirmed as development keys by dominant arrival alone, and both dominant arrivals are followed by extensive standing on the dominant (mm. 88–94, 98–106).

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24 See also Burstein’s description of “auxiliary dividers,” which allow “for a key to be established without an actual statement of its tonal center” (2005, 179–80).

Example 19. Haydn, String Quartet Op. 54 No. 3, i, mm. 76–107.

**development section (continued)**

76 Allegro

sequence: (b:) V<sup>6</sup> → V<sup>5</sup> → VII D: V

78

I... tonicized region

(HK: ♭VII)

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

recapitulation

E: I...

(HK: I)

As the graph in Example 20(a) shows, in the first three regions—G major, B minor, and D major—the regional tonics are prolonged; but in the last two regions—F# minor and C# minor—only the regional dominants are prolonged. Indeed, we might regard the “dominant-ness” as beginning with the arrival of V/ii (Ex. 20[a], m. 88) and lasting all the way through the prolonged V/vi that concludes the section (mm. 98–106), because the sequence connecting the two dominants does little or nothing to restore any sense of “tonic-ness.” Arguably, one of the reasons Haydn brings the section to V/vi instead of closing it on V/ii is simply for the practical reason that V/ii—while providing adequate “dominant-ness”—leads only by awkward voice leading directly back to the home-key tonic, whereas V/vi leads there quite smoothly.

As the graph further shows, the two tonicized regions of B minor and D major are pivot regions between the development keys of G major and F# minor. The ultimate role of D major as VI in F# minor becomes especially palpable after it descends—by way of an interpolated B#—to the dominant C# (mm. 85–88). The two concluding development-key dominants, C# and G#, both support the reestablishment of the principal melodic tone G# (mm. 88–106).

Example 20. Haydn, String Quartet Op. 54 No. 3, i, reductions.

(a) Tour-of-keys model

exposition MT ST development recapitulation

tour of keys: G (bIII) dev. key

b (v) D (bVII)  
ton. reg. ton. reg.  
G: iii G: V  
f# iv f# VI

f# (ii) dev. key  
dominant only

c# (vi) dev. key  
dominant only

"dominant-ness"

(div.) III# I V I

(b) Tonal-polarity model

exposition MT ST development recapitulation

tonal-polarity model

(div.) III# I V I

In the previous two tours of keys that we explored, we saw how the final development key, established by dominant arrival alone, supported the interruption of an upper line whose opening degree was never established as a consonance in the concluding tonal region, and how this unstable tonal context contributed to the restless character of the development section. In the Haydn Quartet, where the development ends with two dominant-only regions, the section correspondingly concludes with two successive interruptions, both appearing in comparatively unstable tonal environments. The first interrupted upper line spans two tonal regions: it begins in D major, with A4 in m. 79 (Ex. 20[a]), but concludes with a dominant arrival in F# minor. The concluding interruption, by contrast, appears entirely within the concluding development key, C# minor; but the initial degree of the upper voice, E5 in measure 97, is established only within the unstable context of the region's German augmented-sixth chord. The concurrence of "dominant-ness" extended over two regions—each articulated by dominant arrival alone—together with two successive upper-voice interruptions generates still more volatility and compulsion to resolve to the stable "tonic-ness" of the recapitulation.

A more conventional Schenkerian interpretation (Ex. 20[b]) might show the G-major region (mm. 59–67) as part of an expanded home-key dominant reaching from B major at the end of the exposition to the prolongation of B minor beginning in measure 72, and, similarly, the D-major region relating primarily back to B minor as its relative major. In this reading focused on a prolonged home-key dominant, the C#-major harmony (m. 88) is more significant for its stepwise connection to B than for its dominant function in F# minor, and the function of G# (m. 98) as a third divider between B and E outweighs its role as the dominant of C# minor. The appeal of this reading is that it demonstrates the requisite prolongation of the home-key dominant, but it does so at considerable cost, sacrificing not only the much stronger cadential confirmation of G major in comparison to B minor but also the listener's perception of the keys of F# minor and C# minor as the governing regions at the end of the development. The tour-of-keys model considers these regions independent of home-key dominant prolongation, with the tonal-polarity model confined to the exposition. Furthermore, in the tour-of-keys model, the home-key dominant never really appears in the development section at all: the tonic of the B-minor region never assumes any dominant function—save for the tonicization of E minor that initiates the following sequence—but instead constitutes a true minor region.

Remarkably, the final two *fortissimo*, double-stopped E chords of the movement have no third, and this omission seems undoubtedly related to the opening of the development on G# and its conclusion on G#, as though Haydn were making a joke that still resonates centuries later.



*Tour of keys intertwined with motivic content*

In some movements, motivic content that first appears in the exposition plays a crucial role in determining the tonal regions in the development section's tour of keys and even its conclusion on a development-key dominant. Such is the case, for instance, in the first movement of Haydn's Piano Sonata No. 25, in E $\flat$  major, where Haydn explores the tonal regions most receptive to exploitation of the motivic content and concludes the development on the dominant of the mediant (on V/iii).

The very beginning of the exposition establishes the two main motives, one of which (motive *a*) saturates the movement and constitutes a driving force throughout (Ex. 21). These two motives are the E $\flat$ –D–C descent in the bass (motive *a*, mm. 1–2) and the G–A $\sharp$ –B $\flat$  ascent in the melody (motive *b*, m. 1), each shown with a bracket in Example 21(a). Both of these motives are tied to these specific pitches and, in the case of motive *a*, to both diatonic and chromatic versions. Motive *a* appears again in measures 2–3, where it combines for the first time with a significant vertical component, namely the E $\sharp$  that accompanies the arrival on C, tonicizing F minor and exposing a cross relation between E $\flat$  and E $\sharp$ , a manifestation shown as E $\flat$ –D–C/E $\sharp$ . Haydn articulates this cross relation more directly when he moves from the tonic chord at the end of measure 4 to the dominant of F at the beginning of measure 5. Motive *a* appears next in measure 8, at the beginning of main theme 2, here with D $\flat$  included in the descent, creating the line E $\flat$ –D $\sharp$ –D $\flat$ –C (Ex. 21[b])—with an interpolated B $\sharp$ —and in diatonic form again in measure 11 (Ex. 21[c]). There is insufficient space here for a detailed discussion of every subsequent manifestation of the motive, but Examples 21(d) and (e) show two instances in the subordinate theme, where Haydn presents motive *a* in the new tonal context of B $\flat$  major, again incorporating chromaticism and exposing cross relations.

An extensive tour of keys appears in the development section (Ex. 22), which moves through the tonal regions of C minor (vi), F minor (ii), A $\flat$  major (IV), E $\flat$  major (I), back to F minor (ii), and finally to G minor (iii). The pre-core (mm. 28–32) begins in the tonicized region of C minor and then moves to F minor, which is confirmed as a development key by a half cadence (m. 32). The core of the development begins in F minor (mm. 33–34), and the subsequent tonicized regions of A $\flat$  major (mm. 35–38) and E $\flat$  major (mm. 38–41) function as III and VII within the broader F-minor region, to which the music returns (mm. 42–44). Another half cadence reconfirms F minor as a development key (m. 44), after which the music moves through another sequence to the closing region of G minor, which is confirmed as the final development key by a half cadence, followed by two and a half measures of standing on the dominant (mm. 48–50).

Example 21. Haydn, Piano Sonata No. 25, i; appearances of motives  $a$  and  $b$  in the exposition.

The image displays a musical score for 'The Swan' by Camille Saint-Saëns, featuring five staves of music. The score is written in G major and 3/4 time, with a tempo marking of 'Moderato'. The notation includes various musical symbols such as notes, rests, and dynamic markings like 'p' (piano) and 'cresc.' (crescendo). The score is annotated with chord symbols and fingering numbers. The annotations are as follows:

- Staff (a):** Chord symbols  $G A \sharp B$  and  $E \flat$  are present. Fingering numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are indicated. A bracket labeled 'a' spans the first five notes.
- Staff (b):** Chord symbols  $D \flat$ ,  $D \flat$ , and  $C$  are present. Fingering numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are indicated. A bracket labeled 'a' spans the first five notes.
- Staff (c):** Chord symbols  $E \flat$ ,  $D$ , and  $C$  are present. Fingering numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are indicated. A bracket labeled 'a' spans the first five notes.
- Staff (d):** Chord symbols  $E \flat/C$ ,  $D$ ,  $A \flat$ ,  $D$ ,  $E \flat/C$ ,  $D \flat$ ,  $E \flat/C$ , and  $E \flat/C$  are present. Fingering numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are indicated. A bracket labeled 'a' spans the first five notes.
- Staff (e):** Chord symbols  $B \flat$ ,  $D \flat$ ,  $D \flat$ , and  $E \flat$  are present. Fingering numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are indicated. A bracket labeled 'a' spans the first five notes.

Example 22. Haydn, Piano Sonata No. 25, i, mm. 28–51.

The image displays a musical score for Haydn's Piano Sonata No. 25, i, mm. 28–51, with Schenkerian analysis annotations. The score is written for piano and includes measures 28 through 51. The tempo is marked 'Moderato'. The key signature is one flat (B-flat major/C minor). The score is divided into two systems, each with a treble and bass staff.

**Annotations and Analysis:**

- Measure 28:** Labeled 'development' and 'pre-core'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 28-29 labeled 'Eb/C' and 'D a'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 28-29 labeled 'Eb/C' and 'D a'.
- Measure 30:** Labeled 'c: tonicized region' and '(HK: vi)'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 30-31 labeled 'f: V<sup>4</sup><sub>3</sub>' and 'i<sup>6</sup>...'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 30-31 labeled 'f: V<sup>4</sup><sub>3</sub>' and 'i<sup>6</sup>...'.
- Measure 31:** Labeled '(f:)'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 31-32 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 31-32 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 32:** Labeled '33 core'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 32-33 labeled 'C/E<sup>b</sup>' and 'a'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 32-33 labeled 'C/E<sup>b</sup>' and 'a'.
- Measure 33:** Labeled '33 core'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 33-34 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 33-34 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 34:** Labeled '(f:)'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 34-35 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 34-35 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 35:** Labeled 'sequence'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 35-36 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 35-36 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 36:** Labeled '36'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 36-37 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 36-37 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 37:** Labeled '(f:)'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 37-38 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 37-38 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 38:** Labeled '(Ab:)'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 38-39 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 38-39 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 39:** Labeled '39'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 39-40 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 39-40 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 40:** Labeled 'I... tonicized region'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 40-41 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 40-41 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 41:** Labeled 'VII'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 41-42 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 41-42 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.
- Measure 42:** Labeled '(HK: I)'. The treble staff has a bracket over measures 42-43 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'. The bass staff has a bracket over measures 42-43 labeled 'Eb' and 'D<sup>b</sup>'.

Example 22 (continued).

40

bass: Eb

D $\sharp$  a D $\flat$  C/E $\flat$

41 42 43

f: V (HK: ii)

(Eb:)

44

45

i iv<sup>6</sup> V sequence (f)

46

47

48

bass: C

G A $\sharp$  B $\flat$

D a

i iv

g: V<sup>6</sup> (HK: iii)

49

50 51 52

recapitulation

B $\flat$  A $\sharp$  B $\flat$

G A $\sharp$  B $\flat$

E $\flat$  D a C

E $\flat$ : I (HK: I)

(g:) standing on the dominant

There are many appearances of motive *a* in the development, shown with brackets in Example 22. Appearances directly related to the tour of keys include the  $E\flat/C$ – $D$ – $E\flat$  manifestation during the modulation from C minor to F minor (m. 29), and the  $E\flat$ – $D\flat$ – $D\flat$ – $C/E\flat$  version during the move from  $E\flat$  major back to F minor (mm. 40–42).<sup>25</sup> The reason that Haydn goes twice to F minor during the tour of keys, both times from a tonicized region whose tonic contains  $E\flat$ , is apparently related to the potential these particular key changes offer for further exploiting the motivic  $E\flat/E\sharp$  cross relation first presented in the exposition. These appearances of motive *a* are shown with brackets in the graph (Ex. 23).

Example 23. Haydn, Piano Sonata No. 25, i, reduction.

The last appearance of motive *a* in the development—and the one that most directly concerns this study—begins just after the arrival in G minor, with the bass note C supporting pre-dominant harmony (Ex. 23, m. 48). The bass moves next to the half cadence on D, and there begins the standing on the dominant that concludes the development section (mm. 48–50). The subsequent return to the home-key tonic of  $E\flat$  major, at the onset of the recapitulation (m. 51), completes the ascending  $C$ – $D$ – $E\flat$  statement of the motive in the bass. Haydn thus intertwines motive *a* deep into the fabric of the movement, to the point where it underlies the formal and harmonic structure of the development and the choice of regions in the tour of keys: Haydn’s modulation to G minor for the concluding development key, use of  $V/iii$  for its concluding harmony—which articulates D in the bass more forcefully than would a more typical  $V_3^6$ —and highly unusual stepwise progression back to the home-key tonic are all intertwined with the large-scale projection of the movement’s motivic content.

Motive *b*, the line  $G$ – $A\flat$ – $B\flat$ , appears less frequently than motive *a*, and its most significant appearances come in combination with motive *a*. As mentioned, the first appearance of motive *b* is in the melody in measure 1, in counterpoint above the opening  $E\flat$ – $D$  motion of motive *a* (Ex. 21[a]). In combination, these two opening melodic fragments already suggest, or at least prefigure, the G-minor tonality that eventually concludes the development: in addition to tonicizing the dominant in the home

<sup>25</sup> In another notable instance (mm. 31–32), the  $E\flat$ – $D\flat$ – $C$  version of motive *a* begins in anticipation of the following C-major harmony—while the  $D\flat$  of the broader  $E\flat$ – $D\flat$ – $C$  version is still in effect, and the  $D\flat$  has not yet resolved to the C on the following downbeat (m. 32) that completes the simultaneous statement of the two versions. In this way, Haydn ingeniously, if only briefly, manipulates the artistic potential of the two cross relations associated with motive *a*, stating both versions at once.

key  $E\flat$ , in the context of G minor these two fragments represent the lower third of the tonic ( $G-A\flat-B\flat$ ) over a  $\hat{6}-\hat{5}$  descent ( $E\flat-D$ ) in the bass, with the concluding vertical interval  $D3-B\flat3$  suggesting a six-four chord over the dominant. Indeed, Haydn makes explicit these dual possibilities by presenting this vertical combination in both tonal contexts in close temporal proximity, when the development moves to the recapitulation. As shown in the graphic summary in Example 24, at the end of the development motive *b* sounds repeatedly over the sustained D in the bass, during the standing on the dominant in G minor—twice in full (mm. 48–49) and subsequently in the form of the fragment  $B\flat-A\flat$  (mm. 49–50). But with the abrupt return of the home key and the main theme, we immediately hear motive *b* again, this time in the context of  $E\flat$  major, with the bass  $E\flat$  moving directly back to the D from which it just came (m. 51). One reason that the development section's conclusion on V/iii works so well is because the listener readily hears the common pitch collection between the development's closing key of G minor and the recapitulation's opening tonicization of  $B\flat$  major, both of which include  $A\flat$ .

The extensive and complex tour of keys in this development section is thus closely intertwined with the motivic content, to the point that this content determines the section's development keys and even its conclusion on a development-key dominant.

Example 24. Haydn, Piano Sonata No. 25, i; tonal contexts for motives *a* and *b* at the end of the development and the beginning of the recapitulation.

development

*b* 48-49

*b* 49-50

recapitulation

*b* 51

52

*a*

*a*

g: iv — V ( $\frac{5}{\sharp} \frac{6}{4}$ ) — VI

$E\flat$ : I —  $V^{\sharp 4}_2$  —  $V^6$  — vi

### THE TOUR-OF-KEYS MODEL AND THE PROLONGATIONAL STRUCTURE IN DEVELOPMENT SECTIONS ENDING ON V/I

The independence from dominant prolongation in the development sections explored above has implications for development sections generally: it suggests that, even in those development sections that conclude on the home-key dominant, the tonal regions in a tour of keys may assume more independence than the tonal-polarity approach acknowledges. For if a large-scale dominant prolongation can be so demonstrably absent from some development sections, why must we, by default, assume its presence in most others? In this closing section, I briefly attempt to demonstrate the value of the tour-of-keys model for development sections that end with the home-key dominant, and to show that—despite such an ending—their development keys remain independent from home-key dominant prolongation.

A natural expansion of the ideas presented so far is to apply them to development sections that conclude with a development-key dominant marking a half cadence or dominant arrival—like the examples discussed above—but then move through an inversion of the home-key dominant during a retransition back to the home-key tonic of the recapitulation. Does such an inverted dominant really represent the end of a prolongation stretching back to the subordinate key of the exposition, or is it a much more localized, expedient harmony that simply smooths over the motion from the main structural goal, the development-key dominant, back to the home-key tonic?<sup>26</sup>

For instance, in the first movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata K. 280 in F major (Ex. 25), the development section begins in the subordinate key of C major (mm. 57–63), and then modulates to the only development key, D minor (vi) (mm. 64–80), which is confirmed by a half cadence, followed by a standing on the dominant (mm. 78–80). The retransition (mm. 80–82) moves from the dominant A major through vii of A major (with elided resolution) and finally to the home-key V<sup>4</sup>. The inverted home-key dominant brings the music back to the home key itself before the recapitulation begins, and smooths the motion to the F-major harmony at the beginning of the main theme.

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26 I follow Caplin's definition of a retransition as "An intrathematic function that effects a modulation from a subordinate key or development key to the home key, thus preparing for a return of the main theme (or A' section)" (1998, 256). Koch describes comparable situations in which an "appendix" modulates from the closing key of the development (to use the modern term) "back to the main key for the beginning of the last period" ([1797, §102] 1983, 200–1). Beth Shamgar observes that, in late eighteenth-century sonata forms, a cadence in the key of vi, ii, or iii frequently marks the boundary between the development section and the retransition (1981, 135). Anson-Cartwright argues that such a passing inverted home-key dominant "connects to the previous structural V" (2000, 181). Laufer, conversely, argues that the "lower-level V following III<sup>#</sup> is not connected to the earlier 'real' V but serves only to reintroduce the following I" (1991, 72, 92), and Webster notes that a caesura on V/vi may be followed by a very brief "passing dominant" (1991, 142). Hepokoski and Darcy read such a passage as "chordal fill separating the two poles, V/vi and I" (2006, 199).



Example 25. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 280, i, mm. 57–83.

development section

Allegro assai

57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83

recapitulation

retransition

standing on the dominant

(d:) HC

(HK: vi)

(HK: I)

F: V<sup>4</sup>

As in most of the examples discussed above, the main goal of this development section—the harmony that receives the most syntactic emphasis at the end of the section and which concludes the half-cadential progression establishing the final development key—is undoubtedly V/vi. But unlike those earlier examples, here this harmony is followed by a retransition that concludes with the home-key dominant. A conventional Schenkerian reading might interpret this latter harmony as part of a prolonged home-key dominant stretching back to the subordinate key, with the dominant of D minor simply subsumed within the stepwise motion from C down to G (Ex. 26[b]). The tour-of-keys model reverses the emphasis, acknowledging the syntactical importance of the A-major harmony, its role in establishing vi as a development key, and the listener’s tangible experience of the region of D minor. This approach correspondingly relegates the bass note G in measure 82 to the status of a localized passing tone (Ex. 26[a]).<sup>27</sup>

Example 26. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 280, i, reductions.

(a) Tour-of-keys model

(b) Tonal-polarity model

In this development section, the concluding “dominant-ness” extends from the arrival on V/vi all the way through the inverted home-key dominant (Ex. 26[a], mm. 78–82): the absence of any resolution to a tonic—of either the development key or the home key—sustains the general feeling of dominant tension throughout this span, even though Mozart transforms the dominant from that of the development key to that of the home key. In its conclusion with “dominant-ness” that extends through two different

27 Beach interprets the A major harmony as “secondary” to the “large-scale harmonic motion V–I,” and, in his graph, shows it subsumed within a prolongation of the dominant from root-position V (m. 57) to  $V^{\frac{4}{3}}$  (m. 82) (1983, 2–7). Hepokoski and Darcy argue that “the ‘wrong dominant’ caesura [on V/vi] is the last structural moment of the development,” and that the following two measures (mm. 81–82) exemplify a “mediated move from V/vi to I” (2006, 199–201).

regions, this development section is similar to that of Haydn's Op. 54, discussed above; but in the Haydn quartet the "dominant-ness" begins in one development key and extends through another, whereas in the Mozart sonata it begins in the final development key and extends into the home key.

Finally, one further expansion of the ideas presented in this study is to apply them to development sections that end on a development-key dominant marking a half cadence or dominant arrival but then move through a root-position home-key dominant during a retransition. Instead of representing the end of a prolongation stretching back to the subordinate key of the exposition, such a root-position dominant might instead constitute a much more localized harmony, and simply the most expedient one for preparing the return of the home-key tonic at the beginning of the recapitulation. In a movement with such a design, the tour-of-keys model recognizes the greater structural weight of the harmonies that establish development keys through cadential function or dominant arrival, and considers these regions independent of home-key dominant prolongation despite the appearance of a root-position home-key dominant at the end of the retransition.<sup>28</sup>

For instance, in the first movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata K. 332 in F major (Ex. 27), the development section begins in the subordinate key of C major (mm. 94–110), and then moves through the tonicized region of G minor (ii) (mm. 114–17) to D minor (vi), which is confirmed as the final development key by a half cadence, followed by standing on the dominant (mm. 123–26). The subsequent retransition (mm. 127–32) begins with an A-minor harmony and then moves to the home-key dominant, first in inversion and then in root position.

The root-position home-key dominant is indeed the final harmony before the recapitulation, but it is a local one that simply prepares the return of the home-key tonic, following a development section that confers cadential function and far more syntactical emphasis on the dominant of vi. As in the first movement of K. 280, discussed above, the "dominant-ness" begins with the arrival on V/vi (Ex. 28, m. 123) and lasts all the way through the home-key dominant (mm. 129–32), and Mozart transforms the dominant from that of the development key to that of the home key; the main difference is that in K. 332 the final home-key dominant appears in root position, but this fails to alter its essentially local and expedient function. A more traditional Schenkerian interpretation might view the G and C in the bass (m. 129–32) as part of a dominant prolongation reaching back to the subordinate key. But more convincing, in my opinion, is to consider the D-minor region independent of home-key dominant prolongation, and the A-major harmony the main structural dominant in the section, a perception reinforced by its key-establishing half-cadential function, its approach through an augmented-sixth chord, and the subsequent standing on the dominant.

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28 Burstein observes that reading a connection between the home-key dominant at the end of the exposition and a localized root-position dominant in the retransition can seem "notably forced" (2011, 24), and, in his graph of the first movement of Haydn's Symphony No. 41, shows vi as the final structural harmony in the development (27).

Example 27. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 332, i, mm. 94–133.

development section

Allegro

94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106

*p*

C: I...

(HK: V)

PAC

107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115

*fp*

g: vii

i...

(HK: ii)

(C:)

PAC

116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123

*fp*

d: vii

i...

(HK: vi)

(g:)

HC

124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133

*pp*

retransition

standing on the dominant

*f*

*p*

V<sup>7</sup>

I

recapitulation

F: V<sup>4</sup><sub>3</sub>

(HK: I)

Example 28. Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 332, i, reduction.

exposition MT ST (1, 2) development 94 101 (109) 115 117 119 121 122 123 retransition 127 129 131 133 recapitulation

tour of keys: g (ii) ton. reg. d (vi) dev. key home key "dominant-ness"

## CONCLUSION

For all of the movements discussed in this study, the tour-of-keys model provides a more accurate description of the large-scale tonal plan than the tonal-polarity model. It is not within the scope of this study to explore the implications of the tour-of-keys model for the prolongational structure of development sections that end with a strongly articulated home-key dominant—one marked, for example, by a dominant arrival. But the potential for a development-key dominant to be the concluding goal of a development section—and for a development section, and its tour of keys, to be independent of dominant prolongation—lends credibility to the tour-of-keys model as a legitimate approach to the analysis of development sections generally. If development keys are autonomous of the dominant in the examples explored above, they might deserve recognition of greater independence even in those far more common sonata-form movements in which the development section closes with dominant arrival in the home key. The Schenkerian approach to development sections is enhanced by integration with the tour-of-keys model, and the tour-of-keys model becomes more refined through a synthesis with the Schenkerian concept of dominant prolongation within a development key. The combination of both approaches leads to a more balanced interpretation of sonata form.

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**UNT\_000975**

## **Introduction to Symposium on Philip Ewell’s SMT 2019 Plenary Paper, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame”**

### **VARIOUS AUTHORS**

The Journal of Schenkerian Studies is proud to publish the following responses to Philip Ewell’s SMT 2019 plenary paper, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame.” As the editors of an academic journal whose mission it is to encourage the exchange of ideas, we are pleased that these responses express a variety of thoughts and perspectives. Informed debate is the essence of scholarly inquiry, and a field or methodology, such as music theory, stands to prosper by interrogating and critiquing itself. The Journal of Schenkerian Studies holds no official stance regarding the issues addressed by the following symposium. We consider ourselves to be—first and foremost—an emissary of the music theory community; we are glad to serve this role through the publication of these responses.

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## **Schenker—Racism—Context**

### **DAVID BEACH**

Heinrich Schenker was a passionate and prolific writer about music, and, as noted by Philip Ewell in his recent presentation at SMT, several of his writings contain racist comments. I do not offer any excuses for these comments, but I do want to stress that it is important to understand the contexts under which they—at least some of them—were made. So, what are the influences that shaped his life and attitudes? Schenker was born into a Jewish family in a German-speaking region of Poland, and as a young man he moved to Vienna, a cultural center of the Austrian-Germanic empire. His early career was that of a performer (piano) and critic, and during this period he would have become acquainted with the great works of European art music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, works that he came to regard as the culmination of western art music, some of which he referred to later as the “masterworks.” As noted by Ewell, the composers represented were all white and male. Indeed, but that is hardly Schenker’s doing. Then came the First World War and the eventual humiliation of the German nation, one result being a resurgence of nationalistic pride. One must understand the writings of this period, including Schenker’s essay on the German Genius, which contains much unfortunate rhetoric, in this context. Let me digress briefly to illustrate my point.

One afternoon—in the late 80s, as I recall—a graduate student rushed into my office out of breath to inform me that there were a half dozen or so young men marching back and forth in front of the Eastman School of Music denouncing Schenker as a Nazi and admonishing the School for teaching his theories. WOW! I found the leader of the group, which turned out to be a Jewish Youth Organization from New York City, and I asked him how they had come to this conclusion about Schenker. The answer I received was that a member of the group (not present) had read Schenker’s essay on the German Genius, which is very pro-German and very anti-everything else. His logical conclusion reading this essay in isolation was that Schenker was a raving Nazi. How ironic. I explained to the leader of this group that it was necessary to understand this essay in its historical context. Furthermore, I explained, Schenker himself was a Jew, and his wife had perished in one of the concentration camps. So, the young men quickly folded up their placards, got into their van and headed home. These fellows meant well, but they had made an embarrassing mistake by accepting the word of a colleague who had not taken the trouble to understand the context behind Schenker’s offensive comments.

Let me get back to Philip Ewell’s comments. He states that Schenker’s anti-black racism informed his theory. This is simply not correct. Schenker developed his ideas about musical structure by studying the music of the great masters (indeed a group of white guys!), and one of the bases of his criticism of music he considered inferior was that they lack what he had observed in the “masterworks.” So, his views on black music did not inform his theory; rather it was his theory that led him to view the music of other cultures as lacking. No doubt this view also influenced his negative opinion of the new music of his time (e.g., Schoenberg). Ewell also notes that Schenkerians have had a tendency to ignore, downplay or “whitewash” Schenker’s racist comments. I suspect this is true to a large extent. Early teachers of Schenker’s ideas in America, like Ernst Oster, struggled to promote and find acceptance for Schenker’s musical insights, so it was only natural that he avoided controversial subjects. For the most

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part, succeeding generations of Schenkerians have focused on the theory and its application. Speaking for myself, I was taught very old-fashioned (non-musical) theory as an undergraduate, and encountering Schenker's ideas later was like a breath of fresh air. I seem to be among a shrinking breed of those who are interested in applying Schenker's ideas analytically, and, like some of my colleagues, I have focused on the musical ideas, not on the rhetoric.

It is interesting that two people can read the same sources and come away with very different views, depending on one's perspective. For me Schenker was a brilliant man, whose musical insights opened our minds and our ears to the sophisticated structure of the great works of the tonal repertoire. For Ewell, he was a racist. Ewell, of course would point out that I am white and by extension a purveyor of white music theory, while he is black. I can't argue with that. So, what can we do to move beyond this impasse? My suggestion to Philip Ewell is that he stop complaining about us white guys and publish some sophisticated analytical graphs of works by black composers. I, for one, would welcome into the analytical canon works by both black and women composers.

## After Ewell: Music Theory and “Monstrous Men”

RICHARD BEAUDOIN

Writing in a year that sees the twenty-fourth United States Census, I hear a hum in American culture around who (or what) counts, and who (or what) does not. Legal proceedings continue regarding which persons can vote, drive, or marry. Who counts within music theory—and what counts *as* music theory—likewise deserve a reckoning.<sup>1</sup> Following Ewell (2019c), I take as a fact the disturbing and mutually reinforcing relationship between Schenker’s much-disseminated music theory and his less-discussed belief in white racial superiority. Schenker fervently believed that some human beings were superior to others and that, within the mechanisms of tonality, the relationship between tones should be understood as similarly unequal. Schenker’s writings on both racial and musical topics are actively, intentionally, and, to him, *usefully* hierarchical and exclusionary.

Generations of academically trained music theorists have had varying degrees of involvement with Schenker’s work, from undergraduate modules to the publication of scholarly articles and monographs. The effects of this widespread education are hard to gauge precisely, but the individual and collective impacts have been profound. Along the way, theorists have had to grapple with criticism regarding how much musical information Schenker’s theories exclude. Critiques of Schenker’s conception of rhythm (Hasty 1997) or the effort required to apply his theories to non-tonal music (Forte 1959, Schiuej 2008) or the concerns that his approach neglects performative realities (Cook 2009) are by now well developed. In this light, Ewell’s (re-)uncovering of Schenker’s racism at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the SMT in Columbus offers a reminder of the basic exclusionary nature of Schenker’s thinking along both musical and racial lines. After Ewell, tenured theorists and emerging scholars alike are not necessarily required to situate their work precisely as pro- or contra-Schenker, but we all are encouraged to re-evaluate our research and teaching along a continuum of inclusivity and exclusivity. This re-evaluation can be aided by a reflection on writings by Kofi Agawu, Claire Dederer, and William Cheng. Agawu’s work provides a succinct and useful refutation of Schenkerian theory’s exclusion of significant rhetorical signals. Dederer and Cheng suggest ways that music theory pedagogy might handle the output of what Dederer calls “the art of monstrous men” (2017).

Agawu’s 1984 article “Structural Highpoints in Schumann’s *Dichterliebe*” enacts a subtle and potent rhetorical departure from Schenkerian exclusivity. Agawu opens his study by highlighting that two prominent Schenkerian scholars—William Mitchell and Peter Bergquist—entirely omit (or analyze out) musical moments that Agawu values. In the case of Bergquist’s 1980 analysis of Mahler’s Tenth Symphony, Agawu grounds his argument in the judgement that Schenkerian reductions remove the very events he finds impactful, writing: “For the average listener, the salient feature of the piece is

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1 The questions “who counts?” and “who is doing the counting?” were initially suggested by Ellie Hisama’s 2019 SMT plenary paper, “Getting to Count,” presented in the same session as Ewell’s paper. Hisama references writings by Sara Ahmed (2000 and 2012), who asks these same questions of feminist theory and institutional hierarchies.

the pair of shattering climaxes that occurs about two-thirds of the way through” but that “Bergquist, however, has little use for these rhetorical signals” (1984, 159). Agawu claims that Schenker’s theory is insufficient to account for important rhetorical events that occur during the unfolding of Schumann’s music. Presenting a new and decidedly broader theory of what *counts* within this repertoire, Agawu cites Leonard Meyer’s conception of “primary” and “secondary” parameters, writing that “a hierarchy of dimensions derived from late eighteenth-century practice—with, for example, melody, harmony, and rhythm as primary, and texture, dynamics, and register as secondary—is no longer tenable here” (1984, 165). Stated more directly, what is “no longer tenable” for Agawu is that central events in *Dichterliebe* are being excluded by the prevailing theory of his time. His statement that Bergquist “has little use for these rhetorical signals” reads as a cordial way of saying that Bergquist’s approach is not useful for the analysis of *Dichterliebe* because it analyzes away events that *must count*. In doing so, Agawu contradicts both earlier and later Schenkerian approaches to the work by Forte (1959) and Ferris (2001), and instead devises a theory inclusive of the architecture and expressive function of highpoints. At our annual theory conferences, and within pedagogical environments, it is disheartening to speak to students whose research topics seem either directed away from the music they love, or, if the music they love happens to conform to academic norms, directed away from their favorite parts of that music. Agawu’s article provides a vivid, teachable example of a thinker who refuses to allow established reductive systems to quash his sensibility regarding what counts.

The field of cultural studies seems ahead of music theory in its reckoning with the question that Claire Dederer poses in her article “What Do We Do with the Art of Monstrous Men?” (2017). Dederer inspects the manner in which influential art is often casually separated from the racist, sexist, and often criminal behavior of its makers.<sup>2</sup> Her inquiry can usefully be mapped on to music theory and music theorists: just as Ewell (2019) chronicles William Rothstein’s dismissal of Schenker’s racist writings as “peripheral ramblings,” Dederer chronicles her encounters with colleagues who act as apologists for those accused of abuse. Focusing on the matter of Woody Allen’s *Manhattan* (1979), which disturbingly depicts the sexual relationship between Allen’s adult character and a 17-year-old girl played by Muriel Hemingway, Dederer writes:

A great work of art brings us a feeling. And yet when I say Manhattan makes me feel *urpy* (sic), a man says, *No, not that feeling. You’re having the wrong feeling*. He speaks with authority: *Manhattan is a work of genius*. But who gets to say? Authority says the work shall remain untouched by the life. Authority says biography is fallacy. Authority believes the work exists in an ideal state (ahistorical, alpine, snowy, pure). Authority ignores the natural feeling that arises from biographical knowledge of a subject. Authority gets snippy about stuff like that. Authority claims it is able to appreciate the work free of biography, of history. Authority sides with the (male) maker, against the audience (2017).

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<sup>2</sup> Writing in *The New York Times* ten days before the publication of Dederer’s essay, Amanda Hess emphasizes the clarity afforded by connecting artist’s biographies—however sordid—to their artworks, writing: “Drawing connections between art and abuse can actually help us see the works more clearly, to understand them in all of their complexity, and to connect them to our real lives and experiences—even if those experiences are negative” (2017).

Transposed onto Schenker studies, we can undertake a similar investigation: a great work of theory “brings us a feeling.” The academic attention devoted to Schenker’s writings places him as a “genius” within the discipline. However, following Dederer, who gets to make this claim? Gatekeeping the field, the answer has been—for centuries—white men. To be sure, Schenker is not uninteresting: encountering his music theory within the undergraduate classroom, the basic premise of Schenker’s graphic analyses is fascinating, akin perhaps to anatomical diagrams of the human body where various interior systems can be viewed in action. But if students are allowed (or assigned) to read a more complete selection of Schenker’s writings, they, like Dederer, would become aware of what the theory is fundamentally *about* within the larger philosophy of the theory’s originator.

In the face of these complexities, a useful way forward comes from musicologist William Cheng, who takes up Dederer’s ideas within the field of music pedagogy. While his 2019 article “Gaslight of the Gods: Why I Still Play Michael Jackson and R. Kelly for My Students” is not Schenker-specific, its conclusions pinpoint the balancing act required when encountering the output and actions of “monstrous men.” Surveying the debates surrounding whether artists such as Michael Jackson are “too big to cancel,” as well as the role of teachers in the power-dynamic surrounding inclusivity, Cheng offers a decidedly humane conclusion: “I respect the decisions of teachers who are taking firm stands in favor of cancellation. Deprogramming, divesting, and boycotting are all vital tools in combating the myriad vices of musicians and music industries. For my part, I believe there’s a complementary wisdom in allowing ourselves, as an exercise, to listen on occasion to the music of problematic artists, if only to speak candidly about our common vulnerabilities” (2019). The output of a racist figure such as Schenker does not necessarily need to be entirely suppressed, but his work requires recontextualization within music theory.

Schenker was not unique in his racism; a proper investigation across our discipline would uncover many more such racists. Following Cheng, if and when Schenker’s work is taught, the totality of his published views should be made clear. His racism should not continue to be explained away as “peripheral” to his theory, as Ewell illustrates in his slides “Whitewashing Schenker I & II” (2019) with quotations from Oswald Jonas, Ernst Oster, Forte, Rothstein, William Benjamin, Nicholas Cook, and John Rothgeb. Indeed, Ewell’s paper provides a rather ideal essay to read (aloud) within any module or lecture about Schenker precisely because it offers students information that will allow them to think critically and simultaneously about *both* his racism and his music theory.

Cheng’s discussion of inclusivity and exclusivity deftly characterizes the role of the teacher navigating a field that is crowded with artists (Gesualdo, Wagner, James Levine) whose actions potentially contaminate their contributions. He puts a fine point on the value of critical thinking: “To be clear, it’s not my job to tell students what music they should love or consume. My job is to teach them how to think critically about the consequences of consumption, the nature of aesthetic enchantment, the tangled networks of music-industrial forces, and the rhetorical strategies displayed by people on multiple sides of a given issue” (2019). Cheng’s view receives an interdisciplinary echo in Laurie Shrage’s conclusions about anti-Semitism within philosophy, when she writes:

When the anti-Semitic views of great thinkers such as Kant, Voltaire or Hume (or Hegel,



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Schopenhauer, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, for that matter) are exposed, one typical response is to question whether these prejudices are integral to their important works and ideas. But this may be the wrong question. A better question is: *Should those who teach their works and ideas in the 21st century share them without mentioning the harmful stereotypes these thinkers helped to legitimize?*” (2019, italics mine).

In music pedagogy and research, inclusivity means not only opening the field to unheard voices, but simultaneously to the ugly, unsettling, and undercutting information about the voices—often male, often white—that are represented there already.

Such a brief rejoinder to Ewell’s paper does not address all the elements at play in the matter of Schenker. Implicit in Schenker’s music theory is the belief that some sounds govern others; Ewell provides ample reminders that the same imbalance informed Schenker’s views on race. Akin to the question of “who counts” in the current United States Census, further scholarship is necessary to contextualize the theories that populate our analytical landscape. Schenker’s racism, and its explicit mirroring in his estimation of what counts *as music*, is itself being countered by recent research that accepts and celebrates the sounds produced by performers, not simply the notations produced by composers. Following Agawu, theorists should make their own estimations of what aspects of a work (or a performance, or a recording) are salient rhetorical signals, and theorize accordingly. The writings of Dederer and Cheng, each in their own way, exemplify scholarship that maturely responds to the complex intersectionality that exists between musical, social, and political realities. Alongside Ewell’s, their work points not only to a franker discussion of the stifling and prejudicial views of many influential thinkers, but also to a widening of what counts as music theory, and who does the counting.

## Response to P. Ewell

### JACK BOSS

In debating, it often happens that one can take the premises used by one's opponent to arrive at a certain conclusion, and use them to reach exactly the opposite conclusion. In the case we are discussing here, it seems as if Philip Ewell has portrayed Heinrich Schenker as arguing from the premise that musical works of genius build themselves out from an *Ursatz* through diminution, and reaching the conclusion that Black musicians cannot produce works of genius. And Ewell seems to be calling on present-day music theorists to throw out not only what he understands to be Schenker's conclusion (which, whether Schenker believed it or not, is surely an erroneous one, deserving of censure) but also the premise that leads to it (the *Ursatz* can help us identify works of genius).

Tim Jackson has already shown (pp. 157–166) that Schenker's attitude toward Black musicians was more nuanced than what Ewell asserts, changing over time as Schenker himself matured. So my response will focus instead on the possibility, perhaps even the *necessity* during our present time, of using the premises of Schenkerian analysis to lead to the opposite conclusion; that Black musicians did indeed produce works of genius, works which ornamented their structures in new and fascinating ways, and are worthy of our study.

To illustrate my point, Example 1 consists of the opening section (A) from Art Tatum's solo piano improvisation on "Willow Weep for Me," a song in AABA form. (I worked from Brent Edstrom's transcription, found in *The Art Tatum Collection* (Hal Leonard, 1996).) This Schenkerian analysis highlights with precision what elements Tatum added to Ann Ronell's original song. For example, Ronell builds her tune from a repeating upper neighbor D-E-D, which Tatum also repeats, adding to it multiple chromatic neighbors to form first  $\flat\text{II}^{13}$  and then  $\text{IV}^{13}_7$  chords. Later (mm. 7–8) Tatum introduces octave coupling to further transform Ronell's simple neighbor. At m. 9, Tatum anticipates Ronell's ii-V-I that ends the A section with a series of seventh chords descending by fifth, a 10-7 linear intervallic pattern that pushes the music toward the flat side, before coming out on the pre-dominant in m. 10. And there is a wealth of other diminutional details here that characterize Tatum's improvisational style—and mark him as a genius.

It seems to me that one of Allen Forte's priorities as a practitioner of Schenkerian analysis was to use the method to illustrate the genius of musicians who wrote in popular styles—and this includes Black musicians. Perhaps his personal favorite among the many books he wrote was *The American Popular Ballad of the Golden Era, 1924–50* (Princeton, 1995). Chapter 14 includes an analysis of Duke Ellington's "I Got It Bad and That Ain't Good," which uses Schenkerian graphs in similar ways to what I have done here to illustrate the specific features that make this, as he puts it, a "splendid song." Thus, to claim that Forte "whitewashed" Schenker is less than accurate, and, worse than that, ignores an important aspect of Forte's own project—to use Schenker's method to reach the conclusion that far more composers and songwriters could be placed under the "genius" umbrella than Schenker was willing to admit. If we can follow in Forte's footsteps by holding on to Schenker's premise while arguing against his limited conclusion, I believe that would be a worthy endeavor.

Example 1. Opening section from Art Tatum's solo piano improvisation on "Willow Weep for Me."

# Willow Weep For Me

As played by Art Tatum

Words and Music by  
ANN RONELL

Freely

Gadd9 A<sup>b</sup><sub>9</sub>/G Gadd9 A<sup>b</sup><sub>9</sub>/G Gadd9 A<sup>b</sup><sub>9</sub>/G

4 Gadd9 A<sup>b</sup><sub>9</sub>/G G C13 G C13

7 G D7/A E<sup>b</sup>7/B<sup>b</sup> G/B C#dim7 Dm7(b5) G13 C7 F7 B<sup>b</sup>7 E<sup>b</sup>7

10 Am7 D7 Gadd9 A<sup>b</sup><sub>9</sub>/G

m. 1 2-4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

G Major: I bII<sup>13</sup> I I IV<sup>13</sup><sub>b7</sub> I IV<sup>13</sup><sub>b7</sub> I V<sup>4</sup> vii<sup>o7</sup>/iii I<sup>6</sup> [vii<sup>o7</sup>] V<sup>7</sup><sub>b5</sub> [V<sup>7</sup>] VII [V<sup>7</sup>] bVI<sup>7</sup> ii<sup>7</sup> V<sup>7</sup> I bII<sup>13</sup> I

## **Response to Philip Ewell**

### **CHARLES BURKHART**

As I hear (on vimeo) Philip Ewell's talk, it contains two main points. The first is a proposal that our white-privileging theory curriculum be reduced from four to two years to make room for two years of non-white music theory. I lack the expertise to comment on this proposal, and must depend on others to figure out how it might be put into practice, and what doing so would mean. Ewell's second point is much simpler—that Schenker's racism infects his music theory. He is quite right to deplore Schenker's racism, but goes way over the top when he equates Schenker's ideas on the inequality of the races with his statement on the inequality of the tones of the scale, and, likewise, equates white control over blacks with the *Uralinie*'s control of the subsequent structural levels. This is to confuse apples with oranges to an extreme degree. If Schenker actually believed such nonsense, he was simply wrong (and not for the first time). Are we therefore to pauperize ourselves—to throw out his better ideas—the ones that have vastly enriched the field of music theory? If not, what is the point in dwelling on his faults at such length? Why this animus?

**UNT\_000987**

## A Response to Philip Ewell

ALLEN CADWALLADER

### INTRODUCTION

I recently viewed the presentation given by Philip Ewell at the plenary session of the 2019 meeting of the *Society for Music Theory*. Seldom have I encountered this degree of misunderstanding concerning Schenker and his work. Two threads of thought emerge in Ewell's discussion: 1) Music theory is white; and 2) Heinrich Schenker was a racist. Concerning the first point, I can sympathize. Our theoretic tradition focuses on a narrowly circumscribed body of literature, spanning the "white" (male) Western world from the chant tradition of the Middle ages through the Austro/Germanic repertoire of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. And it is certainly true that the music of women and Black composers is conspicuously absent in the theory curricula of most colleges and universities. I hope my comments below will shed light on why this is so. For the remainder of my brief response, I will focus on the second point. Let me say from the beginning that I find it odd that Ewell singles out Heinrich Schenker, almost to the point of suggesting that he is responsible for this state of affairs. No other musical thinker or author is cast in this negative light.

### STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY VERSUS CULTURAL SUPERIORITY

In his PowerPoint slides, Professor Ewell presents two theoretical remarks from Schenker's late work. In one slide, he cites Schenker's assertion that the intermediate tones of the major scale are not equal [*in function*];<sup>1</sup> nor, we can infer, are the chords that are built upon them. It is well understood, for instance, that the II and VI chords are "lower-ranking" in relation to V and I. Nevertheless, Ewell concludes, "Here we begin to see how Schenker's racism pervaded his music theories. In short, neither racial classes nor pitch classes were equal in Schenker's theories."<sup>2</sup> The second citation, also from *Free Composition*, concerns Schenker's theoretical notion that the Fundamental Structure (background level) "controls" the middleground and foreground levels. The fact that Ewell assigns racial properties to the deep levels of a *hierarchy* evinces a gross misunderstanding of Schenker's thought and the ways in which we organize our perceptions.

Hierarchies are not about equality and inequality. Rather, they are essential parts of how human beings (regardless of gender or race) process and classify the phenomena of the world in which we live. Consider the inverted pyramid of biology, a hierarchy used to classify the animal kingdom.<sup>3</sup> At the

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I wish to thank Hedi Siegel for reading a draft of this response and for making many valuable suggestions.

1 This is my editorial addition. Certainly Schenker was thinking about the function of the tones relative to the tonic. See also Victor Zuckerkandl, *Sound and Symbol*, Princeton University Press, 1969.

2 This conclusion is ludicrous and suggests that Professor Ewell is not at all well versed in theories of functional common-practice tonality.

3 Many examples of biological pyramid structures can be found on the internet by searching "pyramid biology."

top of the pyramid (normally the wide base) resides the highest-ranking class, the “kingdom.” Moving downward, we ultimately find “species,” the lowest-ranking class. Any given slice of such a hierarchy *relates logically to what precedes and to what follows*.<sup>4</sup>

I evoke this example from biology—and I could name others in mathematics, physics, and the social sciences—to suggest that something higher-ranking “controls” lower-ranking events *not* in the sense that a land owner governs the slaves of a plantation. That is “cultural superiority,” which embodies “the belief that [one] is better than other people.” Schenker’s theoretical hierarchies, on the other hand, are purely structural. The *Ursatz* is a case in point. The background resides at the top level of the hierarchy and is the result of the *transformational processes* (involving harmony, counterpoint, and *Auskomponierung*) that lead from the lower-level foreground, through the middleground, and ultimately toward the singularity of the background. To suggest that Schenker’s background *Urlinie* is racist is patently absurd. It developed logically from the *Urlinie* of 1921. At that time, scalar formations, moving upward and downward—and that are similar to the lines of strict counterpoint—shape the musical surface and foreground. Subsequent development through the *Meisterwerk* years led Schenker to the *Urlinie* of *Five Graphic Music Analyses* and *Free Composition*.

## SCHENKER’S ANTECEDENTS

I should remind Professor Ewell that, in the early twentieth century, Schenker was dissatisfied with the state of musical composition and scholarship.<sup>5</sup> For this reason he turned to ideas from the past, among others, to practical ideas drawn from Fux and C.P.E. Bach, for the sources of his inspiration and musical theories. For Schenker, the disciplines of harmony, counterpoint, and thoroughbass were paramount. (I should also remind Professor Ewell that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries hardly provided a cordial environment for Women composers/performers or for the inclusion of Black participation in intellectual thought.)

The development of Schenker’s ideas is well documented and need not be overly rehearsed here. A study of harmony (1906) led to an epic two-volume examination of species counterpoint (1910 and 1922), and, ultimately, to *Free Composition* (1935).<sup>6</sup> These studies embodied musical traditions that, while narrow from our modern cultural perspective, were nonetheless central to the development of his ideas. My point is that Schenker was a practical theorist who drew upon practical musical ideas from the past. To espouse their principles, and the repertoire from which they are drawn, is at worst exclusionary, not

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4 In music theory of the 1980s, Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff successfully used similar principles of structural hierarchy in their tree diagrams. See *A Generative Theory of Tonal Music*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT press, 1983.

5 “We stand before a Herculeum and Pompeii of music! All musical culture is buried; the very tonal material—that foundation of music which artists, transcending the spare clue provided by the overtone series, created anew in all respects from within themselves—is demolished.” See Schenker, *Counterpoint*, Vol. 1, p. xvii.

6 Schenker’s earlier plan was to follow his study of counterpoint with an exposition of musical form; however, he abandoned this plan. Bear in mind that the final part of *Counterpoint II* is titled “Bridges to Free Composition,” which led eventually to *Der freie Satz*.

racist. I believe that John Rothgeb was correct in asserting that Schenker's *musical* thought is "not at all dependent on any of his extra-musical speculations," despite what Schenker himself might have believed.<sup>7</sup>

### SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

As Philip Ewell's slides indicate, Heinrich Schenker made distasteful statements and embraced some unsavory cultural prejudices. But what, exactly, does this mean for contemporary music theory and pedagogy? Must we, as Ewell suggests, take these unfortunate biases into the classroom and dissect them in our conferences?<sup>8</sup> Consider some of Carl Schachter's comments about Schenker's ideology:

More than sixty years after his death, [Schenker's] musical ideas are still alive and active and continue to stimulate new and creative work. His ideas about society and politics, for the most part, enjoy no such productive afterlife, and many are thoroughly discredited . . . If our aim is to study Schenker's writings not only as important artifacts in the history of music theory but also in relation to literary and philosophical currents of thought, then attention to the ideology is certainly a necessary part of [such] study. Only we must be careful to view Schenker's polemics in the context of other writings of his time and not to judge them as if they were the products of a person writing after World War II.

I never think about Schenker's politics, religion, or philosophy when engaged in analyzing a piece or refining a theoretical concept, and I rarely discuss these matters when teaching analysis . . . In my Chopin Etude class, I had a natural opportunity to discuss Schenker's German chauvinism. . . . I could have, but I didn't. I saw no reason to risk antagonizing any of my students . . . Not one of the countless musical ideas that we gleaned from Schenker's analyses would have been in any way changed by such a discussion.

[Schenker's] politics would hold no interest for anybody were it not for the music theory and analysis. I firmly believe that the ideology is in no way an essential component of the analytic practice.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *Counterpoint I*, p. xiv.

<sup>8</sup> I think not. But if so, then we need, for example, to do the same also for Wagner and his music. His famous article, "Judaism in Music," aptly represents Wagner's deeply-embedded anti-Semitic beliefs. And Huckleberry Finn spoke words that we today find unspeakable; must we therefore denounce Samuel Clemens as a racist? What *should* be discussed in the classroom is not Huckleberry Finn's racism *per se*, but that he ceased to be a racist when he finally acknowledges the equality of Jim. I thank William Pastille for this insight.

<sup>9</sup> Carl Schachter, "Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker's Politics and the Pedagogy of Schenkerian Analysis." *Theory and Practice* 26 (2001), pp. 1–20 (extracts). I urge the readers to read the complete text of this important article. I find it strange that Philip Ewell did not reference this study in his presentation. Ewell presents isolated remarks by Schenker, explaining them *out of context* and without regard to the analytic significance of Schenker's work.



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In 2020, almost exactly 100 years after the term *Urlinie* appeared in print, music theorists and pedagogues have the means and perspective to focus on the good, not the bad, *and* to broaden substantially our musical vistas to include women and people of color. It need not be Either/Or. I have spent my entire career involved with Schenker's work, mostly with his theories and his analyses alone, marveling at the musical insights they can reveal about a certain repertoire. Let us expand that repertoire and celebrate diversity in scholarship and in the classroom. But let's not set aside the countless musical ideas and analytical techniques Schenker bequeathed to posterity.

## Patterns of Exclusion in Schenkerian Theory and Analysis

SUZANNAH CLARK

In his powerful plenary lecture, Philip Ewell quoted the following passage from an opinion piece entitled “Confronting Philosophy’s Anti-Semitism,” by Professor of Philosophy Laurie Shrage, published in *The New York Times* (March 18, 2019):

When the anti-Semitic views of great thinkers such as Kant, Voltaire or Hume (or Hegel, Schopenhauer, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, for that matter) are exposed, one typical response is to question whether these prejudices are integral to their important works and ideas. But this may be the wrong question. A better question is: Should those who teach their works and ideas in the 21st century share them without mentioning the harmful stereotypes these thinkers helped to legitimize?

Shrage went on to point out how core-curriculum philosophy taught across North American universities typically reinforces the patterns of exclusion of Judaism practiced by such figures as Kant, Voltaire, Hume and others. She argues that philosophers do indeed owe it to their students to explain how the “professional habits and pieties [of philosophy] have been shaped by religious intolerances and other forms of bigotry.” However, her main objective was to call for a more inclusive curriculum, though she cautioned against introducing such traditions as Jewish, Islamic, and Buddhist philosophy under the rubric “non-Western,” for this would surely “reinscribe a fundamental divide between West and the rest, where the West is portrayed as the major agent of human advancement.” This debate about the nomenclature of world traditions and its implications will be familiar to ethnomusicologists, musicologists, and music theorists.

Similarly, Ewell called for the SMT to expand its horizons beyond its European roots and pernicious white racial frame. One might be tempted to argue that inroads have already been made, given the inception of global music theory and the growth of jazz and popular music theory. Yet, adding new repertoires, methodologies, and traditions—and a few apposite adjectives before “music theory”—is not in itself enough, for it runs the risk of leaving the European tradition untouched. The benefit of a more inclusive music theory is that new perspectives bring new questions to the currently dominant mode of music-theoretical thought.

My focus in this essay will primarily be on an issue faced by both theorists and philosophers, namely what to do when an influential figure—such as Heinrich Schenker—is known for his prejudice. Ewell provided abundant examples of Schenker’s blatant racism from both his *Nachlaß* and published materials. Alas, anyone familiar with the *Nachlaß* (Federhofer 1985; Schenker Documents Online) and published theoretical work will know that Ewell only scratched the surface. Nonetheless, it was hard not to bristle at the sample presented in the plenary talk.

Throughout his career, Schenker was open about his views and even eager to publish them. Compare, for example, Heidegger, whose *Black Notebooks* dating from 1931–41 were only published in 2014 since he requested that they appear as the last items of his *Gesamtausgabe*. During the 1930s, Heidegger supported Nazism, which was well-known. What has caused a stir is the discovery of unambiguous

anti-Semitism in the later volumes. Amongst the varied reactions to this news by both scholars and the press is precisely the response that Shrage has suggested “may be the wrong question,” namely asking whether Heidegger’s anti-Semitic views are integral to his work and ideas.

In my view, this is not only the right question, it is an imperative one. Indeed, doubts about the relevance of thinkers’ beliefs to their works and ideas tend to arise when those beliefs have negative connotations. As humanists, we energetically trace and document influences but it is capricious to dismiss the investigation of flows of influence when the material is unpalatable.

As for Schenker, Ewell cited numerous examples of translators, editors, and scholars who at one time or another have balked at the idea that Schenker’s “polemics” (as they tend to call it) are integral to his theoretical output: Jonas, Oster, Forte, Rothgeb, Benjamin, Rothstein and Cook.<sup>1</sup> This implies that bigotry, racism, sexism, and xenophobia are autonomous entities that have nothing to do with other idea formations. Rather than exonerating Schenker, Ewell focused in particular on Schenker’s racism and German nationalism and showed how the theorist’s prejudices framed patterns of exclusion that supported the white racial frame. Schenker legitimized a narrow anointed repertoire and a narrow stylistic tolerance.

In this essay, I am interested in demonstrating how we ought to trace interconnections between Schenker’s beliefs and his theory principles and/or analytical choices. Ewell hinted at two cases of resonances between Schenker’s racism and theoretical concepts, however he did not pursue the implications of his observations. To be sure, Ewell had too little time to attend to every aspect of the vast topic he tackled in his plenary talk, but, while presenting the long list above of scholars who have rejected the relevance of Schenker’s prejudices to his theory, he omitted mention of any scholars who have claimed that there is such a connection. In addressing this gap in this essay, I should also point out that the group of scholars who have highlighted such connections by no means agree on what it means for Schenkerian practice. As I shall demonstrate, some scholars who attribute significance to Schenker’s ideology and its role in shaping his theory nonetheless still shy away from ultimately thinking that the ideology remains in place when the theory is practiced. As I shall illustrate below, and as I have argued elsewhere (Clark 1999 and 2007), many of the most foundational elements of Schenkerian theory were defined by Schenker’s worst convictions or quirky superstitions, a fact which opens up profound questions of what we mean to achieve as theorists if we summarily substitute his irrational foundations with ostensibly logical axioms in order to practice his theory.

Once again, the points raised in the paragraph by Shrage cited at the outset of this essay demand further reflection, not least because they are so persistent. Almost two decades ago, Carl Schachter (2001) pondered exactly the same questions as she did. In laying out the plan for his article “Elephants,

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<sup>1</sup> The comments by Jonas, Oster, and Forte may be found in Schenker (1979, xiii and xviii); Rothgeb’s are in Schenker (1987, vol 1, xiv). See also Benjamin (1981, 157), Rothstein (1986, 8), and Cook (2007, 148 and 153). It may come as a surprise to some readers that Cook is included here. While the overall message of his book was to contextualize Schenker’s thought in its historical context, Cook often equivocated about the significance of Schenker’s political and racial prejudices when the theorist’s attitude was at its most egregious.

Crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker's Politics and the Pedagogy of Schenkerian Analysis," Schachter wrote:

What I want to do in this paper is first of all to survey Schenker's political views and attempt to place them in historical context. Secondly I wish to consider whether the musical and political ideas are necessarily bound together for Schenker's readers today (few of whom would welcome the kind of societal regeneration he sought). And finally whether the teaching of his approach nowadays needs to incorporate references to his political ideology (2001, 4).

In placing Schenker's views in historical context, Schachter cited numerous individuals from Schenker's time who held similar views. In so doing, he deployed the familiar argument that Schenker's views were commonplace and that people of the past need not be held up to the same moral standards as people of today. Yet, Schachter also points to numerous friends and acquaintances who were in direct contact with Schenker and who openly disagreed with him. These included Oswald Jonas, Walter Dahms and Victor Hammer (Schachter 2001, 12). Despite being regularly challenged over his views, Schenker dug in his heels. Indeed, Schenker's publisher Emil Hertzka even tried to convince Schenker to remove the article "The Mission of German Genius" from *Tonwille*, finding its xenophobic comments both ill-conceived and a barrier to international sales.<sup>2</sup> Schenker rejected any suggestion that he ought to leave out his polemics from his theoretical work. He saw them as tightly bound together. Thus, presenting Schenker as little more than a child of his time and place, as Schachter did, is problematic (2001, 9).

Schachter's second ambition was carefully worded. While attributing significance to Schenker's convictions, he questioned whether "Schenker's readers today" need persist in reflecting on their connection. He parsed the following statement by Allen Forte, which Ewell also cited (see n. 1 above):

Almost none of the material bears substantive relation to the musical concepts that he developed during his lifetime and, from that standpoint, can be disregarded; it is, however, part of the man and his work (cited in Schachter 2001, 10).

While Schachter distances himself from Forte's view that Schenker's thought and theory were mutually exclusive, he continues: "none [of the polemical material] is inseparable from the musical ideas" (2001, 10). This leaves little daylight between his own conclusions and Forte's since, in the end, Schachter presumes it is possible to disregard the politics after all. Matthew Brown (2005) reaches a similar conclusion. He attributed significance to Schenker's beliefs yet argued they could be substituted with axiomatic musical explanations. Meanwhile, part of Schachter's argument is that Schenker's drive toward the autonomy of musical analysis—that is, toward a "non-verbal mode of presentation"—means

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<sup>2</sup> For more on Hertzka's objections, see the General Prefaces by Ian Bent and William Drabkin in Schenker (2004, vii–viii and 2005, vi–vii). In particular, Hertzka remarked "I find it impossible to believe that a genius-aristocracy would flourish better in the context of imperialism and militarism than in the context of democracy" (quoted in Schenker 2004, vii). Universal Edition also suppressed its name in favor of a fictitious publisher named "Tonwille-Flugblätterverlag." The publisher reminded Schenker of a conversation in which the following conditions had been imposed: when Universal Edition tied the use of its name to "a certain right of censorship when it comes to personal and national-political attacks, you made very clear that under these conditions you would prefer 'Tonwille Press' to continue to appear as the publisher. And we took note of this at the time, and accordingly retained it as the publisher's imprint" (quoted in Schenker 2005, vii).

that everything besides the graphic notation can be disregarded. However, as I have argued elsewhere, Schenker's theoretical principles, analytical choices, and graphic notation *represent* and *present* his ideology (Clark 2007; see also Ebyl 1995).

Schachter also felt that Schenker's claims about musical hierarchy need not necessarily be a reflection of his views on German superiority and preference for monarchic rule because a contemporary like Riemann also believed in German superiority and musical hierarchy yet came up with a different theory. However, it is possible for people to hold the same beliefs yet draw different implications from them. Witness the compelling case made by Matthew Arndt (2018) that the contrasts between Schenker's and Schoenberg's musical thought emerged despite the two composer-theorists sharing the same spiritual belief system.

Finally, Schachter argues that there is no need to draw attention to the politics while teaching Schenker's theory. As he puts it, "I confess that I never think about Schenker's politics, religion, or philosophy when engaged in analyzing a piece or refining a theoretical concept, and I very rarely discuss these matters when teaching analysis" (2001, 13). He provides instances of when he could have discussed Schenker's views with students, but didn't, seeing "no reason to risk antagonizing any of my students" (2001, 15). Such an approach of keeping students in the dark does little to protect them; it protects Schenker. Moreover, keeping his beliefs under wraps obscures the derivation of Schenker's theoretical principles and analytical decisions and how he distinguished himself from other theorists.

In the space that remains, I shall revisit an example scrutinized by Nicholas Cook (2007, 287–89) regarding Schenker's exclusion of a salient subdominant. It will lead us briefly to another example that also excludes a salient modulation—this time a chromatic one. Taken together, they reveal patterns of exclusion which have their justification in Schenker's disdain for other cultures and races and his invocation of nature, numerical mysticism, monarchic rule, German genius, and a sacred triangle.

Heine's poem "Wenn ich in deine Augen seh'" is made up of two stanzas, each comprising four couplets, each of which has a distinctive rhyme to form the scheme aabb ccdd:

Wenn ich in deine Augen seh',  
So schwindet all mein Leid und Weh;  
Doch wenn ich küsse deinen Mund,  
So werd' ich ganz und gar gesund.

When I look into your eyes,  
All my suffering and pain disappear;  
But when I kiss your mouth,  
Then I regain my health totally.

Wenn ich mich lehn' an deine Brust,  
Kommt's über mich wie Himmelslust;  
Doch wenn du sprichst: "Ich liebe dich!"  
So muß ich weinen bitterlich.

When I lean upon your breast,  
There comes over me a feeling of heavenly passion;  
But when you say: "I love you!"  
Then I must weep bitterly.<sup>3</sup>

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3 The translation is from Perrey 2002, 181.

Each of the first three couplets focuses on a different part of the beloved's body—the “Augen” (eyes), “Mund” (mouth), and “Brust” (bosom), which Agawu (1984, 161) sees as a progression of increasing intimacy that cuts across the stanzaic boundary of the two-stanza poem. In the last couplet, the beloved speaks—or is quoted as saying “Ich liebe dich!” In quintessential fashion, Heine introduces caustic irony in the last line. In response to hearing her say she loves him, the protagonist responds with: “so muß ich weinen bitterlich” (“then I must weep bitterly”). Indeed, the irony in the poem is not necessarily evident until the last word, which is the moment when the reader of the poem learns *how* the protagonist is weeping. It also implies a context for the beloved's exclamation “Ich liebe dich!” that belies its literal meaning, a context which is fleshed out in the rest of the cycle of poems in Heine's *Lyrisches Intermezzo*, from which Schumann drew poems for his song cycle *Dichterliebe*. Sketches of Heine's poem reveal that he initially ended with the word “freudichlich,” meaning “joyfully” (Hallmark 1975, 105, n. 5). What a difference a word can make.

Schumann set the poem as a through-composed song (see Ex. 1). The word repetition might have suggested a strophic setting, given the “wenn ich .... doch wenn” construction of both stanzas. However, the declamatory style and fluid form is unique in Schumann songs from this time (Malin 2010, 128). Schumann was encouraged to write a through-composed song perhaps, as Agawu (1984, 161) has suggested, because he sensed the dynamic quality of the poem's increasing sense of intimacy in the first three couplets, followed by the twist at the end. As numerous commentators have pointed out, Schumann alerts the listener to the twist at the end far earlier than Heine's last word (see for example Hallmark 1975, 101–2; Agawu 1984, 161; Perrey 2002, 184). Already at “sprichst,” Schumann introduces a chromatic move in the vocal line, from G to G $\sharp$ , and harmonizes it with a diminished seventh chord. At the same time, he also changes the chordal piano accompaniment that has hitherto dominated the texture. The striking new descending arpeggio in m. 13 is further marked by a “*ritardando*.” The dissonance resolves to generate a wisp of A minor (in the context of a global tonic G major), whose lack of security or grounding as an established key gives away the twist yet to come verbally. Suurpää (1996, 112) argues Schumann introduces musical sorrow even earlier, at mm. 8–9. His graph (not reproduced here) brings out the parallel octaves between the outer voices of the downbeats of mm. 8 and 9.<sup>4</sup> Suurpää rather brilliantly observes that Schumann once drew a link in his writings between parallel octaves and fifths and the sorrow of life.<sup>5</sup> When the last line finally comes, Schumann cloaks it in a sweetness, which lends a sense of resignation (Malin 2010, 129). Indeed, whichever of these is one's preferred reading, Schumann's music simulates a poetic reader who already knows the poem, rather than a first-time reader who is likely startled by the last word.

Schumann set the endings of the two poetic stanzas as harmonic rhymes, albeit in different keys. The first is in the subdominant C major (mm. 7–8) and the second in the tonic G major (mm. 15–16). Hallmark (1975, 102) observed that the *ossia* in the vocal line at the opening of m. 7, which invites

4 Suurpää's sketch (p. 111, “example 5”) can be viewed at [www.esm.rochester.edu/integral/10-1996/10-suurpaa/](http://www.esm.rochester.edu/integral/10-1996/10-suurpaa/)

5 Witness, by contrast, how Smith (1996) treats the passage, emphasizing the tonic E minor over the arpeggiation through B major. Thus, octaves can be avoided here despite the elevation of the subdominant; see ahead to Ex. 5.

the singer to match the upper line of the piano throughout the measure rather than just at the end, was inserted at the stage of publication. It does not appear in the sketches. Most singers sing the *ossia*, consequently few hear this passage as mirrored in the conclusion of the vocal line in mm. 15–16. As Hallmark (1979, 104) suggests, singing the original vocal line in m. 7 would bring out the only remnant of a would-be strophic form, although it should also be observed that Schumann changes details in the harmonic underpinning of the two passages. By contrast, singing the *ossia* places the highpoint unusually early in the form, as Agawu (1984, 175) has observed.

Significantly for my current argument, the subdominant in m. 8 will be the only conspicuous modulation in the song. It is also the only clear PAC cadence in the whole song, emphasized as it is by the *f* dynamic (and the highest pitch in the vocal line, if the *ossia* is taken, as noted earlier). Even the return to the tonic at the end feigns a PAC between the vocal line and the bass: the piano's right hand scuppers the effect due to the held D above the tonic. Nor does the postlude make up for it. It too avoids a PAC. I shall return to this observation shortly.

Schenker excluded this subdominant modulation from his graph in *Free Composition* (reproduced as Ex. 2). Unlike many of Schenker's graphs, this one has measure numbers for virtually every event. At m. 8, there is indeed a C-major subdominant harmony. However, cross-reference with the score (Ex. 1) reveals that the presentation of the harmony in Schenker's graph—with G in the upper voice, followed by the passing note A—refers to the end of m. 8 and not to the arrival of C major with the PAC cadence at the beginning of m. 8. Schenker's initial interest in m. 8 is with the piano's upper line. However, he notates it in the octave occupied by the voice, which enters only with the note A that leads to the reiteration of the *Kopftón*  $\hat{3}$ . Instead of being harmonized by G major,  $\hat{3}$  is harmonized by B major. While common enough (see Schenker 1979, Figure 14.1b for its simplest incarnation), its surface-level function is the dominant to E minor. The connection between B major and E minor as dominant-to-tonic is not obvious from Schenker's notation. The bass possesses no slur, as dominant-tonic gestures usually do. Rather, it is left to the Roman numerals in the parentheses below the graph to draw out the connection. They are interpreted in the overall key of G major; hence the equal sign, followed by III<sup>#</sup>–VI<sup>♯</sup> in parentheses in Schenker's graph (Ex. 2).

Kofi Agawu (1984, 174) fleshed out mm. 1–8 in order to show the foreground that is “implied by Schenker's middleground” (see Ex. 3). He also argues that the diminished seventh chord, shown in Schenker's graph as a passing sonority in m. 13, “exists strictly speaking, only on the foreground level of structure” (1984, 174). He concludes that “this inconsistency points to an obvious difficulty in the rigid application of the rules for middleground reduction, rules which may result in the elimination of important surface characteristics. The chord in b. 13 represents one of the most striking moments in the song, and Schenker is clearly aware of this” (1984, 174). Just as Schenker could pluck a striking moment such as the diminished seventh from the foreground and feature it in an otherwise middleground graph, so he could exclude an inconvenient striking moment such as the subdominant.

Nicholas Cook (2007, 287) rightly suspected that Schenker's belief in the “mysterious five” had something to do with his exclusion of the subdominant modulation from his graph of Schumann's song. Schenker introduced the mysterious five in *Harmonielehre* (1954, 25–44) and reasserted its importance



at the beginning of *Free Composition* (1979, 10). It lies behind the question mark under Figure 6.4, which shows a I–IV–I bassline. Reproduced in Ex. 4, it is one of many basslines that Schenker annotated with a question mark in this figure. Only I–V–I has no question mark underneath it. Schenker posits that all of the basslines with a question mark are “out of the question” (1979, 14). These question marks in parentheses are not gentle queries or signs of a perplexed author, but signal the emphatic exclusion of the material above them. The reason that I–IV–I is out of the question is that “the arpeggiation moves through the IV instead of V” (1979, 14). That’s it? Not quite: he goes on to make a further comment about Figures 6.2 and 6.4: they “express no motion whatsoever and thus do not signify an artistic realization of a chord” (1979, 14).

A few paragraphs later, Schenker explains the importance of the I–V–I bassline in its notated form, this time invoking a geometric rather than numerical mysticism, calling it “the sacred triangle”:<sup>6</sup>

May the musician always carry in his heart the image of the bass arpeggiation! Let this triangle be sacred to him! Creating, interpreting—may he bear it always in ear and eye! By extension, every triad, whether it belongs to the middleground or foreground, strives for its own triangle (1979, 15).

The explanation behind these assertions may be found in the *Harmonielehre* (1954, 25–44). As I have explained elsewhere (Clark 1999), Schenker invoked the “mysterious five” to guide the foundational shape of the musical rudiments of the major system. The subdominant was excluded from his otherwise natural components of the major mode. He asserted:

... the extraneous character of the subdominant fifth *F* [in the *C*-system] should be perceived clearly in this system. This tone should be considered as the representative of another, more remote, system rather than as an organic component of the *C*-system, which, according to Nature’s intention, originated from a series of rising fifths alone (1954, 41).

No matter the salience of a subdominant modulation in a piece of music, it is destined for the foreground, featured as part of “Tonalität,” the illusory keys at the foreground level (1979, 5). Despite Figure 6.4 looking like it possesses a motion to IV, the notes of a descending fifth followed by an ascending fifth go against nature, which ordains that the ascending fifth must come first, following the direction of the overtone series. Generally the subdominant serves as a subsidiary contrapuntal-melodic step of a second—i.e. a predominant (1979, 30). However, Charles Smith (1996, 208) produced a graph with a structure to match the salience of this subdominant (see Ex. 5), although he did not go so far as to create an *Bassbrechung durch die Unterquint* (“underfifth”). Of course, the dominant in the cadence in mm. 15–16 is always available to fulfill the role of the structural dominant. At any rate, anyone faithfully following Schenker’s principle of the *Bassbrechung* though the upper fifth is not at liberty to do what Smith proposes.

It cannot be argued that Schenker excluded IV from his graph of Schumann’s song on the grounds that

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6 Schenker, *Free Composition*, 15. §19 in the English translation (p. 15) bears the title “sacred triangle,” whereas in the German edition (p. 45) it has no title.



he was analyzing the middleground. After all, as mentioned above, he includes the diminished seventh in m. 13 even though it is hardly the stuff of the middleground. Rather, the subdominant was excluded because it threatened to lend support for the viability of a bass through the *Unterquint*, especially given that it is the only significant modulation in the song. Moreover, Schumann's plagal maneuvers in the postlude only highlight the allure of the subdominant in this song. If the sacred triangle must be in the eye and the ear, then the ears listening to Schumann's song risk informing the eyes to remove the question mark from Figure 6.4 and to take in the possibility of an inverted sacred triangle. Such a conclusion brings Schenker within striking distance of dualism, a theory he firmly rejected (1954, xxvi–xxvii). The concept of the mysterious five helped keep dualism—and his theoretical rival, Riemann—at bay.

Schenker's faith in the mysterious five might seem a mere peccadillo, but he deployed it to shape his unique version of the foundation of the rudiments of the major-minor system and to determine the hierarchy both among *Stufen* and the tones of the *Urlinie*. Indeed, it is the basis on which Schenker argued that not all tones of the scale have “real independence or, to use a current but certainly musically unsuitable expression, ‘equal rights’” (1979, 13 n.3). This was the passage that Ewell drew our attention to for its analogy to Schenker's insistence—most likely in opposition to the US constitution—that “it is not true that all men are equal, since it is, rather, out of the question that the incapable ever become able; that which applies to individuals must apply to nations and people as well” (2015, online “Literature” supplement, 23 n. 13). Thus, when Morgan (2014, 62 n. 9) dismisses the mysterious five as “bizarre” yet goes on to present Schenker's foundational principles without any adaptation and when Brown (2005, 213) critiques the mysterious five but not the principles arising from it, the irrational basis for Schenker's patterns of exclusion may have been repudiated but the patterns of exclusion themselves are left intact.

Directly linked to Schenker's commentary on the graph of “Wenn ich in deine Augen seh” is another graph with another exclusion. This time Schenker analyzes Schubert's “Auf dem Flusse,” a song that also contains an inconvenient modulation. Schenker therefore excludes it from his graph (1979, Figure 40.2). The modulation goes to G# minor within the context of an E minor song. As with Schumann's song from *Dichterliebe*, G# minor is the only significant modulation in the song. To prevent the appearance of a *Bassbrechung* that goes through a mediant that would linearize a major triad, Schenker creates instead a large-scale *Anstieg* in the upper voice that outlines a major triad. Contrary to what one might assume, this brazen omission in the bass requires great analytical and theoretical effort on Schenker's part (Clark 2011, 82–88). Indeed, David Lewin (1986) argued that the E-major arpeggiation that Schenker worked so hard to suppress is in fact the “secret” deep structure of the song. Lewin puts immense hermeneutic pressure on this observation. But presumably Schenker felt his effort to hide it was worth it: the omission preserves *Diatonie* at the background level—that level apprehended only by the genius. Schenker's “aristocracy of genius” permits no democracy of tones, no “equal rights” for musical tones. In this analysis, the modulation to G# minor no longer threatens the integrity and purity of the *Ursatz*, which is famously compressed, occupying as it does a single measure.

The choices that Schenker made in his analysis of “Wenn ich in deine Augen seh” and “Auf dem

Flusse” are fascinating. They reveal Schenker’s ingenuity and flair in the service of adhering to the basic tenets of his music-theoretical principles. They also reveal patterns of harmonic exclusion grounded in mystical superstition and polemical conviction. Schenkerian thought is so pervasive in Anglo-American scholarship and theory pedagogy that it is our duty to understand where his musical concepts came from. After all, the promulgation of another theoretical model—not least, Riemann’s function theory—would have led to a very different understanding of both the subdominant and the chromatic mediant that we just studied. Indeed, Riemann’s function theory (or rather, a non-dualistic adaptation of it) is the most common methodology of harmonic analysis in Germany today.

Knowledge of Schenker’s prejudices does not mean that Schenkerian theory should be dismissed. Nor should one assume or oversimplify the interconnections between Schenker’s life and thought. As the study of Schenker continues—much like the study of Heidegger will continue in the wake of the publication of the *Black Notebooks*—my argument is that it is imperative to combine the history of theory with analytical practice. We cannot disregard the origins of theoretical concepts just because we don’t like what we find, especially when those concepts permeate our discipline and cannot be disentangled from the way we have come to understand tonal music. As humanists, it is critical to trace the origin and development of the ideas and concepts that we put into analytical practice. This constitutes a responsible hermeneutics of Schenkerian theory and analysis. By attending to the history of ideas as we practice and critique them, we can work towards a more ethical practice of doing music theory.

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Example 1. Schumann, “Wenn ich in deine Augen seh’,” *Dichterliebe*, op. 48, no. 4.

*Langsam.*

Wenn ich in dei-ne Au-gen seh', so schwin-det all' mein Leid und

4 Weh, doch wenn ich küs-se dei-nen Mund, so werd' ich ganz und gar ge-

8 sund. Wenn ich mich lehn' an dei-ne Brust, kommt's ü-ber mich wie Him-mels-

12 lust, doch wenn du sprichst: „Ich lie-be dich!“ so muss ich wei-nen bit-ter-

16 lich.

Example 2. Schenker, *Free Composition*, Figure 152.1; analysis of Schumann, “Wenn ich in deine Augen seh’,” *Dichterliebe*, op. 48, no. 4.

Schumann, "Wenn ich in deine Augen seh'" (*Dichterliebe*, no. 4)

m. 1 4 5 8 9 12 13 14 15 16

1 3 2 1


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I — (=III<sup>#</sup> - VI<sup>b3</sup> - #3) II V<sup>4</sup> - 3 — I

Example 3. Expansion of mm. 1–8 of Schumann, “Wenn ich in deine Augen seh’,” *Dichterliebe*, op. 48, no. 4 (Agawu 1984, Example 10).

X = sequential rise to highpoint

Example 4. Schenker, *Free Composition*, Figure 6.1–5.

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Example 5. Resketch, to reflect formal shape, of Schumann “Wenn ich in deine Augen seh’,” *Dichterliebe*, op. 48, no. 4 (Smith, Example 5(b)).

4 8 14 16

$\hat{5}$   $\hat{4}$   $\hat{3}$   $\hat{2}$   $\hat{1}$

G:  $\boxed{\text{I}}$   $\frac{\text{V}}{\text{IV}}$   $\boxed{\text{IV}}$  || vi  $(\text{ii}^6)$  V  $\boxed{\text{I}}$

## Response to Philip Ewell

### NICHOLAS COOK

I don't want to make a meal of this, because one of the main arguments of my book *The Schenker Project* was that we shouldn't treat Schenkerian theory—even in its Americanized form—as simply an analytical tool. Against those who believe that Schenker's political beliefs can be detached from his music theory, I argued that when we work with his theory we tacitly sign up to a set of decisions about the nature of music and the questions we should ask about it that reflect the very different times in which Schenker lived. That's why I said “a knowledge of the context within which Schenker formulated his theory—of its social, political, religious, or philosophical dimensions—is important not just if one is to understand why these particular decisions have been made . . . but if one is to understand that decisions have been made at all; the danger otherwise is of an analytical practice that has all the answers but none of the questions” (303). So I agree with Dr. Ewell on the importance of unearthing the cultural and political roots of Schenkerian theory.

At the same time I have a problem with the idea that I “whitewash” Schenker, and I'll confine my comments to that. In my book I included a number of the grisly passages Dr. Ewell quotes, including the multiple references to cannibalism, to Senegalese marriage relationships and racial mixture, and to the ignominy of the black (presumably Senegalese) troops in the Saarland, complete with the reference to genitalitis. I said that such statements could only be seen as “designed to provoke hatred, sometimes of a specifically racial nature;” I referred to passages that are “objectionable by any reasonable standards,” and continued by saying that our aim in such cases should be “to understand—for to understand is not to condone, while to condemn without understanding is futile” (147). A few pages later, however, I admitted that “there is a point when explaining turns into explaining away” (156), referred to “the unacceptable face of Schenker” (157), and documented how many of Schenker's friends and admirers found his views repellent—including Oswald Jonas, who apparently “moved in the 1920s from Vienna to Berlin largely because he could not stand Schenker's politics” (158). This isn't what I would call whitewashing.

Dr. Ewell refers specifically to two passages. The first is my comment that “it is tempting but I think not very helpful to draw the obvious parallel” between Schenker's hierarchical world-view and his music theory (153). Dr. Ewell explains in his talk that “what Cook means to say here is that it would be unhelpful to music theory's white racial frame insofar as it would call attention to race and whiteness,” but I meant nothing of the sort. My comment linked with a discussion earlier in the book about the endless parallels that can be drawn between music, philosophy, law, politics, Jewish culture and just about everything else in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, and the need to properly contextualize such parallels if they are to be meaningful. The same applies to music and society. Examples of what I called “obvious”—that is, direct and non-contextualized—parallels might include claiming that strongly hierarchical music reflects strongly hierarchical society, interpreting dodecaphony as expressing social egalitarianism or atonality as signifying anarchy, or (in Dr. Ewell's example) linking the inequality of tones to the inequality of races. In contrast, the kind of contextualized interpretation I see as more meaningful and therefore more helpful is illustrated by the parallel I drew between Schenker and Guido Adler. I cited

Schenker's praise of Smetana for bringing Bohemian national music into a system: this system, Schenker continues, "is naturally that of German art, for this is best able to solve the principal problem of the logical development of a piece of music," and so Smetana was able "to present Bohemian music in a perfection which will not be surpassed" (79). I read this against Guido Adler speaking nine years later of how the classical composers draw on the national customs of "the Austrian peoples.... As the motivic material is taken from the national stores, which the artists ... work up into classical structures, so may a higher statescraft join the particularities of the peoples into a higher unity" (12). Putting these statements together reveals the sociopolitical significance, in the context of "German logic" and the "higher unity" of the multinational Dual Monarchy, of what might otherwise have been read as a purely musical claim on Schenker's part. It also throws light on the distinction, both musical and sociopolitical, between unity and uniformity about which Schenker wrote in the *Meisterwerk* essay "Abolish the phrasing slur."

As for the second charge of whitewashing, Dr. Ewell says in his talk that I suggest "Schenker was only joking when he wrote the repugnant things he wrote." That's downright misleading because I was referring to one, very specific claim on Schenker's part, when he said of Beethoven's music that "the wide tension-spans of its linear progressions" represent "better proof than any evidence from racial science" that Beethoven was fully German (148). Dr. Ewell is implying that by passing this off as a joke, I'm brushing its real meaning under the carpet. But actually its meaning is the same whether or not it is a joke, and either way it contradicts Dr. Ewell's claim in his talk that Schenker was a biological racist. Schenker is saying that true Germanness cannot be established by a blood test, because it is not a matter of biology but one of culture; the proof of Beethoven's Germanness lies in his music. (The question I raised is whether in saying this Schenker was making fun of Nazi racial science—though I added that there are some things you should not joke about.) And actually, it would be very peculiar if Schenker *was* a biological racist, since that would negate the legitimacy of his own position in relation to the German musical culture of which he saw himself as the only true guardian. (Recall how Philip Bohlman and Ronald Radano characterize the musical implications of biological racism: music played by Jews "would 'sound Jewish' because its performer could not escape a race-specific predilection to a Jewish metaphysics of music.")

What we can say is that Schenker believed in some form of cultural evolutionary theory, implying that white people represent a higher stage of human development than the "more primitive races" to which he referred. Clearly we would regard that as racist today, but the fact is that such thinking is found in a great deal of writing from the high point of imperialism a century or so ago; it wasn't exceptional, in the way that the extremity of Schenker's political beliefs was. The difference in worldview between now and then is something we should always attend to when we engage with the writings or more generally the culture of that period. For example, when we read Schenker's statement in *Free Composition* that music's basis in linear progression means that it "is accessible to all races and creeds alike"—which one might take to indicate a more inclusive attitude on his part—we should be aware that the supposed universal accessibility of Western "art" music was a longstanding trope of imperial legitimization. "Universalism," as Homi Bhabha observes, "masks ethnocentric norms, values, and interests."

I have a final point that arises out of Schenker's Jewish ethnicity. I am uncomfortable with a

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discussion of Schenker's racism that doesn't engage with the way in which racism impinged on his own life. "Race" is in my book title because Schenker was himself marked by race, a Jew in a society in which anti-semitism was often overt, sometimes violent, and never far beneath the surface. From his diaries you get a sense of the tension between a personal commitment to his Jewish identity and public concealment of it, even to the extent of occasionally expressing anti-semitic views himself (as many assimilated Viennese Jews did, mainly in relation to impoverished Eastern Jewish immigrants). And we should never forget that Schenker's wife Jeanette was sent to the Theresienstadt concentration camp in 1942 and died there in 1945; I suppose Heinrich would have shared her fate had he lived long enough. In short, Schenker knew what it was to be a member of a racially marked minority. Maybe when we work with his theory we should remember that, too.



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## A Preliminary Response to Ewell

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Philip Ewell contends that not only was Schenker himself a “fervent racist,” but claims that Schenker’s hierarchical analytical approach *per se* is inherently racist. With the latter assertion, he extends ideas about hierarchy in musical structure paralleling that of human races, just as he claims Schenker to have done. Since Stephen Slottow addresses that issue (pp. 189–94), I will focus here on other matters. When Ewell scapegoats Schenker and Schenkerians for the paucity of African Americans in the field of music theory, what he leaves unsaid becomes just as important as what he actually asserts. Although he brings up anti-Semitism late in his talk, he neglects to mention that Schenker himself was Jewish, as were most of his students, with enormous repercussions for the reception of Schenkerian theory in Europe and America. Furthermore, as Barry Wiener shows (pp. 195–206), because Ewell omits the full context of the excerpts he cites from Schenker’s letters and diary, he often falsifies or misconstrues their meaning. For every citation from Schenker, we cannot be too careful to provide and consider the context, and also check that the transcription and translation are correct. In this regard, most importantly, Ewell will not allow Schenker to evolve and mature, and to change his views. Although Schenker did not lack self-assurance, he did pivot very significantly from a typical German racist to an egalitarian viewpoint, and from a staunch German patriot who hated everything English and American, to one who saw new hope for Schenkerian analysis in America (given his student Hans Weisse’s success here). Furthermore, as anyone knows who carefully studies Schenker’s readings of pieces, he was constantly tweaking them, often revising them significantly as he refined his analytical tools and concepts. But Ewell wants to reify Schenker in order to condemn him, instead of acknowledging his personal metamorphosis. Furthermore, by cherry-picking short phrases out of their full textual and historical environments, he is able to misinterpret them, employing a technique similar to today’s political attack ads that employ video editing of speeches by adversaries to make them appear to say things they never intended.

Already by the mid-1920s, Schenker was keenly aware of the rise of Nazism, and the dangers it posed, and this realization forced him to change his views on race. Just as African Americans and Jews faced fierce racism here in the United States, Schenker and his students (most of whom were also Jewish) had to contend with an equally intense and rising anti-Semitism in Austria and Germany on a daily basis. For example, when his student Mrs. Pairamoll visited on June 25, 1925, Schenker reports in his diary, “anti-Semitism hurts her deeply,” [“Die Antisemitismus trifft sie hart”]. On January 15, 1926, Schenker records a conversation with a chauffeur, who complains that he would have preferred to have worked in a factory rather than drive around “the Jewish pigs” [“Saujuden”] [“lieber in die Frabrik gegangen ist, als dass er die ‘Saujuden’ führte”]. With prescience, Schenker’s student Weisse decided to emigrate to America already in the late 1920s because of anti-Semitism.

When I was a student at CUNY in the early 1980s, my teacher Saul Novack arranged for me to meet privately with Felix Salzer, who had recently retired because of the onset of dementia. Fortunately, when I visited him in his apartment, he was still almost completely lucid, and I spent the better part of a day listening to him reminisce about his Vienna years, immigration to the US, and studying with Schenker himself in the last year of his life. Later, after Salzer’s death, I also met with his wife Hedi and

held several long conversations with her about related topics. The fact of Schenker's Jewishness, and that of most of his students, came up repeatedly in all of these conversations, Salzer considering it to be a factor of central importance for understanding the negative reception of Schenkerian Analysis, first in Europe during the period of the rise of Nazism, and then in early post-war America.

Influenced by growing Jew-hatred in the culture in which he lived, Schenker even internalized some of its stigmata when having to endure the unveiled anti-Semitism of a famous conductor like Furtwängler. On the evening of April 11, 1925, Furtwängler appeared, and Weisse also came with the score of his string quartet. In his diary, Schenker records that, "In the course of the discussion, he [Furtwängler] revealed himself openly anti-Semitic, *not without basis* [my emphasis]; while I had to agree with the reasons, I did not fail to stress my unwavering commitment to Judaism" ["Im Verlaufe der Gespräch, gab er sich unverhüllt als Antisemit, nicht ohne Begründung, da ich musste die Gründen zustimmen, habe aber nicht unterlassen, meine strengen dennoch am Judentum festhaltenden Standpunkt zu betonen"]. Some have argued Schenker's "folkish" claims about the superiority of German music can be understood as part of his effort, as a Jew, to assimilate and be accepted by mainstream German society. However, I doubt that Schenker made these "proclamations" in order to ingratiate himself with the Germans, or with anyone for that matter; that is just too self-serving. Rather, he genuinely believed in the divine origin of musical laws, and, for him, the great German composers paralleled the prophetic tradition in Judaism. In other words, Schenker's Jewish identity was deeply rooted in his belief in "immutable laws of music"—laws that he understood to parallel those set forth in the Torah, which means (in Hebrew) "teaching" or "law." Just as Moses proclaimed the laws of God, and the Jewish people were the bearers of those laws to the nations throughout the ages, so too, he, Schenker, revealed the laws of music as expressed in the art of the great masters of German music, who had followed and obeyed them. The divine origin of musical laws is an ancient position held by many Christian theorists that Schenker assumes from a Jewish perspective, and that is his primary motivation. Additionally, Schenker identified *both* Germans and Jews as persecuted peoples who needed to be mutually supportive. On October 26, 1926, he commented on a letter he had received from one of his relatives, that "above all, he [Victor] failed to understand the historical background and the difficult position of the Germans in the world, and does them as much injury as the other enemies of Germany, when instead, a national Jewish interest should bind him to Germany: persecuted, robbed, shoulder to shoulder. He has not yet recognized that it is the Englishman who destroys all that is good in the world, the Englishman in his original form or in the American derivation" ["Überhaupt fehlt ihm die Kenntnis des historischen Hintergrund, er begreift die schwierige Lage der Deutschen in der Welt nicht und tut ihnen, den ewig Bedrohten und Betrogenen, genau so Unrecht, wie andere Feinde Deutschlands tun, wo doch ein nationales jüdisches Interesse ihn eher mit Deutschland verbinden müsste: Verfolgte, Beraubte, Schulter an Schulter. Die Einsicht ist in ihm nicht reif, dass es der Engländer ist, der alles Gute in der Welt stört, der Engländer in der Originalgestalt oder in der amerikanischen Abhandlung"].

The Schenker Documents Online (SDO) English translations are very helpful, but at the same time, they must be used with caution and require exegesis. When, in 1925, Schenker exclaims: "die mir ein Hakenkreuzlertum andachten oder Unaufrechtigkeit um etwa das Verbergen des Judentums," which

SDO translates as, “all of the people who fantasize that I am a swastikite or insincere, such as by hiding my Jewishness;” a more “direct” translation would be, “all the people who suspect me of Nazism, or dishonesty, for example, by hiding my Jewishness.” To better understand exactly what Schenker means here, we also need to know that “Hakenkreuzlertum” is an uncommon, *disparaging* neologism for Nazism that Schenker may have borrowed from Joseph Roth’s 1923 novel *Das Spinnennetz*. After Hitler’s “seizure of power” in early 1933, initially enthusiastic about Hitler’s “defeat” of hated Communism, both Schenker and his close friend and colleague Reinhard Oppel became fully disillusioned—again, evidence of a change of heart. On 13 July, 1933, Schenker noted in his diary that he had received a letter from Oppel which was “evidence of [his] disenchantment with the new regime,” and, ten days later, on 23 July he reported: “Letter to Oppel dictated: *I confirm him in his skepticism* [my emphasis].” There are further indications of Oppel’s lack of enthusiasm for Nazism in his later letters to Schenker, who shared his views.

Schenker’s wife Jeannette would be murdered in Theresienstadt, and his most gifted student Angelika Elias in the Ravensbrück concentration camp for women. If Schenker had lived longer, there can be no doubt that he too would have perished, alongside his wife. Schenker’s Jewish students, Weisse, Jonas, Salzer, Deutsch, Albersheim, and others including Oster (a student of Jonas)—the lucky few professional music theorists who were fortunate to escape to the US—had to contend not only with the general hostility of Americans towards foreigners and refugees, but also widespread anti-Semitism in academe as well as among the general public. Until the late 1930s, in parks and public beaches in the US and Canada, it was not uncommon to see signs that read, “No dogs or Jews allowed.” Here in the US, it was well known that the source of “Schenkerism” was German-Jewish emigrés, and, especially in the 1930s and 40s, when there were quotas on Jews in the universities, it was difficult for Schenker’s ideas to make headway. In Nazi Germany, Schenker’s publications were, of course, overtly banned, deliberately hunted down, and copies of his books and pamphlets destroyed. And here, until well after the war, Schenkerian analysis was “tacitly” regarded as “Jewish” music theory. I distinctly recall a conversation with a fellow student at Queens College who, as recently as 1982, warned me that, “New York City is not the United States, and Schenker does not travel.” Translation: “outside of New York City, with its large Jewish population, in the more anti-Semitic country at large, it will be difficult for you, as a Schenkerian, to find a job.” Also, in this context, Allen Forte told me that in the early 1960s he had risked his career for supporting Schenker and Schenkerians at Yale. When he first came to Yale, he was admonished in no uncertain terms by Howard Boatwright and others not to be too interested in “that Schenker stuff”—or else. Do not forget that Yale, like many Ivy Leagues, had been a bastion of institutionally sanctioned “White Privilege” and anti-Semitism, and the Yale administration had cozied up to the Nazis as late as 1937.<sup>1</sup> Was there still more than a whiff of anti-Semitism at Yale even in the early 1960s? Of course, we all know that Forte ignored that threat and soldiered on. However, I must

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<sup>1</sup> On Yale’s support for Nazi Universities, see Timothy L. Jackson, “‘The Company You Keep’: Recipients of Honorary Doctorates from the 1936 Heidelberg Celebration—Sibelius and Those Honored alongside Him,” in *Jean Sibelius’s Legacy*, edited by Daniel Grimley and Veijo Murtomäki (Cambridge: Scholars Press, 2017), pp. 88–110, especially pp. 96–97, which discuss Yale’s participation in the 1936 Heidelberg Celebration organized by Joseph Goebbels.

point out that, by promoting Schenkerian analysis, maintaining his support for Oster (a German-Jewish refugee), and pursuing publication of an—also unwanted—English translation of *Free Composition*, Forte exhibited considerable moral courage and integrity. I urge scholars to read Forte's letters on behalf of Oster and the translation project now preserved in the Yale Archives.

Is the so-called “White Frame” a concept that can be validly applied to the Jewish Schenker, his students, and his work, as Ewell attempts to do? Indeed, the situation regarding Jewish ethnicity is highly complicated. While many Ashkenazi Jews are literally white-skinned, does that mean they automatically identify themselves as “White?” Quite to the contrary, many white-skinned Jews do not identify with “Whiteness” as defined by WASPs. As Jews, diary entries prove that Schenker and his wife knew very well that they were considered “Other” by mainstream German-speaking Viennese society, as his Jewish students would be later in America. Therefore, simply to assume that Jewish Schenkerians are “White” and therefore participate in “White Privilege” in America is surely a naïve, unnuanced, and overly simplistic viewpoint at best.<sup>2</sup>

Schenker's many earlier anti-French, anti-British, anti-American, and anti-Black vituperations—before, during, and after World War I—must be interpreted in the context of that war and its aftermath, in which these nations were all perceived enemies of Germany and Austria, and of German scientific racism. Furthermore, it must be recognized that racist and genocidal thinking was common among German intellectuals from the late twentieth century forward. Therefore, it is not coincidental that the first important genocide in the twentieth century was perpetrated by Germans against Black San, Herero, and Namaqua peoples in their African colony of what is today Namibia, although this pioneering genocide is insufficiently widely known or recognized for its prophetic significance (possibly because of the “White Frame” through which world history tends to be viewed).<sup>3</sup> It was in their genocide in 1904 in Southwest Africa that the Germans honed their skills of concentration camps, medical experiments, and other pseudo-scientific genocidal techniques, on Blacks, whom they considered subhuman. Then, in the Armenian genocide of the First World War, the Turks employed German participation and advice (some of the same scientists who had been involved in the African genocide were consultants); and, yet again, this same “expertise” was applied by the Germans themselves, most systematically and on the grandest scale, to the Jews before and during World War II. It would be a mistake to regard German perpetration of the Holocaust as anomalous; rather, German scientific racism—with genocidal implications—had become ubiquitous in German culture by the beginning of the twentieth century, and one would be hard pressed to find educated Germans at that time who remained uninfluenced. Therefore, we should not be at all surprised that some of Schenker's earlier statements decrying racial mixture reflect this mindset;

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2 There is a literature seeking to address the issue of whether Jews in America are “White.” Emma Green asks, “Are Jews White?,” *The Atlantic* December 5, 2016, delineating “rough sketches of two camps, concentrated at the margins of U.S. political culture. On the extreme right, Jews are seen as impure—a faux-white race that has tainted America. And on the extreme left, Jews are seen as part of a white-majority establishment that seeks to dominate people of color. Taken together, these attacks raise an interesting question: Are Jews white?”

3 The United States Holocaust Museum maintains an informative webpage about this genocide: [www.ushmm.org/collections/bibliography/herero-and-nama-genocide](http://www.ushmm.org/collections/bibliography/herero-and-nama-genocide)

but these in no way prove that he was the “fervent” racist Ewell claims him to have been. The Germans were profoundly offended by the French use of colonial Black African troops to occupy the Rhineland after World War I since they felt it had been done purposely to humiliate them, which was true.

To be sure, the Great War provides *the* essential framework within which one must interpret Schenker’s earlier anti-French, anti-British, anti-American, and also anti-Black comments in his diary and letters. Indeed, readers of Schenker’s diary cannot ignore the extent and breadth of its author’s virulent, visceral hatred of the French, a *white* race; during and after World War I. His diatribes against the French fill *pages* of his diary with the most disgusting vituperative, long entries that make his few anti-Black comments scattered here and there pale into relative insignificance. However, by the mid-1920s, as the Nazis turned on the Jews, the sources disclose that Schenker became more sober. As already noted, letters between Schenker and his close friend and colleague Reinhard Oppel in Leipzig contain anti-Hitler and anti-Nazi sentiments. And by 1934, with the Nazis firmly in control in Germany, he writes in *Free Composition*, “Since the linear progression, as I have described it, is one of the main elements of voice-leading, *music is accessible to all races and creeds alike* [my emphasis]. He who masters such progressions in a creative sense, or learns to master them, produces art which is genuine and great.”<sup>4</sup> Carl Schachter speculates that this statement may be a late addition to the text. Whether or not that is the case, as this quote unambiguously shows, now for Schenker [“classical”] music is a non-racial *meritocracy*. The race of the musician is irrelevant; what matters is the ability to hear and understand linear progressions, and then, through a developed technique, either compositional, performing, or analytical, to (re)create and interpret music accordingly. This fact, namely that classical music is a meritocracy based upon that very ability, is the fundamental reason why individual musicians from oppressed or marginalized groups (such as Jews, Gays, Asians, and Blacks) have found through it a path to social acceptance and financial security.

Having portrayed Schenker as “a fervent racist,” Ewell then proceeds to construct his conspiracy theory that Schenker’s immediate followers sought to conceal his racist views, for example by banishing them to appendices in *Free Composition*; this assertion is a direct attack on the book’s translator Oster and editor Forte. Ewell implies that the passages that Oster and Forte exiled to appendices are racist; they are not. Rather, they are pseudo-scientific and philosophical speculations; Oster and Forte decided to move these paragraphs into appendices because they were afraid they would needlessly prejudice readers against Schenker’s important theory of musical structure, which they felt, rightly or wrongly, to have little or no bearing on his technical analysis of music. Ewell argues, probably correctly, that Schenker would have objected. However, it is indeed possible—even desirable—to separate the technical musical-analytical aspects of Schenker’s theory from most of his philosophical, political, and aesthetic claims, which also mutated considerably over time. Many important figures in the history of science, the arts, and music firmly held beliefs which are now fully discredited and seem bizarre; that does not mean that we should reject their great discoveries. Neither Oster nor Forte knew the brief racist comments that Ewell excerpted from SDO in 2019 that were still buried in Schenker’s letters

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4 *Free Composition*, xxiii.

and diary. The one putatively “racist” passage in the first edition of *Free Composition* that Jonas took out and was not included in Oster’s translation concerns whether or not Beethoven was a German composer, since some scholars had argued that he was Flemish. (Schachter cites this passage in his article in *Theory and Practice*.) Given the heightened sensibilities about race and “blood” after WWII, Jonas—rightly—felt that Schenker’s pre-war argument in favor of Beethoven’s “Germanness” would not be well received. Thus, Ewell’s charge that Oster and Forte “whitewashed” Schenker’s racism simply will not hold up to scrutiny. It should be pointed out that Forte, putatively an apologist for Schenker’s racism, was one and the same person who gave a significant number of female, Jewish, Asian, and Black students—like Ewell himself—a chance for a career in music theory. Fortunately, Forte did not live to witness this attack.

Ewell’s scapegoating of Schenker, Schenkerians, and Schenkerian analysis, occurs in the much larger context of Black-on-Jew attacks in the United States. Over a quarter-century ago, a detailed scholarly article was published on African American anti-Semitism in a refereed social sciences journal.<sup>5</sup> The author observed that according to surveys, American Blacks were increasingly more inclined to hold anti-Semitic prejudices than Whites, and to blame Jews for their problems. At the end of the article, the author warned that this trend was extremely worrying, and that it was necessary to take decisive steps to roll back anti-Semitism in the African American Community, both latent and overt. Presumably those steps were never taken. On the contrary, demagogues from the extreme right and left, Black Nationalist—and also White Nationalist—and also in academe, continue to legitimize scapegoating “the Jews” for every conceivable ill. In this sense, Ewell’s denunciation of Schenker and Schenkerians may be seen as part and parcel of the much broader current of Black anti-Semitism. Given the history of racism against African Americans, there is a strong tendency today to excuse or downplay these phenomena, but they are real—and toxic. They currently manifest themselves in myriad ways, including the pattern of violence against Jews, the obnoxious lyrics of some hip hop songs, etc.<sup>6</sup>

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5 Lee Sigelman, “Blacks, Whites, and Anti-Semitism,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 36/4 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 649–56. In her recent article, “Save Me from My Defenders,” *Commentary*, January 2020, Ruth Wisse of Harvard University writes, “The point of departure in my talk was an opinion piece from the New York Times by Henry Louis Gates Jr. that had been published in 1992. Entitled ‘Black Demagogues and Pseudo-Scholars,’ Gates’s article warned that while anti-Semitism in America was generally on the wane, it was on the rise among African Americans, with Blacks twice as likely as Whites to hold anti-Semitic views. Gates cited research showing that anti-Semitism was most pronounced ‘among the younger and more educated Blacks,’ and as he was then writing as the newly appointed chairman of Harvard’s Department of Afro-American Studies, he was understandably concerned.”

6 Wikipedia, “Misogyny in rap music,” [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misogyny\\_in\\_rap\\_music](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misogyny_in_rap_music). The authors observe that, “In a study of the images of African American women in rap music videos, three stereotypes were revealed: Jezebel, Sapphire, and Mammy/‘Baby Mama.’ In an analysis of 38 rap music videos, Emerson noticed that videos have the ideological controlling image of the hypersexual ‘Jezebel’ as well as images of agency, independence, strength, and autonomy. Emerson also points out that the videos often feature reversals of the traditional focus on female bodies from the male gaze. Instead, he notes that the videos have in common ‘the construction of the male body, and particularly the black male body, as the object of Black female pleasure.’ ‘Based on these three stereotypes, the videos present African American women as greedy, dishonest sex objects, with no respect for themselves or others, including the children under their care. The women in the videos are scorned by men and exist to bring pleasure to them.’ In the genre of ‘gangsta rap,’ women but more specifically African American women, are lessened to mere objects, with their only purpose being good for sex as well as abuse, and at the end of the day are a burden to men. Misogynistic



It is noteworthy that, when the New Jersey attacks took place, CNN initially failed to mention, and later played down, that the perpetrators of the latest attacks on the easily identifiable Ultra-Orthodox Jews were African American. Of course, the reason that Black anti-Semitism is soft-pedaled, excused, ignored, and even applauded, is that for too long Blacks themselves have been the object of racism. Yet history does not absolve African Americans of anti-Semitism. What we are seeing now in NYC and its environs, and increasingly across the US and Europe—especially in France—and in academia, are the lethal fruits of this slowly gestating disease.<sup>7</sup>

Why, then, are there so few Black professors of music theory in American universities? Is it because of a conspiracy by racist Schenkerians practicing their inherently racist analytical methodology, as Ewell would have us believe? Of course, I understand full well that Ewell only attacks Schenker as a pretext to introduce his main argument: that liberalism is a racist conspiracy to deny rights to “people of color.” He is uninterested in bringing Blacks up to “standard” so they can compete. On the contrary,

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descriptions of black women in rap music is predominately dominated by their black male counterparts which might actually reflect a real problem between the tensions of gender relationships within African American communities. In Dennis Herds article, Rose (2008) states, ‘Sexism is visible, vulgar, aggressive and popular, fueled by a complex of factors including sexism in black communities that influence rappers’ attitudes and lyrics as well as the patriarchal values permeating the wider society.’”

7 This strain of African American anti-Semitism has, in the past several years, metastasized into *repurposing* legitimate disability studies in the service of an overtly anti-Semitic agenda. In Jasbir Puar’s *Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability* (Duke, 2017), Israel is reconceived as the Satanic “colonial” state par excellence because Israeli Jews now can be demonized as “White colonizers” of the indigenous “peoples of color,” namely the Arabs. Just as White Americans shoot unarmed African Americans, Israelis “maim” innocent Palestinians, an “intersectionality” that links Gaza with Ferguson. Furthermore, through “pinkwashing,” Puar claims that Israel exploits its support of LGBT rights to conceal its crimes against the Palestinians. As Balázs Berkovits observes in “Critical Whiteness Studies and the ‘Jewish Problem,’” “the tag ‘whiteness’ is susceptible to be turned against Jews, not merely as a ‘critical’ concept, but rather in an explicitly accusatory manner, [as] is evident if one takes a look at how whiteness and racism scholars analyze the state of Israel.....To be sure, in these works, the arbitrary usage of the concept of ‘whiteness’ becomes even more conspicuous than in Whiteness Studies proper, as it encompasses an increasingly diverse set of phenomena. However, this fact does not bother totalizing critics *emboldened by their academic prestige* [my emphasis].” For such critics, Israel is the apex of ‘predatory imperialism,’ ‘Jewish whiteness,’ ‘Jewish hegemony and supremacism,’ ‘Zionist racism and colonialism,’ and so on. Berkovits points out that, while “Most of the time, these interpretations are contradicting one another. Still, there is a unanimous intention of radical criticism, and total political agreement on the evaluation of Zionism, Israel, and Jews in the Middle East. A furtive look into these texts would be sufficient to conclude that whenever it comes to Israel, political criticism fully subordinates any interpretation. It is also evident that the concept of ‘Jewish whiteness’ serves that kind of criticism, by which one can comfortably detect that Jews have not only become part of the dominant majority, but also the ruling white elite or ‘caste’ exercising their domination on racist grounds, thereby forming one of the most oppressive majorities in the world.” As Puar explained in a lecture at Vassar, reported on by John-Paul Pagano, “It [Israel] controls ‘infrastructure’ so it can ‘modulate calories ... to provide a bare minimum for survival.’ And to what end? To transform the Palestinians into a population of half-fed zombies whose ‘dismantled and dismembered bodies’ can be subjected to ‘gendering,’ ‘ungendering,’ and ‘epigenetic deterioration’ through biological ‘hacking.’ This not only enables the extraction of Palestinian resources right down to their very flesh [i.e., the harvesting of their internal organs], but it nourishes the Jewish privilege conferred by the Holocaust: ‘[Israelis] need the Palestinians alive in order to keep the kind of rationalization [sic] for their victimhood and their militarized economy. I think any Jewish resident of medieval Cologne or Worms would recognize this scene for exactly what it is: In this occulted room, Puar chanted an abracadabra of quasi-religious jargon and blood libels that must have struck her audience as wondrous.” Cited from “Anti-Racism Erases Anti-Semitism,” *Tablet Magazine* (2016) [www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/204990/anti-racism-erases-anti-semitism](http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/204990/anti-racism-erases-anti-semitism). The great danger of lending academic imprimatur to these demagogues is that it establishes the requisite ideological foundations for a second Holocaust of Israeli Jews, just as Nazi academic literature in 1920s and 1930s laid the groundwork for the (first) Holocaust.



he is claiming that those very standards are in themselves racist. African Americans have the right to embrace their own culture as precious—i.e. rap music, hip hop, etc.—and study and teach it in universities, so that the products of the “defective,” “racist” White culture—i.e., classical music—can be shunted aside.

Be that as it may, I would like to propose that genuine solutions lie elsewhere, especially by the African American Community establishing different priorities, by addressing the deficiency of background in classical music caused by few opportunities for serious training, and by the removal of systemic barriers in American society at large. As I see it, a fundamental reason for the paucity of African American women and men in the field of music theory is that few grow up in homes where classical music is profoundly valued, and therefore they lack the necessary background. To master classical performance practice on any instrument, to achieve musical literacy, and theoretical competence, one must begin intensive training when very young. Therefore, parents must provide their children with lessons and insist upon regular practice from an early age. Low socio-economic status does not preclude any racial group from doing so; poverty does not prevent setting priorities; it is not *solely* a matter of money. All four of my grandparents were poor working-class Jewish emigrants who had fled from Central and Eastern Europe to the United States and England with the clothes on their backs, who spoke heavily accented English, which they wrote phonetically to the end of their lives. Yet, my mother recalled that even during the Great Depression, when there was barely enough to eat, her parents somehow scraped together the money to buy her a cheap violin and pay for lessons! My father grew up in the poverty-stricken Jewish Ghetto in the East End of London; yet again, miraculously, a rickety old upright piano appeared and my father took lessons. As a consequence of this early grounding, both of my parents loved classical music for the rest of their lives, even though they did not become musicians themselves. Classical music was cherished not only for itself, but as the great social equalizer—as a meritocracy, and as the path to a better future for the children of immigrant parents. For my working-class grandparents, who had done hard, menial labor all of their lives, classical music was like a call from another world, divine, mysteriously exalted, pointing to a higher plane of existence than that which they had experienced and could barely imagine. I still recall them listening raptly to me playing on a rented piano when I was six years old, and saying in awed tones, “my grandson the *composer*,” as if this were something totally inconceivable, as indeed it was to people of their generation and background. At that time, they promised my parents that if I stayed with music until I turned thirteen, they would buy a certain number of keys of a new grand piano if my parents would pay for the rest. They kept that promise, and I still have that piano with the keys they paid for today. These personal experiences show that success in classical music is a matter of setting priorities, and summoning inner resources to succeed, no matter what it takes: first and foremost, young African Americans must *want* to be classical musicians, and their families must be supportive. But admittedly that is not enough. If we are to achieve true social justice in music theory, then we will be compelled to engage with the real issues. We must address African American students’ lack of foundation, especially music-theoretical, by facilitating their early training with appropriate resources, and by demolishing institutionalized racist barriers; *this* is the solution,

not blaming Schenker, his students and associates, and practitioners of Schenkerian analysis.<sup>8</sup> Ashley Horne, a distinguished African American violinist, speaking of the Black composer Joseph Bologne, Le Chevalier de Saint-Georges (1745–99), shares Schenker’s later view of classical music as a meritocracy, when he observes in the documentary on the composer’s life, “I think, Black children need to know that there was a great (Black) composer in the European style. We all need to know that. Whether the kids be Asian or Caucasian or what have you, Jewish, I don’t care. But he certainly is an important person as a composer, and an important person as a character of history, whom it is criminal to submerge beneath the waves of history.”<sup>9</sup> As for Black composers, they have had to overcome unbelievable prejudice and hardships, yet there have been many talented and technically competent Black composers in the past hundred years. We can certainly listen to their music with pleasure, even if they are not “supreme geniuses” on the level of the very greatest classical composers. One of the cruelest things in Ewell’s agenda is his concomitant dismissal of the works of Black classical composers as irrelevant. They are the people who suffer the most from ideologues. That is racism.

Although we now live in an era of “alternative facts,” I believe that demagoguery and intellectual dishonesty must not go unanswered. We have seen what occurs when this happens on a massive scale, with catastrophic results in the twentieth century, and now again in our own time. I was not present when Ewell spoke at the SMT plenary session, but I heard about the standing ovation he received, which, to my mind, is just as worrying as his talk itself. The warm reception, the applause that Ewell earned there, is as outrageous and dangerous as the contents of his speech, and bespeaks the sorry state of the field of music theory generally these days. Schenkerians of the different pedagogical schools have always “decoupled” ideological claims from music theoretical approaches. Furthermore, not only did Schenker’s own ideas about politics and race evolve considerably (as I have shown), so did his analytical methodology (as Pastille, Bent, and others have amply documented). Looking back, at least two generations of Schenkerians have explored and critiqued the evolutions of both aspects. For example, what a tremendous transformation there is between Schenker’s early and later ideas about just the particular issue of organicism; the same holds true for his views of race, which also changed dramatically!<sup>10</sup> Schenker’s critics assume that his cultural-political ideas were immutable, but in fact they were not: just as there were u-turns in the rapid developments in his analytical methodology and his readings of specific pieces, so too they occur in the ideological realm in his transformation from anti-organicist to organicist, racist to non-racist, etc.. To call attention to just one further striking example, Schenker’s perception of the United States evolved significantly in his last years. For most of his life,

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8 Brandon Keith Brown’s article, “When Black Conductors Aren’t Comfortable at Concerts, Classical Music Has a Real Problem; There’s a Reason so Few Black People Go to the Symphony,” *M Level*, February 2020, shows how much more needs to be done to eliminate racism in the world of classical music.

9 The supreme irony here is that the first important Black composer of classical music, the Chevalier de Saint Georges, was imprisoned and almost executed after the French Revolution, even though he had supported it—and the emancipation of slaves—because he had been too close to “the oppressors,” i.e., to the aristocrats of *l’ancien regime*! He had been too friendly with people like Marie Antoinette, among others. However, the Revolutionaries spared him the guillotine, perhaps because he was just enough of an “outsider” to be forgiven.

10 William Pastille, “Heinrich Schenker, Anti-Organicist,” *19th-Century Music* 8/1 (Summer, 1984), 29–36.

Schenker had held America and Americans in low esteem, as is evidenced from the quotation given above and many other comments until the later 1920s. However, after Weisse emigrated to America in 1931 and began sending Schenker reports about the enthusiastic reception of his theory there, and especially after *Five Analyses in Sketchform* was published by the David Mannes Music School in 1933 with an English translation of Schenker's introduction, the great theorist's opinion of America became decidedly more positive! Ewell assures us that Schenker would have objected to "decoupling" his philosophical, historical, political, racial, and other ideas from his music theory. But is this claim, even if true, really as self-evident as it might initially seem, since the question then becomes: *which* philosophical-historical-political ideas cannot be disassociated from which stages of music-theoretical development, given the very significant advances in both dimensions? Therefore, even Schenker himself must have recognized, especially late in his career, not only the possibility, but the absolute necessity of such decoupling.

Some would like to demolish the classical canon of "Bach-to-Brahms," falsely claiming it to be exclusively a "white male" elitist meritocracy, and arguing that we should replace it with putatively egalitarian pop, hip-hop, punk, and world musics. This is a mischaracterization because the great tradition of classical music includes Black, Jewish, and female composers, and remains, as Schenker ultimately recognized, an "elitism of the hearing of the spirit, not of race." A colleague recently wondered—given the apparent current lack of focus on "the notes" of complete pieces within the Bach-to-Brahms canon (unfortunately, also a concept associated with Schenkerian analysis)—if we music theorists were not now metamorphosing into non-theorists. In other words, by divorcing ourselves from the detailed investigation of the structure of pieces within the canon—which now, because deemed elitist, becomes obsolete—we will all wake up one morning soon, just like the protagonist of Kafka's *Metamorphosis*, who found himself a giant beetle. But, perhaps, just as Schenker finally saw the light, albeit late in life, we music theorists will eventually also come to our senses. In all cases, better late than never.

## De-Scripting Schenker, Scripting Music Theory

STEPHEN LETT

In “The De-Description of Technical Objects,” Madeleine Akrich develops a vocabulary for studying relationships between technologies as designed and technologies as used. As designed, technologies offer a “script” for their use. That is, designers imagine and seek to create “the world into which the object is to be inserted” (1992, 207–8). Doing so entails “defin[ing] actors with specific tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest, and they assume that morality, technology, science, and economy will evolve in particular ways” (1992, 208). But these scripts, she tells us, are often fantasies: “it may be that no actors will come forward to play the roles envisaged by the designer. Or users may define quite different roles of their own” (1992, 208). In this way, the users “de-script” the technology. However, even if more often imagined than used, we should not, according to Akrich, simply disregard the designer’s script. If we wish to understand how technologies circulate and create worlds, she argues, “we have to go back and forth continually between the designer and the user, between the designer’s projected user and the real user, between *the world inscribed in the object* and *the world described by its displacement*” (1992, 208–9 emphasis in original).

Considering Schenkerian analysis as a technology, I propose that Akrich offers us a productive way to think through the ethical and political concerns attending our use of his technology. Her framing leads us to examine how the world Schenker hoped to create through his analytical tools relates to the world described by their displacement—our world, the academic discipline of North American music theory. She asks us to examine, that is, whether we are performing some version of Schenker’s script as “actors with specific tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest,” or whether we are writing new roles for ourselves. In this essay, I argue through a study of Carl Schachter’s “Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker’s Politics and the Pedagogy of Schenkerian Analysis” (2001) that the role Schachter plays (which is also often the role we play) aligns in significant ways with Schenker’s script. Continuing, I argue that Schachter’s scripting of Schenkerian analysis falls in line with another foundational disciplinary script that leads us to defer responsibility for the effects of our discourse. In doing so, I hope to draw attention to how, in doing music-theoretical work, we foster a disposition towards the world that aids and abets harmful political projects. To conclude, I argue that if we wish to develop a music theory that holds itself accountable to its worldly effects, we must both recognize the politics that we perform through our research and begin to imagine how we might strategically re-script our worlds through academic production.

In “Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven,” Schachter labors to save Schenker’s analytical tools from Schenker’s script. To begin Schachter recounts the strategic and partial de-scripting of Schenker’s ideas in the English translation of *Der freie Satz*. As others have written, in order to protect Schenker’s valuable music-analytical ideas from being dismissed by readers on political grounds, some wished

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to censor the text, while others found such censorship intellectually dishonest.<sup>1</sup> As a compromise, “a number of Schenker’s statements about matters philosophical, pseudo-scientific, political, social, and esthetic” were allocated to the appendix (Schachter 2001, 2). As Schachter notes, all was relatively well for Schenkerians in the following decades—increasing prestige, expanding influence.<sup>2</sup> Writing in response to recent critical studies of Schenker that thematized the relationship between his politics and his music theory, Schachter wishes to dispel any “facile connections” (2001, 13) between the practice of Schenkerian analysis and the method’s intellectual history. To do so, he offers the following plan for the article:

What I want to do in this paper is first of all to survey Schenker’s political views and attempt to place them in historical context. Secondly I wish to consider whether the musical and political ideas are necessarily bound together for Schenker’s readers today (few of whom would welcome the kind of societal regeneration he sought). And finally whether the teaching of his approach nowadays needs to incorporate references to his political ideology. (2001, 4)

Schachter answers the latter two questions by falling back on a presumed common sense: Of course Schenker’s musical ideas are not *necessarily* bound to his political ideas for the purposes of our music-theoretical practice; and of course we don’t *need* to reference his political ideology in our teaching.<sup>3</sup> By historicizing Schenker’s thought, Schachter seeks to disarticulate Schenker’s script—a vestige of the politics of his time—from his analytical method, which Schachter views as an enduring intellectual innovation.

Cast in Akrich’s terms, Schachter argues that although Schenker created a set of analytical technologies with a lengthy manual, we users can (and should) disregard parts of his script and put the technology to use in ways that Schenker would never have wished. According to Akrich, Schachter is quite right. We users have agency. We may de-script the technology, refuse to play the roles Schenker wrote for us, and instead write ourselves new ones. And, indeed, Schachter offers us such a script for Schenkerian technologies that centers on the following theme: *Schenkerian analysis offers insights into tonal music without parallel in the long tradition of tonal theory*.<sup>4</sup> This script, Schachter argues, relieves us of any complicity in the political project that animated and informed the technology’s construction. But we ought not take Schachter’s word for it. Following Akrich’s insistence that a technology’s script

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1 See in particular, William Rothstein’s “The Americanization of Heinrich Schenker” (1986, 8–9).

2 Rothstein, in fact, uses the metaphor of a rising empire to frame “The Americanization of Heinrich Schenker.” Although Schenkerians have had to make sacrifices to fit into the academy, he writes, “the reward has been an expanding Schenkerian empire which as yet shows no signs of decline ...” (1986, 16).

3 Schachter’s common sense assumes three absolute separations: between the musical and the political, between Schenker and us, and between politics and pedagogy. If we assume that these are entirely separate things, there is indeed no *necessary* connection. The separations he assumes, however, are heuristic rather than empirical. While heuristics are helpful in orienting us toward distinctions between things, falling back on heuristic separations in order to argue for the separateness of those very things fails as the basis of any compelling argument.

4 The language I use in my supposition of Schachter’s script is based on his concluding remarks: “It is only because of his musical insights—insights without parallel in the long tradition of tonal theory—that he is remembered and read” (2001, 16).

imagines a world, we must ask: what is the world that Schachter imagines in his script? And then, in order to come to a better understanding of the relationships between their respective scripts, we must ask: How might Schachter's imagined world resonate with and/or seek to undermine Schenker's?<sup>5</sup>

In his scripting of Schenkerian analysis, Schachter imagines a world where tonal music is something that certain people care very deeply about. It is a world, furthermore, in which tonal music is performed as part of a living tradition rather than as a relic of worlds past. Schachter's script, in fact, appears animated by a desire for the tradition to survive, as though the tradition's life is currently threatened. This aspect of his script briefly surfaces when he offers an aside on the state of the arts in the United States: "Whether a populist, anti-elitist society and government like ours can foster valuable artistic production is doubtful, at least in my view; in any case, recent trends in this country are not encouraging" (2001, 8). Valuable artistic expression in music, Schachter insists, is created neither by individuals untrained in the long tradition nor for the *demos*. It is, rather, created by a gifted and talented elite for those trained to recognize artistic value.<sup>6</sup> While Schenker finds in the German humus something unique to the production of genius,<sup>7</sup> Schachter believes such genius—or as he recasts it, "artists of uncommon ability" (2001, 8)—can be produced anywhere given the right conditions. And for Schachter it is precisely through Schenkerian analysis that we might create better conditions for nurturing true art.

So far, then, we see that Schachter imagines a world where people find value in and seek to support furthering the tonal tradition. In order to maintain the tradition, however, Schachter understands that an immense amount of resources must be invested in order to train the musicians and discriminating listeners required to sustain it. That is, Schachter imagines a world where there are institutions that support the cultivation of such individuals. Schenker, as Schachter notes, addresses this consideration directly: "Schenker believed that an aristocracy of some sort—at least in cultural matters if not also in political structure—would promote the selection and support of gifted individuals among whom the rare genius might emerge" (2001, 8). And while Schachter does not explicitly imagine what kind of institution would best serve to promote the selection and support of gifted individuals, he appears convinced that Schenkerian technology is indispensable for or in relation to such an institution.

Why does he believe Schenkerian technology so indispensable? As noted in his script, it is indispensable because it offers unparalleled insights into tonal music, by which he means the technology

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5 Though such questions can only be fully answered through a detailed ethnographic study, because of the short amount of time I have had to undertake this essay, I am necessarily limited in the kinds of evidence I have been able to draw on. In what follows, I begin to sketch a network of relations based on evidence in Schachter's text. Rather than offering a final analysis here, what I offer is best understood as a starting point for such an ethnographic inquiry.

6 Schachter appears to take this stance on artistic production when he endorses Schenker's perspective regarding works of art that happen to be popular: "Schenker would have maintained that artistic productions like Strauss Waltzes and Chaplin films are 'popular' only in that they appeal to a wide public; their creation, however, is due to individual artists of uncommon ability. And who could deny that this was true?" (2001, 8).

7 Schachter summarizes Schenker's view thusly: "The German masses constitute a kind of nourishing soil—'humus' is Schenker's word—in which superior individuals, and eventually geniuses, can grow" (2001, 8).



has “explanatory power.”<sup>8</sup> In addition to these insights serving as the basis of quality performances of and meaningful listenings to masterfully composed music, Schachter’s emphasis on insights and explanatory power seems to imagine a world where a certain kind of discursive formulation — “knowledge” — can be leveraged for various ends. Where Schenker always acknowledged and engaged with this political aspect of his knowledge production, Schachter is mum on this front. But his article does, if only implicitly, seek to intervene in two institutions that have, in the past, helped keep the tradition alive. One is the music-world that supports and sustains music of the tonal tradition—a scene consisting of a network of non-profit corporations that sustain a professional space for the performance of such music.<sup>9</sup> Second is the academy, another non-profit corporate space in which knowledge is produced and dispositions cultivated.<sup>10</sup> In order for these institutions that support the arts to remain viable, they need funding. And this funding comes increasingly from wealthy donors and corporate sponsorships. Part of the utility of Schenkerian analysis, then, is to demonstrate the enduring value of the tonal tradition by producing insights into such music that might translate into financial support.

Schachter’s script, as I read it, then, performs a conservative politics. He seeks to safeguard the tonal tradition by appealing to institutions that have historically helped to sustain it rather than seeking to transform the broader political structure in which we dwell. Indeed, rather than actually imagining a world otherwise, Schachter’s script appears to simply assume our own.

So how different is Schachter’s script from Schenker’s? Certainly there are a number of notable differences. However, as I see it, the primary difference is that Schenker had an *explicit* political project. He had a vision. And instead of imagining a world otherwise, Schachter concedes to our own—a world that, like Schenker’s, perpetuates white supremacy (if not the genius of the German humus) and is ruled by moneyed elite (if not an aristocracy).

Nearing the end of his article, Schachter writes, “I must confess that I never think about Schenker’s politics, religion, or philosophy when engaged in analyzing a piece” (2001, 13). This is because, as he had asserted earlier, Schenker’s political investments do not “deal directly with music-theoretical issues” (2001, 2). The irony, however, is that in ignoring Schenker’s “extra-musical” thought, Schachter is unable to recognize that he is actually performing a political project *continuous* with Schenker’s. In particular, Schenker’s script and Schachter’s script are two complementary strategies in the ongoing

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8 In comparing theories of tonal music, Schachter writes, “. . . and [Schenker’s] musical ideas have far greater explanatory power than Rameau’s” (2001, 9).

9 Schachter appears worried over the direction of these institutions with the de-funding of the National Endowment for the Arts and the increasing reliance on marketing discourse to attract consumers rather than true appreciators of the tradition. In an endnote, he writes: “A sign of these times: the marketing strategies that American orchestras now feel they must use in order to attract an audience. Here is the latest brochure of the New York Philharmonic, advertising the Verdi *Requiem*: ‘this choral classic garbs religious celebration in the vivid hues of Tintoretto and Michelangelo as violins weep, drums pound, and voices soar in fervor and ecstasy’” (2001, 19, n. 28).

10 This institution arises both as the institutional space in which his article is published as well as his discussion of his experience teaching a class “at Mannes College of Music—an elective course in the analysis and performance of Chopin Etudes” (2001, 13–14). Here he performs his investment in this institution, though he does not explicitly script it as an actor in his world.

projects of colonialism. This is obvious with Schenker. His thought is steeped in the tradition that was formulating and promulgating ideas that animated the “enlightened” desire of “the West” to carry out projects of empire. This is less obvious, though perhaps even more pernicious, with Schachter—and, by extension, us. Although his/our discourse is based on practices that disavow any connection to such obviously bigoted intellectual projects, this disavowal belies the fact that we continue to occupy indigenous lands for our benefit. Schachter’s discourse, that is, enacts a practice of elimination that settlers continue to carry out so that we might better ignore the fact that we are, in fact, still carrying out colonial projects.<sup>11</sup> In the prior script, the harm was necessary to civilize. In the current one, we actively forget and, all the while, continue to inflict harm. As Schenker’s saying goes: *Idem semper sed non eodem modo*.

Since my turn to settler colonialism may seem out of left field, to close this essay I would like to elaborate how another foundational disciplinary script performs a logic of elimination based in practices analogous to aspects of (settler) legal practice. As I have hoped to show by drawing on Akrich, in order to adequately address how, in doing music-theoretical work, we perform a politics that aids and abets ongoing harm in the world, we must trace complicated networks that quickly explode any simple relation between designer’s intention and user’s practice. Unfortunately, to date, we have not done this work. Instead, like Schachter, we simply insist that our analytical technologies have been re-scripted, recuperated from their designer’s nefarious intentions. And furthermore, we argue that in producing knowledge about music, we are not doing any significant harm. Responding to a critique of his work, Joseph N. Straus offers the clearest articulation of this pervasive music-theoretical script:

We [music theorists] like imagining and describing musical structures. I know that the concepts of a “work,” a “larger whole,” and “structure” are hotly contested in contemporary critical theory. Nonetheless, until it can be shown that our pleasures and enjoyments are immoral or harmful to others, I hope we may continue to indulge them. . . . I hope we will not abandon [our traditional analytical modes] on the false grounds that they suffer some ineradicable stain of their origin. (1995, [7–8])

We should not concern ourselves with the possible negative effects of our technologies until it can be shown that we are doing harm through their use—until evidence is presented. What is pernicious about this argument is that the work of tracing these effects is continually written out of our field. *We refuse to admit the evidence into music-theoretical discourse*.<sup>12</sup> Music-theoretical discourse, that is, operates by

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11 The text that brought the settler colonial analytic (as well as its logic of elimination) to prominence in the North American academy is Patrick Wolfe’s “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” (2006). As la paperson writes in *A Third University is Possible*, “Settler colonialism is too often thought of as ‘what happened’ to Indigenous people. This kind of thinking confines the experiences of Indigenous people, their critiques of settler colonialism and their decolonial imaginations, to an unwarranted historicizing parochialism, as if settler colonialism were a past event that ‘happened to’ Native peoples and not generalizable to non-Natives. Actually, settler colonialism is something that ‘happened for’ settlers. Indeed, it is happening for them/us right now” (2017, 4).

12 Here I am also referencing political events occurring as I write. In the trial of Donald John Trump, President of the United States, the Republican-controlled Senate took an unprecedented vote against allowing new witnesses to be questioned and new



setting up barriers to recognition involving notions of standing and admissibility. We argue that other scholars have no standing and that the evidence they offer is inadmissible in establishing harm because we have a legalistically-limited notion of harm that continually allows us to defer responsibility from our complicity in perpetuating it. This disposition of deferral is what we have been fostering in music theory. And this is the harm we are doing, for we should be fostering a disposition that attends to *all our relations*.<sup>13</sup> Rather than plugging our ears and retreating to our musical imaginaries, we ought to recognize how theorizing music always opens us up to the world.

The harm we are doing, then, is less blatant than might sway some of us. But as scholars and educators in the university, we must recognize, following la paperson, that “the university is world-making” (2017, xiv). And central to our work of world-making is the fostering of dispositions. la paperson notes three dispositions we foster in the university.<sup>14</sup> First is to dispose students to *accumulate* knowledge (but also resources, power, etc.). Second is to dispose students to *critique* this accumulation (while also reinscribing that accumulative logic). Third is to dispose students to *strategize*—that is, fostering an attitude that finds in the first two attitudes technologies for decolonization. To date, music theory (as is true of the academy writ large) primarily fosters the accumulative and critical dispositions. We see ourselves, that is, as being in the business of accumulating knowledge and leveraging critique in order to relieve any anxiety that in so doing we might be doing harm. We often say we are studying music, not doing politics. But we must recognize that we have always been performing a politics, building a world. And realizing this opens us up to the potential of producing knowledge and worlds otherwise—to strategizing.<sup>15</sup> In order to do so in ways that wreak less havoc, however, we must begin retraining our ears so that we might resonate with and value the knowledges articulated by voices outside of our white racial frame.

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evidence to be presented. While the evidence was already overwhelming, Republicans acquitted him. Immediately following his acquittal, Trump removed witnesses who offered damning testimony from their positions in his administration.

13 I draw my emphasis on attending to all our relations from Kim TallBear’s article “Caretaking Relations, Not American Dreaming.” There she “foreground[s] an everyday Dakota understanding of existence that focuses on ‘being in good relation.’ ... Thinking in terms of being in relation, I propose an explicitly spatial narrative of *caretaking relations*—both human and other-than-human—as an alternative to the temporally progressive settler-colonial *American Dreaming* that is ever co-constituted with deadly hierarchies of life. A relational web as spatial metaphor requires us to pay attention to our relations and obligations here and now” (2019, 25).

14 Here I recast la paperson’s exposition of the primary actions undertaken by the First, Second, and Third Universities in terms of the actions they dispose students towards (2017, 37–53).

15 Another book that I have found helpful in thinking about academic work strategically is Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (2013).

## **Detail, Reduction, and Organicism: A Response to Philip Ewell**

**RICH PELLEGRIN**

As someone who studies jazz, and as a human being concerned with social justice, I was happy to see Philip Ewell stand in front of hundreds of theorists at the plenary session of the SMT annual meeting and begin his talk by stating what for me has always been a painfully obvious truth: “Music theory is white” (0:31). In his concluding remarks, Ewell suggests that real change might include making major revisions to the standard undergraduate curriculum (20:08). In my view, there is no single correct path to take in curricular innovation, and highly traditional programs are vitally important and must continue to exist. The problem with music departments has not necessarily been the curricular structures themselves, but the homogeneity of these curricula—the fact that nearly all programs have offered the same basic experience. There are few schools of music where one can comprehensively study non-white or non-Western musics and music theories, including jazz and jazz theory.

I mention jazz not only because I study it, but because it would seem to be a music offering everything theorists value: it contains a richly continuous spectrum of music—often within a single decade—from tonal to atonal, improvised to composed (sometimes notated, sometimes not), complex to simple, African to European, “high” to “low,” solo to orchestral, and vocal to instrumental; it has a lengthy and well-developed theoretical tradition, both inside and outside of academia; it is frequently described as “America’s classical music;” and it is an unusually egalitarian art form in many respects, from its collective and improvisatory nature to the diversity of its audience and practitioners. Yet, the amount of attention, respect, and resources accorded to jazz in academia is wildly disproportionate to its contributions to music and music theory. Moreover, the reasons for this disparity are obviously (if sometimes unknowingly) connected with issues of power and race—from decisions about degree programs and hiring to condescending, implicitly racialized questioning of whether jazz musicians know anything about theory and self-perpetuating ignorance that equates jazz only with bebop and big band (in keeping with the limited scope of jazz presented in schools of music due to the paucity of resources).<sup>1</sup>

As someone who also teaches Schenker, I was happy to hear Ewell’s call for Schenker’s racism to be presented alongside his theories. In my seminar on reductive analysis I always assign Schachter’s (2001) article on Schenker’s politics. Schachter’s writing, as ever, is evenhanded and moderate. It is therefore no surprise that he approaches the issue of Schenker’s racism from more than one perspective. Ultimately, Schachter contends that Schenker’s racist ideology must be studied when his theory is the focus, but that the analytical practice can be separated from the ideology. Ewell does not cite Schachter’s essay, but I find that it is an excellent starting point for introducing this subject, and the discussions it engenders among my students are civil, thoughtful, and substantive, following Schachter’s model.

Because Schenker viewed the world through a hierarchical lens that was racist (and more), and

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<sup>1</sup> For more on the challenges jazz and jazz theory have faced in academia, see Larson 2005 and Tymoczko 2011, 387–90.

because his ideology is closely connected with his music theory, it is logical enough to conclude that he placed little value on the lower structural levels. However, to reach this conclusion—which Ewell did not *explicitly* do in his talk—is to fundamentally misunderstand Schenker.<sup>2</sup> This is the case for two closely-related reasons, which I will discuss for the remainder of this essay. First, there is another significant aspect to Schenker’s thought, one which is concerned specifically with the relationship between the whole and the part—organicism. Second, to reach this conclusion is to fall into the trap of believing that Schenkerian analysis merely reduces away the vibrant details of a piece of music—the classic misinterpretation of Schenker.<sup>3</sup>

In Schenker’s own writings there are innumerable passages providing evidence that he did not view music or analysis in the way suggested by criticism along these lines; I will mention only a few.<sup>4</sup> In his discussion of Chopin’s *étude* op. 10, no. 3, Schenker remarks: “How imaginatively the neighboring-note harmony  $II_3^7$  is expanded in measures 22–41, how striking the figurations in measures 41–53!” ([1935] 1979, §310). Yet, his graph indicates very little about the expansion and shows none of the figurations; they have been reduced out at the level given. Reduction of detail serves an important practical function—imagine how difficult it would be if maps of our world were only available at a scale that showed every detail.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, even though we can zoom out our view of a piece’s voice-leading map, we should not fly “over the work of art in the same manner that one flies over villages, cities, palaces, castles, fields, woods, rivers, and lakes.” Rather, the “inner relationships” of a work of art “demand to be ‘traversed’” ([1935] 1979, 6).

Moreover, the details were not only aesthetically significant for Schenker ([1935] 1979), but themselves representative of the whole—“The total work lives and moves in each diminution, even those of the lowest order. Not the smallest part exists without the whole” (§253)—and even the secret hiding place of large-scale structure itself: ““One must conceal the depths. Where? On the surface”” (6).<sup>6</sup> This is the essence of Schenker’s organicism.

There are also innumerable discussions of this question about reduction in the secondary literature; again, I will mention just a few. The polemical Beach/Smith exchange of the 1980s (Smith 1986, Beach 1987, Smith 1987) is worth revisiting because it demonstrates that even scholars who work extensively

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2 Ewell did not specifically state that Schenker placed low value on the lower structural levels. He did provide evidence that Schenker believed the higher levels controlled the lower levels, that Schenker believed in the “inequality of tones,” and connected these beliefs with analogous, racist statements (15:38).

3 For instances of this argument being made that are not subsequently cited, see Narmour 1977, 9; Kerman [1980–81] 1994, 23–25; Kerman 1985, 34; Russ 1993, 268; and Cumming 2000, 172. For defenses against this critique (again, not otherwise cited), see Martin 1978, 197–98; Cook 1994, 89–90; and 2007, 132–33 (regarding Schenker and Salzer on ornamentation; see further citations there).

4 For passages of Salzer, see [1952] 1982, pages 45, 207, and 220.

5 Schenker’s omission of foreground graphs also allows him to present a large number of analyses in one volume. For a discussion of omitted foreground graphs in the work of Schenker and Salzer vis-à-vis that of Lerdaahl (and Jackendoff), see Pellegrin 2013, 119–22.

6 In the latter passage, Schenker is quoting Hugo von Hofmannsthal.

on Schenker can fall into subtle variations of the trap I have described. While Smith's response conveys a sense of reasonability and rationality, aiming to make Beach appear fanatical by comparison (and to some extent succeeding), Beach had good reason to be critical of Smith 1986; for the same fundamental misunderstanding of reduction is at the root of Smith's argument. Beach rebukes Smith along these lines, but in his response, Smith insists upon his point:

He [Beach] states that my argument illustrates only "the principle that changes in surface design do not necessarily alter underlying structure" (p. 180). This is, in fact, an eloquent statement, in Schenkerian language, of the very point I have been trying to make. Having accepted this "principle," as well as (I presume) the undeniable fact that the *Introduzione* [from the *Waldstein*] is a far better piece of music than my graceless counterfeit, how can Beach avoid the conclusion of *FE* [Smith 1986]? What are we to make of an analysis that cannot reveal such a significant distinction? In other words, of what ultimate analytical value is an "underlying structure" that is not affected by such radical "changes in surface design"?<sup>7</sup> (Smith 1987, 191)

In this statement, Smith seems to misunderstand the essence of Schenkerian analysis. As surface features are reduced away (the core objection lurking behind this passage) and one moves further away from the foreground, the structures encountered naturally become more generic.<sup>8</sup>

Similar to Smith's argument is Russ's (1993, 281) reference to "the closed Schenkerian view of the musical world . . . where music does not evolve, but constantly produces more variants of the same type—a view which prefers to treat adventurousness parenthetically rather than progressively." Schenkerians are indeed circumspect in the way they approach the issue of repertoire (which is one reason why it is important to sustain a Salzerian tradition as well), and the question of reduction does become more relevant in the analysis of post-Schenkerian repertoire. However, the parenthesization itself of progressive passages is not the underlying issue. Every event is in some sense parenthetical, in both Schenkerian and Salzerian analysis (as well as Lerdahl's [2001] work on tonal and post-tonal repertoire), except for events at the level of the background—that is simply the nature of reductive analysis. The crux of the matter is more qualified: the question of when—at what structural level—a passage should be reduced out becomes more complex and more consequential as increasingly progressive repertoire is encountered.<sup>9</sup>

Schachter 1999 is significant in that it addresses the matter of reduction directly, and begins by providing illustrative passages regarding the importance of detail by Viktor Zuckerkandl, Allen Forte and Stephen Gilbert, and Felix Salzer. Most of this contribution examines the question of levels through the analysis of works where "elements of the background are 'foregrounded'" (299). Through this discussion Schachter highlights the fact that within the Schenkerian analytical tradition, "progressive

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7 Smith's "counterfeit" is composed in such a way that the underlying structure is the same as the *Introduzione*.

8 While the issue involved does become more relevant in later repertoire (see below)—and Smith does deal with some such music towards the end of his essay—it must be thoroughly understood in that context as well.

9 For more on this subject, see Pellegrin 2013, 77–83. For a discussion of parenthetical passages (more strictly defined), see the section titled "Expansion by Parenthetical Insertion" in Rothstein 1989, 87–93.

reduction” is only one “analytic strategy.” He states, “‘Ihr Bild’ [Schubert] . . . calls into question the widespread belief (even among many Schenkerians) that Schenker’s approach is based on reduction” (302).<sup>10</sup> Schachter speaks of each successively higher structural level as a “horizon that clarifies and gives meaning to the level beneath it” (302). Through these types of statements, he engages with the question of the relative balance of “top-down” and “bottom-up” analytical processes, another issue which arises frequently in the literature.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast to Beach, Schachter’s writing here is again reasonable and moderate, exemplifying the “more relaxed rhetoric” of which Rothstein spoke (1986, 13). However, even Schachter uses the strongest word possible — “heresy” — to respond to critics who object to according more structural weight to some details than others. This occurs in the conclusion of his essay, where Schachter acknowledges, with characteristic diplomacy, that Schenkerian theory can easily lead one to unwittingly undervalue musical detail; at the same time, he makes clear that this issue is of critical importance:

My disagreements with Rosen’s statement are probably obvious to anyone who is reading this paper. . . . In any case, I am not quoting these words to argue but—in part—to agree. In doing analysis, in teaching it, in trying to learn it, even in reading Schenker’s graphs, it can become all too easy to fall into the heresy of valuing the work’s deep structure more highly than the work itself. (313–14)

Cook 1999 considers Schenker’s ([1925] 1994) article on editorial practice, “Abolish the Phrasing Slur.” Schenker’s essay, particularly its conclusion, draws explicit connections between editors’ elimination of detail through use of the phrasing slur and contemporary ideological analogs, railing against “the social and political ideology that understands unity only as uniformity” (30). So much is this the case that Cook reads the entire article as “a demonstration through music of how individual difference can be reconciled with social cohesion, of how society can discharge its ‘duty to the particular’ (Schenker [1925] 1994, 30), in this way giving the lie to oversimplified interpretations of Schenker’s anti-democratic and xenophobic political views” (1999, 101).

Lastly, it is instructive to revisit the perspective offered by Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983). They distinguish between salience, which is defined as a function of metric placement, duration, parallelism, loudness, register, etc., and stability, which is more directly related to pitch space, tonal closure, and prolongation. (The rhythmic work of Rothstein (1981, 1989, 1990) and Schachter ([1976] 1999, [1980] 1999, [1987] 1999) is entirely consistent with Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1977, 1983).)<sup>12</sup> Section 2.1 —

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10 Even in cases where a mere path of progressive reduction is followed, such a process would only be the first step in analysis, as Salzer ([1952] 1982) makes clear on many occasions, for example: “Knowledge of structure alone is by no means enough. The mere statement that a melody features a descending fifth as structural outline is fragmentary knowledge” (45).

11 For a discussion of this issue within the context of the work of Schenker and Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983), see Pellegrin 2013, 17–20. For discussion pertaining to Salzer and Lerdahl 2001, see Pellegrin 2013, 108–10. See also Salzer [1952] 1982, 206–8; Narmour 1977, 70 and 122; 2011, 13; Keiler 1978, 203ff.; 1983/84, 194; Agmon 1990, 297–98; Pople 1994, 113–14 and 121; Larson 1997, 116; Lerdahl 1997, 152–53; and Brown 1998, 121. This issue is also intrinsically involved with any discussion of reduction or the perception of the whole and the part.

12 See Pellegrin 2013, 3–15 for discussion. The work of these scholars also developed concurrently, and their ideas cross-fertilized.

“The Need for Reductions”—provides a thorough justification for reduction, all the way to the level of the “background” (105–11), and contains the following statement:

We do not deprecate the aural or analytic importance of salient events; it is just that reductions are designed to capture other, grammatically more basic aspects of musical intuition. A salient event may or may not be reductionally important. It is within the context of the reductional hierarchy that salient events are integrated into one’s hearing of a piece.<sup>13</sup> (109)

The use of the word “salient” here is relevant because many of Schenker’s critics specifically oppose the reduction of salient details. This objection is sometimes even formulated with the word “salient,” prompting Rothgeb (1997) to publish an essay entitled “Salient Features.”<sup>14</sup> Opposing the reduction of salient details is different than taking issue with the reduction of details in general. Those who object specifically to the reduction of salient details tacitly agree that events vary in their degree of structural importance; the disagreement is simply that they wish to use the criterion of salience rather than that of stability to make these distinctions.

Consider another passage from the same section of Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, which is accompanied by a score excerpt with two circled portions labeled *m* and *n*:

Suppose that we were listening to a recording of the scherzo of Beethoven’s Sonata op. 10, no. 2 (5.3), and that a speck of dust obliterated the sound of event *m*. The effect would be one of mild interruption. But if the cadence *n* were obliterated, the effect would be far more disconcerting, because *n* is structurally more important than *m*. In other words, it would change the sense of a phrase more if its goal—a cadence—were omitted than if an event en route toward that goal were omitted. (107)

I would first emphasize their choice of words, “structurally more important,” which is consistent with the Schenkerian language of “structure.” There are different types of importance; for example, structural and aesthetic. The trunk of a tree is structurally more important than a twig, an apt metaphor considering Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s prolongational trees (as well as Schenker’s organicism), which are part of their formalization of Schenkerian analysis.<sup>15</sup> Their argument in this passage could be rephrased by stating that event *n* represents a larger branch than event *m*.<sup>16</sup> By contrast, Schenker’s comments on Chopin’s étude, op. 10, no. 3, cited above, highlight the aesthetic significance of the lower levels.

Equally significant is the fact that this passage from Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s work exemplifies

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13 I mentioned above that the issue of reduction becomes more relevant in post-Schenkerian repertoire. It should be noted here that Lerdahl 2001, which considers both tonal and post-tonal music, also continues reductions all the way to the “background.”

14 For example, see Kerman 1985, 82; and Rosen 1971, 38. Rothgeb’s (1997) view of the relationship between stability and salience is entirely consonant with that of Lerdahl and Jackendoff. However, he redefines—at least rhetorically—the notion of salience, ultimately arguing that the structural features of a piece are the truly salient ones.

15 See Pellegrin 2013, 20–27.

16 To make the example more obvious one could compare the opening tonic chord in one of their analyses, which would be represented with a large branch, with a surface-level embellishment, which would be represented as a twig.

a belief in the “inequality of tones,” to use Ewell’s words (15:41). However, this inequality presents no problem for the same reason cited above—tones are only unequal in their *structural* importance. There is nothing inherently racist about Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s example, any more than it is racist to observe that a tree severed at the trunk will die, whereas the removal of a twig will scarcely affect it. As Schachter has written, “one does not need to be a monarchist or pan-German nationalist to perceive musical hierarchies” (2001, 12).<sup>17</sup> Hierarchy is natural, often a matter of life and death, and is in and all around us—from the fractal, branching structures of our circulatory and nervous systems to those of rivers and snowflakes; from networks of paths and roadways to electrical, plumbing, and delivery systems; and from rhythm and meter in tonal music to harmony and voice leading.<sup>18</sup> It is only in social and political systems that hierarchy becomes oppressive, due to the human capacity for abuse of power. Not everything is or should be organized hierarchically; there are other important systems—such as heterarchy and anarchy—which possess their own sets of advantages.<sup>19</sup> However, in social and political contexts, these systems are unfortunately vulnerable to precisely the same shortcoming—the strong may still choose to oppress the weak.

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17 It should also be remembered that Schenker was not the first to approach music “reductively.” Schenker’s concept of diminution was influenced by the Italian embellishment manuals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which sometimes presented information in the reverse order, “de-embellishing” existing music. (See Schenker [1935] 1979, §251; Forte and Gilbert 1982, 7–10; and Bent 1987, 9 and 38–41.) Furthermore, Morgan (1978) contends that the “roots” of Schenker’s approach “extend far back into Western music history and encompass a wide range of theorists and theoretical ideas” (73). Morgan demonstrates the ways in which *musica poetica* (the theory of musical figures, or the rhetoric of music) and functional harmonic theory—as well as diminution technique—prefigure Schenker’s concept of levels, arguing “that his theory represents a remarkable synthesis of some of the main currents of Western musical thought” (73).

18 For an examination of the relationship between fractal geometry and Schenker’s organicism, see Pellegrin 2006.

19 See Martin and Waters 2017 for a comparison of hierarchical and heterarchical approaches to reductive analysis of two Wayne Shorter compositions. Martin allows for ambiguity at the highest levels, leading him to argue that his approach is heterarchical, since it blends “organizational systems at different levels” (see his example 6). But other Schenkerians, including Salzer and Schachter, also allow for such ambiguity—see section entitled “Salience and Subjectivity” in Pellegrin 2013 (32–43).



## Schenker, Schenkerian Theory, Ideology, and Today's Music Theory Curricula BOYD POMEROY

In his thought-provoking paper, Ewell poses two important questions: First, was Schenker's racism cultural or biological? Second, for Schenker's theory, which came first, racism or music? It is perhaps illuminating to begin by considering the cases of Scarlatti and Chopin, famously admitted by Schenker to his Pantheon of "German" masters despite their non-Germanic origins. Had Schenker been motivated primarily by racism, we would surely expect them to have been excluded on ideological grounds; instead, purely musical considerations forced Schenker to admit them to "the Twelve"—despite the (for Schenker) inconvenient fact of their foreign origin. For Schenker, musical quality came first, ideology second.

The facts are not seriously in question: Schenker was a deeply flawed and conflicted character whose virulently nationalist and racist views are unpalatable by any standards. Ewell reopens the question of their relevance to his theory, a lingering controversy at least since the posthumous publication history of *Der Freie Satz/Free Composition*, with Oswald Jonas and Ernst Oster's editorial excisions of some of the most offensive passages and their subsequent restoration by John Rothgeb, but relegated to an appendix.<sup>1</sup> Ewell's firm belief in a deep connection between ideological outlook and music theory puts him (not surprisingly) squarely at odds with most of the prominent Schenkerian analysts and scholars of the last half-century, including Nicholas Cook, Allen Forte, Robert Morgan, Ernst Oster, John Rothgeb, William Rothstein, and Carl Schachter (among others).

But what of Ewell's evidence for his claim of racism's foundational role in the theory itself? It is, to put it mildly, flimsy. His strategy is to find parallel passages that seem conducive to the mapping of ideological polemic (nationalism/racism) to music theory (the behavior of musical notes). So, for example, he compares a passage taken from an ideological digression in one of the Beethoven late sonata monographs, an all-too-familiar polemic on the inherent inequality of nations and individuals, with one from *Free Composition* decrying the notion of "real independence" of all notes of the chromatic scale (the larger context of which is a discussion of the dependent status of passing tones).<sup>2</sup> While the quote in question conveniently does include a gratuitous dig at "the current, but certainly musically unsuitable expression, 'equal rights,'" the purported connection between racism and the theory is so self-evidently superficial, it is hard to take seriously. Another of his examples compares a private letter (1922) denigrating the idea of black aspiration to self-governance with a foundational Schenkerian theoretical concept—the idea that the tones of the *Urlinie* exercise control of middleground and foreground.<sup>3</sup> Well, yes, they do!; that is part and parcel of the notion of the existence of structural levels. At the risk of triviality, such "inequality of notes" (Ewell) is nothing more or less than a *sine qua non* of the very existence of tonality and the tonal system in the first instance. Such naive analogizing and

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1 Schenker 1956 (1935); Schenker 1979 (1935). See summary in Cook 2007, 250.

2 Schenker 2015 (1915), Online Literature Supplement, 23, n. 13; Schenker 1979 (1935), 13, n. 3.

3 Schenker 1979 (1935), 111.



out-of-context cherry picking hardly call for refutation, but if one were so inclined, evidence of a more communitarian-minded Schenker is not hard to find, as when he speaks in *Harmony* of a “community of tones . . . to be established usefully and continued stably.”<sup>4</sup>

Then again, the complexity of Schenker’s case—as a Galician Jew in Vienna from the 1890s to the 1930s—appears to hold little interest for Ewell, whose relentless focus on Schenker’s stridently nationalistic racism ends up painting a one-dimensional picture. To say the least, Schenker was a character of enormous personal contradictions, which still present a great challenge for us to grapple with today.<sup>5</sup> Had he not died in 1935, he would probably have met the same fate as his wife Jeanette (at Theresienstadt concentration camp).

Indeed one of the most thought-provoking developments in recent Schenkerian scholarship has been a new interest in the influence of Jewish thinking and law on Schenker’s theoretical thought.<sup>6</sup> And of course Schenker’s first-generation followers were largely Jewish (and seemingly healthily immune to the nationalist and racist contradictions of their mentor).<sup>7</sup> In his contemporaneous German-speaking world, Schenker’s mature theory was doomed to an inauspicious reception by its overwhelming perception as such<sup>8</sup> (witness the short-lived posthumous Schenkerian journal *Der Dreiklang* [1937–38]—a journal in the wrong place at the wrong time, if ever there was one!). Its early American establishment in New York, while positive, also had strongly Jewish associations in the circles of Mannes and the New School.<sup>9</sup> The other side of the coin is the issue of Schenker’s post-war reception in the German-speaking countries, where the taint of nationalism hung heavy, in an almost complete failure of the theory to gain a foothold for the rest of the twentieth century, belatedly followed by an exceedingly cautious thaw whose effects linger to this day.

From a practical point of view, Ewell advocates direct and far-reaching changes to our academic curricula. In this context it is undeniably true that Schenker has attained an unprecedentedly dominant position, both in graduate studies of tonal repertoire and, more indirectly, in his ideas providing the underpinning foundations of much undergraduate pedagogy, in textbooks such as Aldwell and Schachter’s *Harmony and Voice Leading* and Steven Laitz’s *The Complete Musician*. Ewell would unceremoniously demote Schenker from this position of preeminence or, at the very least, present his work and life from a radical vantage point of racist “warts and all,” and “let students decide for themselves.”

Fair enough, you might think, but it does raise some intriguing conundrums: First, how exactly would this work—by taking “democratic” polls of graduate students, most of whom (completely understandably

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4 Schenker 1954 (1906), 40.

5 See Cook 2007, ch. 3 (“The Conservative Tradition”).

6 Alpern 1999; Arndt 2018; Morgan 2014, 175–76.

7 Cook 2007, 157–58.

8 Though even here, Cook (2007, 274) argues that the situation was more nuanced than commonly assumed.

9 Berry 2002.

but inevitably) lack the knowledge and perspective to do just that? In my own experience, for what it's worth, I broach the subject of Schenker's worldview and character contradictions as and when they arise for any reason. Students react with some bemusement, often no little incredulity, but I have yet to encounter one who as a result made the decision to boycott the theory. From their perspective they are there to learn hands-on practical skills in an analytical approach they rightly feel is something essential to know about, whether as analysts, readers of the musicological and music-theoretical scholarly literature, performers, or listeners.

Second, we might ask just why Schenkerian thinking has come to dominate so much undergraduate pedagogy. As a model for explaining tonal music, his ideas (harmonic prolongation, melodic fluency, the "will of the tones," hypermeter) are simply unsurpassed—vividly intuitive, and conducive to simplified presentation as a basis for the pedagogy of harmony, melody, voice leading, and meter; and structural depth as it relates to all these things. They also have the most direct relevance to the pedagogy of aural skills and ear-training, informing the everyday activities of listening and performance in highly tangible ways, delivering real and far-reaching results.

Should we then attempt to preserve these incalculable benefits even while disavowing their source? But wouldn't that be intellectually dishonest? After all, a "warts and all" Schenker cuts both ways: we would have to accept the good along with the bad. On the other hand, the price of throwing out the analytical baby with the nationalist/racist bathwater seems steep indeed. Do we really want to deny students exposure to this unparalleled (in power, subtlety, and insight) explanation of the world of tonal music, on ideological grounds? (And is there any irony in that?) And what of the alternative? For all the academic prestige Schenker's ideas have come to enjoy, there are still many who advocate a flat tonal perspective of an uninterpreted chord-to-chord surface—and the textbooks catering to such an approach, for those who would choose it. And no doubt the one-dimensional simplicities of such thinking would hold their siren attractions for some students too. But it is indeed a free marketplace of ideas, and this option is already open to us.

Finally, we might additionally reflect on the related question of why the common-practice tonal repertoire (albeit a somewhat broader version of it than Schenker had in mind!) continues to supply the foundation for our undergraduate curriculum. Could it be that it actually works best for the very musical phenomena the theory curriculum concerns itself with (a long list to be sure, but starting with a few universal basics—melody, harmony, rhythm and meter, phrase structure, form . . .)? Moreover, the principles of tonal syntax derivable from their closeness of fit with this repertoire are precisely those most powerfully adaptable/generalizable to many other repertoires (encompassing a wide variety of vernacular and popular—including non-white—ones).

By all means let's continue to expand the diversity and inclusiveness of repertoires used in our classroom coverage of the subject (and the strides made in this area in the last twenty years have indeed been remarkable). But there should be no contradiction between doing this and keeping our primary focus on the most powerful explanatory models of tonal music ever devised.

**UNT\_001033**

## **Prolongational Analysis without Beams and Slurs: A View from Russian Music Theory CHRISTOPHER SEGALL**

In light of Philip Ewell's (2019c) imperative that we reinvestigate how the scholarly frame of whiteness has insulated Heinrich Schenker's reputation from meaningful critique of his racist beliefs, I propose a re-appellation of Schenkerian analysis to prolongational analysis and the replacement of English terms for German ones, since both alternatives carry less baggage. My position is that such a change would improve the practice and pedagogy of prolongational analysis, for reasons to be expounded upon below.

Most analytical methods are not named for their progenitor or most important practitioner. We do not call Roman numeral analysis "Voglerian" or "Weberian" analysis. This has implications beyond nomenclature. When doing Roman numeral analysis, we do not consult Vogler's or Weber's original texts, and we do not model our notation on their practice. Roman numeral theory, or scale-degree theory, has experienced two hundred years of constant development and refinement.

Similarly, what I will call *prolongational* analysis has experienced one hundred years' development since Heinrich Schenker's formulation of the concept, primarily through several generations of work by Anglo-American scholars. Attesting to this, prolongational ideas have even been assimilated into undergraduate harmony textbooks. Some books represent embellishing harmonies with Roman numerals in parentheses (Aldwell and Schachter 2019, Caplin 2013); others use two levels of Roman numerals or function symbols, the lower level indicating which harmony is being prolonged (Laitz 2015, Clendinning and Marvin 2016, Roig-Francolí 2020). Several decades' worth of scholarship has refined our field's understanding of the concept of prolongation and demonstrated its effectiveness in analysis.

As I contend, the term *Schenkerian* analysis creates certain problems. I'll deal with two. The first problem is notational. Prolongational analysis as commonly practiced attempts to replicate Heinrich Schenker's notation—it attempts to *look* Schenkerian—but does not always effectively convey prolongational harmony and voice leading. The second problem is personal. Philip Ewell's reassessment of Schenker's legacy shows a stain of racism that has been whitewashed out. No mere incidental figure, Schenker has been enshrined in the very name of the analytical method. I believe that these two problems are related—they both render "Schenkerian" analysis exclusionary.

To examine the first problem, I provide here an anonymous student analysis that is reflective of how prolongational analysis is taught. I use a student's work, rather than a published graph, because I have no desire to call out any individual author or to take issue with any prolongational pedagogue. I furthermore note that prolongational analysis is required in graduate programs, so whereas a majority of music theorists are not prolongational scholars, all have been taught prolongational analysis. Perhaps for this reason, the analysis here exhibits common features with published analyses in our field. It is instructive to compare two analyses, though of different works: the student analysis (Example 1) with a sample analysis from *Free Composition* (Example 2).

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Example 1. Clementi, Sonatina in C Major, op. 36, no. 1, I, mm. 16–24. (a) Score. (b) Anonymous student analysis.

The image displays two musical staves for Example 1. The top staff (a) is the original score for Clementi's Sonatina in C Major, op. 36, no. 1, measures 16–24. It features a treble and bass clef, a key signature of one sharp (F#), and a 2/4 time signature. The bottom staff (b) is an anonymous student analysis of the same passage. It uses Roman numerals (I, V, N, etc.) and functional symbols (arp, N, P) to analyze the harmonic structure. The analysis includes various annotations such as 'arp', 'N', 'P', and 'I' to denote specific harmonic functions and voice-leading patterns.

Example 2. Chopin, Polonaise in C-Sharp Minor, op. 26, no. 1, mm. 25–32. Analysis from Schenker (1979, fig. 80.2).

The image displays two musical staves for Example 2. The top staff (a) is the original score for Chopin's Polonaise in C-Sharp Minor, op. 26, no. 1, measures 25–32. It features a treble and bass clef, a key signature of three sharps (F#, C#, G#), and a 3/4 time signature. The bottom staff (b) is a Schenkerian analysis of the same passage. It uses Roman numerals (I, V, etc.) and functional symbols (arp, N, P) to analyze the harmonic structure. The analysis includes various annotations such as 'arp', 'N', 'P', and 'I' to denote specific harmonic functions and voice-leading patterns. The analysis also includes a table of scale steps at the bottom right:

#3	4	4	3
8	9	8	
5	6	6	5

The student analysis looks Schenkerian in its use of beams and slurs. But I notice several discrepancies. First, the student graph sketches outer voices only. In fact, Clementi's right-hand "melody" and left-hand "bass line" are both compound, engaging multiple strands of the voice-leading structure, but these compound melodies are depicted as arpeggiations within a single voice. Every note of the surface is represented, even repeated tones and fleeting decorations.

Second, the Roman numerals use a mix of uppercase, lowercase, and functional symbols, as in undergraduate harmonic analysis. But Schenkerian Roman numerals, always uppercase, reflect not surface harmonies, but prolonged *scale steps*. Through composed-out figuration, of the type shown at the right side of Example 2, the chord quality will shift over the course of the prolongation. A simple

inflection of a chordal third changes the quality between major and minor. Uppercase Roman numerals permit these changes to be indicated through voice-leading Arabic numerals.<sup>1</sup>

Third, the student's apparent conflicting prolongations are not clarified by the Roman numerals. Does the first half (mm. 16–19) prolong I or V? The most structural tones are shown as scale degrees 2 (soprano) and 5 (bass), suggesting a prolongation of V. But other notes of V are labeled as neighboring tones to those of I. The second half (mm. 20–23) is shown more clearly to prolong V. But the music is a modestly embellished repetition of the first half, with an identical underlying structure not reflected in the graph. The harmony in m. 21 is represented as a neighbor 6/4 chord, an embellishment of V, but the same harmony in m. 17 is shown as  $i^6$ , its stemmed noteheads suggesting local stability.

I would argue that the student analysis mimics the most superficial aspect of Schenker's—the notation—without adequately confronting the concept of prolongation. The student has focused on the notation but hasn't thought enough about the analysis it represents. More to the point, the student has absorbed the specialized vocabulary of the field, without integrating it into critical thought or consideration of analytic content. Such a focus serves an exclusionary role, separating those who speak the language from those who do not.<sup>2</sup>

The second problem is the issue that Ewell has raised of Heinrich Schenker's racist legacy. Individuals throughout American society have been uncovering and reckoning with versions of this problem in a number of domains. Buildings and colleges have been renamed, including on my own university campus. Is it enough to rename Schenkerian analysis, or should the entire enterprise be torn down? I can't claim to have a definitive answer, but I'd like to proceed from the pragmatic standpoint that calling the method *prolongational* analysis would not only dissociate it from a problematic figure, but it would also improve the pedagogy and understanding of its key concept, prolongation. It would, among other things, explicitly shift our attention to the “big picture” that musicians—analysts and performers alike—are often advised to listen for or play through.

Russian music theory provides an alternative model for depicting prolongation. Soviet theorist Yuri Kholopov (1932–2003) was a prolific author who wrote voluminously on a wide range of theoretical topics. He read widely in the historical and contemporary theoretical literature. His 1971 book, whose title translates to “Heinrich Schenker's Music-Theoretical System,” introduces Schenkerian theory to a Russian-language readership.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, Kholopov writes from a different disciplinary environment from Anglo-American theory. He approaches Schenker not as a central foundational figure of the field, but rather as one of a number of theorists who can be placed in a historical and intellectual context.

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1 Even many Schenker pedagogues and specialists do not adhere rigidly to the practice of using uppercase Roman numerals (see, e.g., Beach 2012, a wonderful textbook by one of my own former teachers). Many scholars may not consider this a problem, but it does impact the efficacy of prolongational representation.

2 In pointing to the student's nonsensical use of prolongational notation, I do not deny how the notational system can be marshalled in rich and elegant ways that beautifully capture complex musical insights, as shown through the legacy of the best analyses in our field.

3 The book was published posthumously as Kholopov 2006.

Kholopov's harmony treatise, "Harmony: A Theoretical Course" (1988), is indebted primarily to Hugo Riemann and German function theory (in contrast to the scale-degree theory mentioned above).<sup>4</sup> Prolongation makes a brief but significant appearance, however. Although Kholopov elsewhere uses the loanword *prolongatsiya*, citing Schenker, there is another concept that deals more thoroughly with prolongation.<sup>5</sup> Kholopov defines *razrabotka akkorda* ("development of a chord"; *razrabotka* is also the term for the development section of sonata form) in a way that clarifies its close relationship to prolongation. It involves a single harmony expanded through a variety of linear motions, lengthening the functional time-span of that harmony, almost as if an imaginary pedal point were present.

Example 3 demonstrates this *razrabotka*, which I would choose to translate as "prolongation." Rather than assigning individual Roman numerals to each passing, neighboring, and suspension chord, the analysis uses Arabic numerals to depict the linear motions that generate them. These in turn clarify the prolonged harmonies: I for the first half, V for the second half.<sup>6</sup> (Kholopov actually uses function symbols, T and D, instead of Roman numerals. In this case, one can be substituted for the other without any loss of meaning.) Nowhere are Schenkerian-style beams and slurs found, and yet prolongation is directly and effectively displayed.<sup>7</sup>

Example 3. Tchaikovsky, Nocturne in C-Sharp Minor, op. 19, no. 4, mm. 1–4. Analytical reduction adapted from Kholopov (2003, 356). Each notated measure of 2/4 corresponds to one-half score measure in common time.

Example 3. Tchaikovsky, Nocturne in C-Sharp Minor, op. 19, no. 4, mm. 1–4. Analytical reduction adapted from Kholopov (2003, 356). Each notated measure of 2/4 corresponds to one-half score measure in common time.

The score shows the following analytical reduction below the bass line:

(I) — P — (I) — P — (V) susp. — N — N — (V)

Below the reduction, the voice leading is detailed with Arabic numerals (1-8) for each voice part:

c#: I 8 — 7 — 8 — 2 — V 8 — 7 — 6 — 5 — 3(♯)  
 5 — 6 — 4 — 8 — 6 — 5 — 4 — 2 — 1  
 3 — 4 — 5 — 8 — 4 — 3 — 4 — 2 — 1  
 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 1 — 2 — 7 — 1

Example 4, also from Kholopov, reduces Chopin's florid surface to a four-voice progression that clarifies the prolongational voice leading. Kholopov normalizes the music's register (though he retains the octave leaps in the bass line), enharmonicism (the passage shifts back and forth between sharps and

4 References here are to the lightly revised second edition (Kholopov 2003), published in the year of Kholopov's death.

5 *Prolongatsiya* is borrowed from its English cognate. As is well-known to readers of this journal, Schenker commonly used the term *Auskomponierung*.

6 Given my purpose in this essay, I am not here going to quibble with the details of Kholopov's analysis. My intention in reproducing it is to show how prolongation can be indicated through Roman numerals alone.

7 This is similar to the early examples of prolongation in Schenker's *Harmony* (1906), albeit there without Arabic voice-leading numerals (Schenker 1954, 141–53). Admittedly, Kholopov's analysis conveys harmonic prolongation more effectively than melodic prolongation, which must be inferred through comparing the various ranks of Arabic numerals.

flats), and polyphony (the four-voice structure eliminates the doubled tones found in the left hand's arpeggios and right hand's block chords). The resulting analysis shows a prolongation of V, expressed through Arabic numerals.

Example 4. Chopin, Nocturne in D-Flat Major, op. 27, no. 2, mm. 40–46. (a) Beginning of excerpt. (b) Analytical reduction adapted from Kholopov (2003, 363).

Db: V<sup>7</sup> 5 — 4 — 3 — 1 — 3b — 2 — 2b — 3 — 4 — 4# — 5 — 1 — 1# — 2 — 3b — 3 — 4 — 4# — 5 — 1 —

Depicting prolongation through voice-leading figures is not unique to Kholopov. But its appearance is conspicuous in a treatise otherwise concerned with Riemannian functions. In this context, Kholopov implicitly argues that the most practical contribution of prolongational analysis is its focus on underlying linear motions, not the large-scale scaffolding of a fundamental structure. Either of Examples 3 or 4 could be rendered in Schenkerian notation.<sup>8</sup> My point, however, is that such notation is not necessary for prolongational analysis. Moreover, an emphasis on that style of notation may occlude the real significance of the analytical method.

Michiel Schuijjer (2008, 236–78) persuasively argues, with more nuance than my oversimplification will attempt to convey here, that Schenkerian analysis and pitch-class set theory served to institutionalize professional music theory within the American academy (see also Rothstein 1986). The rigorous training required and the complex notation employed lent both projects a scientific sheen that met the needs of

<sup>8</sup> In fairness, I should acknowledge that Kholopov does provide a further reduction of each example that more closely approaches Schenkerian notation (e.g., measure lines are eliminated). It is significant that Kholopov does not skip directly to these reductions or present them as primary.



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mid-century scholarly illustriousness. Schenkerian notation, that is, may have been attractive precisely for its inaccessibility.

It is this legacy of exclusion that is being reassessed and scrutinized by Ewell and others. The field as a whole is shifting beyond adhering to a limited number of analytical models, extolling one repertoire over others, and privileging arcane systems of disseminating information. The same white, male power structures that put these in place generations ago also permitted Heinrich Schenker's racist comments to be excused or dismissed as irrelevant or misleading.

I view the retention of original German terms in Schenkerian scholarship from the same perspective. The use of words such as *Zug*, *Kopftón*, and *Ursatz*—rather than linear progression, primary tone, and fundamental structure, translations that are readily available—lends a mythic ethos to Schenkerian analysis, inviting only to its initiates. It serves, therefore, an exclusionary purpose. Ewell asks why graduate programs in music theory require that students study German. Many historical theory texts have by now been translated into English, but it is in Schenkerian literature and pedagogy that a reliance on German terms is most steadfastly retained. Using these terms' English-language equivalents would not only make prolongational analysis more accessible, but it would also help to disentangle it from Heinrich Schenker.

I propose that we consider renaming, but also reconceiving, Schenkerian analysis as prolongational analysis. Due to decades of scholarly development, we arguably now better understand prolongation than Heinrich Schenker ever did. There is less necessity to tether prolongational scholarship to Schenker's original writings or to model our prolongational notation on his. It should be possible to make prolongational analysis more accessible. If our discipline wishes to continue this type of analysis, then I contend that this renaming and reconception would actually improve the study, practice, and pedagogy of prolongation.

## An Initial Response to Philip Ewell

### STEPHEN SLOTTOW

In his talk at the 2019 SMT plenary session, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame,” Philip Ewell argued that Schenker’s racism pervades his music theory and analytic practice.<sup>1</sup> Ewell illustrates this permeation with two examples, each pairing two apparently parallel statements by Schenker. In the first, he juxtaposes a statement on “the inequality of peoples” with one on the “inequality of notes” (Example 1). In the second (Example 2), he juxtaposes a statement on “whites controlling blacks” with one on “the fundamental structure controlling the middleground and foreground.”<sup>2</sup> He comments:

Here we begin to see how Schenker’s racism pervaded his music theories. In short, neither racial classes, nor pitch classes, were equal in Schenker’s theories. He uses the same language to express these beliefs. Since he wrote this in 1922, when virtually all of Africa was under white colonial rule, his sentiment is clear: blacks must be controlled by whites. Similarly, Schenker believed notes from the fundamental structure must control other notes, as the quote on the right of the slide shows. I have only scratched the surface showing how Schenker’s racism permeates his music theories.<sup>3</sup>

I would like to make two points.

#### POINT 1: EQUALITY OF PITCH CLASSES AND THE *URSATZ*’S CONTROL OF LESSER LEVELS

I agree that Schenker’s views on politics and race inform his music theory. For how they do so, see especially Carl Schachter’s 2001 article “Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker’s Politics and the Pedagogy of Schenkerian Analysis.”<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, I find Ewell’s parallelisms curiously unconvincing. Are the human and musical realms really as parallel and interchangeable as Ewell implies? His statement that “neither racial classes, nor pitch classes, were equal in Schenker’s theories,” is accurate, but it does give the impression that regarding notes as unequal is somehow racist. A problem with equating the inequality of peoples with the inequality of tones is that the assertion of the latter is hardly limited to Schenker. To my knowledge, no theorist or composer of tonal (or pre-tonal) music has ever postulated the “equality” of tones (at least before Schoenberg, if then)—because, to risk making an obvious observation, tonal music is hierarchical. A tonal work is in a key; the key has a primary scale. Other scales are excluded or relegated to a lesser level. The scale will contain certain notes and

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1 Philip Ewell, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame,” Society for Music Theory annual meeting, Columbus, OH, November 9, 2020.

2 Philip Ewell, powerpoint examples from “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame,” Society for Music Theory annual meeting, Columbus, OH, November 9, 2020.

3 Ewell, ““Music Theory’s White Racial Frame.”

4 Carl Schachter, “Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker’s Politics and the Pedagogy of Schenkerian Analysis,” *Theory and Practice* 26 (2001): 1–20. Schachter’s article responds, eighteen years in advance, to virtually all of Ewell’s points about Schenker and Schenkerian analysis.

not others, and these notes will carry different weights, and create chords with different functions, etc. The whole concept of consonance and dissonance, and chord tones and non-chord tones, assumes the inequality of tones. In tonal music, notes are decidedly unequal. And that is true of most, or at least many, non-Western musics too, such as Indian Carnatic music, Arabic Maqam, Japanese Noh music, etc.

The above is quite clear if Ewell's Schenker quotation is read in full and in context. The quote is taken from footnote 3 of *Free Composition*, a section entitled "The tones of the fundamental line are not overtones."<sup>5</sup> Ewell quoted only the first line: "It is therefore a contradiction to maintain, for example, that all scale tones between *C* and *c* have real independence or, to use a current but certainly musically unsuitable expression, 'equal rights.'" But the footnote continues as follows:

No matter how one would divide this tone series, any division compels recognition of diatony in the sense of a relationship of all tones of the series to the fundamental, *C*. In compositional practice, the error of this point of view results in a constant violation of the tonality in the foreground. One feels justified in setting down any key whatsoever, claiming for it independence, without any relation to the fundamental key. The effect may well be imagined . . .

Here Schenker makes the point that tones are governed, so to speak, by the diatonic "tonality in the foreground," which itself relates to the fundamental tonic of the key. Ewell's project here is to show that "Schenker's racism pervaded his music theories" by demonstrating that Schenker used similar language in his statements on race as well as those on music theory.<sup>6</sup> The language may be similar, but the footnote simply describes a basic property of keys in tonal music, and if that property is racist, then tonal music itself must be racist—a proposition which I at least am not prepared to swallow.

Regarding the second of Ewell's parallel statements: he said "similarly, Schenker believed notes from the fundamental structure must control other notes."<sup>7</sup> Well, yes, he did—but, again, Ewell's statement conveys the impression that levels of elaboration are somehow racist. Schenker's theory of levels is based on the far older and more universal concept/practice of diminution. Diminutions are elaborations of more basic structures or models—they are always "controlled" by the more fundamental structures which they are elaborating. Examples include schemas, variations on grounds or themes, doubles of dance movements, variations on popular songs (such as by the English virginalists), etc. Sequences are good examples, since they are harmonic/voice-leading prototypes which are virtually *always* elaborated in practice. Schenker's theory of levels is a vastly expanded theory of diminution writ large in order to encompass his ideas about a particular repertoire.

Thus it appears to me that if both diminution and the basic inequality of tones in tonal music is

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<sup>5</sup> Heinrich Schenker, *Free Composition*, trans. and ed. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979), §9, p. 13. Trans. of *Neue Musikalische Theorien und Phantasien*, Part III, *Der freie Satz*, 2nd ed., ed. and rev. Oswald Jonas (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1956).

<sup>6</sup> Ewell, "Music Theory's White Racial Frame."

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

somehow deemed racist, then tonal music must therefore be inherently racist at its very core and by virtue of its very existence—and that would certainly apply to Western popular music too, and to many non-Western musics. This *reductio ad absurdum* (as I see it, anyway) illustrates some of the problems involved in regarding such “parallel” statements as somehow equivalent.

## POINT 2: SCHENKER AND SCHENKERIANS

Ewell spoke about how Schenkerians have “white-washed” Schenker, citing Oswald Jonas, Ernst Oster, Allen Forte, William Rothstein, Nicolas Cook, and John Rothgeb.<sup>8</sup> He also repeatedly made the point that Schenkerian analysis should be presented in pedagogical contexts<sup>9</sup> without whitewashing, partly because that is “what Schenker would have wanted.” Well, perhaps it is, but is that such a conclusive argument? Should teachers of Schenkerian analysis devoutly ask themselves “what would Schenker do?”, thus seeking the guiding light of the Founder whilst enmeshed in the snares of pedagogy?

My point is that there is a distinction between Schenker and Schenkerians—the latter consisting of the Schenkerian lineages and community. Schenker’s analysis is not necessarily the same as Schenkerian analysis—the latter isn’t limited to the former. Schenkerian analysis is a living, evolving tradition, and although of course based on and, in a way, encompassing Schenker’s ideas, is not necessarily identical to them. It can include expanding or critiquing them as well. For instance, Schenker denied the existence of sequences and invertible counterpoint;<sup>10</sup> but subsequent Schenkerians accept them.<sup>11</sup> In particular, many of Schenker’s most influential students, such as Oswald Jonas, were appalled by his political and racial beliefs. In fact, none of Schenker’s students, nor later Schenkerians, continued Schenker’s linkage between German supremacist ideology, racism, and music theory and analysis. So the “white-washing” of Schenker began very early and during Schenker’s lifetime. Schenker may have believed at some points in the evolution of his thought that his various political and racial beliefs were indistinguishable from his music theory and analytical methodology, but his successors haven’t agreed, finding something very valuable in the latter but not in the former.<sup>12</sup> And their practices, not only Schenker’s, have formed the tradition today (see Rothstein 1990).<sup>13</sup>

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8 See Ewell, powerpoint examples to “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame.”

9 It is not particularly white-washed in non-pedagogical, or even in advanced pedagogical, contexts. Any graduate student who uses Schenkerian analysis will probably be aware, for instance, of Oster’s Appendix 4 in *Free Composition*.

10 Heinrich Schenker, *Free Composition*, trans. and ed. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979), §222, p. 78.

11 See Stephen Slottow, “To Be or Not to Be: Schenker’s versus Schenkerian Attitudes Towards Sequences.” *Gamut* Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2018: 72–96.

12 It is important to note that both Schenker’s political, historical, and racial beliefs and his theory and analytical methodology changed and evolved throughout his lifetime. For the former, see Timothy Jackson’s article “A Preliminary Response to Ewell” in this issue of the *Journal for Schenkerian Studies*. For an example of the latter, see William Pastille, “Heinrich Schenker, Anti-Organicist,” *19th-Century Music* 8/1 (Summer, 1984), 29–36.

13 William Rothstein, “The Americanization of Heinrich Schenker.” In Hedi Siegel, ed., *Schenker Studies*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1990: 193–203.

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In conclusion to this short critique, I do not believe that Schenker's political and racial opinions should be suppressed (and, in fact, they're not), nor that mention of them should be avoided in the classroom; nor do I think that Ewell makes a convincing case that they have contaminated Schenkerian analytical methodology. Citing similar language in statements about politics and race on the one hand, and tonal function and the Ursatz on the other, suggests a false equivalence. Nor does the fact that Schenker himself made such connections in various writings itself establish the point, since Schenkerian analysis is a continuing lineage not limited solely to Schenker himself. For me, Carl Schachter sums up the matter when he says "I firmly believe that the ideology is in no way an essential component of the analytic practice."<sup>14</sup>

Example 1.

Two Schenker quotes, one on the inequality of peoples,  
the other on the inequality of notes

"But let the German mind also gather the courage to report: it is not true that all men are equal, since it is, rather, out of the question that the incapable ever become able; that which applies to individuals surely must apply to nations and peoples as well" (2015, online "Literature" supplement, 23n13).

"It is therefore a contradiction to maintain, for example, that all scale tones between 'C' and 'c' have real independence or, to use a current but certainly musically unsuitable expression, 'equal rights'" ([1935] 1979, 13n3).

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<sup>14</sup> Schachter, "Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven," 16.

Example 2.

Two Schenker quotes, one on whites controlling blacks,  
the other on the fundamental structure controlling  
the middleground and foreground

About whites controlling blacks he says, "Even negroes proclaim that they want to govern themselves because they, too, can achieve it" (Handwritten letter, September 25, 1922, SDO). [That is, blacks must be controlled by whites.]

About the scale degrees of the fundamental structure, he says, "the scale-degrees of the fundamental structure have decisive control over the middleground and foreground" ([1935] 1979,111).

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## **Philip Ewell's White Racial Frame**

### **BARRY WIENER**

#### **INTRODUCTION: SCHENKER AND AMERICAN MUSIC THEORY**

In his talk at the 2019 SMT Plenary, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame,” Philip Ewell made a series of accusations relative to the present state of American music theory. His complaint began with Schenkerian theory and ended as a condemnation of Western culture. The accuracy of Ewell’s statements about Schenker deserves to be challenged. The most basic level concerns simple facts about “Schenkerian analysis” and its reception in the American academic world. Ewell asserts that Schenker’s theories are dominant in American university theory programs: “Schenker is our shared model, whether we study tonal music, popular music, or post-tonal music.” He also describes Schenker as “a white German racist.” Finally, Ewell maintains that “our white racial frame has white-washed Schenker’s racism for nearly one hundred years.”

Ewell’s claim about the importance ascribed to Schenker’s theories in American academia is linked to his contention that “Schenker in many ways represents our shared model” for the analysis of tonal, popular, and post-tonal music. Ewell makes this assertion despite Schenker’s vehement rejection of popular and non-tonal music. For Schenker, non-tonal music violated all of the immutable laws of art. He even accused his pupil Weisse of failing to properly appreciate his theories, due to Weisse’s rather timid use of dissonance in his own music.<sup>1</sup> Schenker’s rejection of popular music was tied to his elitist notions about the “genius,” which he borrowed from eighteenth-century German aesthetics. Schenker argued that there was a significant qualitative difference in the way the great masters employed musical techniques that differentiated their music from that of their inferiors, German or otherwise. It is precisely that qualitative difference in music, tonal or non-tonal, that is now explicitly denied within the American academy, in favor of a leveling, egalitarian approach to culture. Schenker would have rejected out of hand most of what passes for discussion of his ideas today in the American academic world.

#### **SCHENKER, RACISM, AND THE GERMANS**

Ewell’s claim that “our white racial frame has white-washed Schenker’s racism for nearly one hundred years” is a fantasy: Schenker’s theories were not widely disseminated for most of the period under discussion, and most theorists knew little more than his name, if that. In addition, much of his work was inaccessible or not easily available to scholars. Although Ewell accuses Schenker’s acolytes of deceptively hiding the evidence of his prejudices, Carl Schachter eloquently confronted the problem many years ago: “His ideas about society and politics, for the most part, enjoy no such productive afterlife, and many are thoroughly discredited. . . . They are also more than a little frightening, resonating

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1 Timothy L. Jackson, “Punctus contra punctus—a Counterpoint of Schenkerian and Weissian Analysis and Hans Weisse’s Counterpoint Studies with Heinrich Schenker,” *Journal of Schenkerian Studies* 4 (2010), 25–27.



as they now do with some of the most horrific events of modern times.”<sup>2</sup> Cook articulated the problem in a similar way, writing of “the most grisly exhibits in the Schenkerian chamber of horrors.”<sup>3</sup> In the preface to his translation of Schenker’s *Counterpoint*, John Rothgeb wrote, “It is perhaps understandable that Schenker’s political and social arch-conservatism found expression in his musical publications. . . . Especially his fanatical German nationalism—a posture radically tempered, incidentally, by events of the period from 1933 to the end of his life—has caused subsequent editors of his works to expunge passages that were considered at best irrelevant and at worst offensive. *Our own editorial policy . . . has been shaped by our distaste for censorship in any form; our text is, therefore, unabridged.*”<sup>4</sup> [my italics]

Schenker’s harsh criticism of certain groups was primarily based on vague generalizations about national habits. His most unfortunate comments are linked to his response to World War I: “The other nations were from the very start born to ‘decadence,’ to decline (who cannot see this already today among the French, English, and Russians?)”<sup>5</sup> When Japan prepared to enter World War I on the side of Great Britain,<sup>6</sup> Schenker simultaneously reviled the Japanese and the English: “Japan’s ultimatum to Germany!! . . . Animals of the East . . . *The small English brain, which is capable only of theft*, runs aground already in distinguishing word and deed.”<sup>7</sup> [my italics]

Ewell points to Schenker’s reference to “less able or more primitive races” in the Literature supplement to his edition of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, op. 111 (1915) as evidence of his toxic racist beliefs. In fact, Schenker condemned all of Germany’s enemies equally—including the English, French, Italians, and Anglo-Americans—as members of primitive races:

And what, incidentally, is the World War of today . . . but a thousandfold-intensified curse of that equality-delusion of the **less able or more primitive races and nations**? They all, all who so maliciously attacked Germany and Austria—the *English, French, Italians, Russians, Serbs, and all the others who joined with these forces behind the mask of neutrality, like the Anglo-Americans, Japanese, Rumanians*, etc. —, they all, all march, as they say, “at the forefront of civilization.”<sup>8</sup> [my italics; Ewell’s quotation in **bold**]

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2 Carl Schachter, “Elephants, crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker’s politics and the pedagogy of Schenkerian analysis,” *Theory and Practice* 26 (2001), 9.

3 Nicholas Cook, *The Schenker Project* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 147.

4 John Rothgeb, “Preface to the English Translation,” in Heinrich Schenker, *Counterpoint: A Translation of Kontrapunkt by Heinrich Schenker*, Book I, trans. John Rothgeb and Jürgen Thym, ed. John Rothgeb (Ann Arbor, Mich: Musicalia Press, 2001), xiv.

5 Heinrich Schenker, “Deutsche Genie,” (OJ 21/2, [1]), [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/other/OJ-21-2\\_1.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/other/OJ-21-2_1.html)

6 See Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999).

7 Schenker, diary entry, 20 August 1914, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-15\\_1914-08/r0027.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-15_1914-08/r0027.html)

8 Schenker, Beethoven, *Piano Sonata in C Minor, Op. 111: Literature*, 21. [fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/uscompanion/us/static/companion.websites/9780199914180/C\\_minor\\_Op\\_111\\_Web.pdf](http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/uscompanion/us/static/companion.websites/9780199914180/C_minor_Op_111_Web.pdf)

Schenker elaborated on the “equality-delusion” of the primitive (mostly European) nations:

But let the German mind also gather the courage to report: it is not true that all men are equal, since it is, rather, out of the question that the incapable ever become able; that which applies to individuals surely must apply to nations and peoples as well, so that unrestricted evolvement is no more attainable by the former than by these latter.<sup>9</sup>

Schenker specifically applied the concept of the “inequality” of nations to the English:

Even a criminal sometimes produces an excellent child, a fine idea; even a criminal is also sometimes calm and well behaved, especially so long as everything flows according to his wishes—and is nevertheless dealt with and scolded as a criminal only because of a single misdeed: *why should we then not similarly name the English nation*, for example, as a great criminal among the nations despite a Shakespeare, Carlyle, Byron, etc.? For peace will not come to mankind until *inequality, the principle of all creation, becomes an axiom in the intercourse of nations and individuals as well*.<sup>10</sup> [my italics]

It is noteworthy that Schenker castigated the English for exploiting their colonial subjects in a contemporaneous diary entry: “One sees that sport was, for the English, only a complementary manifestation of their narrow-minded and easygoing idleness on earth; a convenient trading activity with **wild and half-wild peoples**, *an equally convenient exploitation of primitive nations and races*.”<sup>11</sup> [my italics; Ewell’s quotation in bold] As we have seen, for Schenker at the time, almost everyone on earth fit into the categories of “wild and half-wild peoples,” and “primitive nations and races,” except for the Germans.

In the Literature supplement to his edition of Beethoven’s Sonata, op. 111, Schenker was even more caustic about the moral failings of British imperialism:

“Sport” (as again precisely to the Englishman, who through the educational ideal merely of a trained, healthy half-wit has already learned enough to dispense with religion, custom, art, science in life and who, just to gain completely the convenience of that sport-blessing, does not scruple to *plunder all of the weak of the world, to kill them and wipe them out by force, with hypocritically raised eyes—crude inside, barbarous, mendacious, revolting as ever a race that has meddled on the earth*).<sup>12</sup> [my italics]

Oddly, at the same time as he expressed xenophobic views, Schenker condemned the very notion of nationality, after castigating the “half-animalistic” Slavs for their inferiority:

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<sup>9</sup> Schenker, Beethoven, *Piano Sonata in C Minor, Op. 111: Literature*, 23. See Philip Ewell, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame,” Slide 18. Plenary Session, SMT 2019 annual meeting, Columbus, Ohio, philipewell.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SMT-Plenary-Slides.pdf

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>11</sup> Schenker, diary entry 8 September 1914, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-15\\_1914-09/r0014.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-15_1914-09/r0014.html)

<sup>12</sup> Schenker, Beethoven, *Piano Sonata in C Minor, Op. 111: Literature*, 21.

Verily the last examples from the Balkans show the wantonness in the concept of an idea of nationality: nations and groups of people wrestle with one another without it being possible for any person to say from which father or mother he is descended. And yet, according to their mood, millions of people say that they belong to this or that group and, if pressed, to some other one as well—in short, the character of nationalities can also be created according to political needs.<sup>13</sup>

Like all nineteenth-century conservative political theorists, Schenker evoked the murder and mayhem generated by the French revolution in order to condemn democracy as negation and social disintegration. In *Der Tonwille*, he attacked the political culture of the “nations of the West” (i.e., the English and French), whose “pronounced *barbarism, nay cannibalism*, they conceal from themselves and others only scantily behind high-flown language”<sup>14</sup> [my italics]. Schenker’s assertion that black Africans are not capable of ruling themselves should be understood within this context. He actually wrote that *all human beings*—not only the “inferior” Africans—are incapable of governing themselves. Here is the passage from which Ewell excerpted part of a sentence:

Since we have deviated from nature, no longer hop around on branches and nourish ourselves on grass and the like, but instead have entered into the artifice of a state, *it is out of the question that humankind can come to terms with it*. If Mozart, Beethoven, were to compose a state according to his feeling for primordial laws, then it would work, but the mass does not even know that it is a matter of an artifice which, as such, needs falsifications, not to mention that in its lack of talent the mass would find means, particularly today, when **even negroes proclaim that they want to govern themselves because they, too, can achieve it (!?)**.<sup>15</sup> [my italics; Ewell’s quotation in bold]

Schenker’s condemnation of democracy and of Germany’s enemies during World War I resembles the sentiments of Thomas Mann, who wrote, “There are highly ‘political’ nations—nations that are never free of political stimulation and excitement, that still, because of a complete lack of ability in authority and governance, have never accomplished anything on earth and never will. The Poles and the Irish, for example. On the other hand, history has nothing but praise for the organizing and administrative powers of the completely nonpolitical German Nation.”<sup>16</sup> Like Schenker, Mann eventually repented those views.

Ewell singles out Schenker’s derogatory remarks about blacks and Slavs, while omitting similar comments about the English and French. He cynically circumscribes his portrait of Schenker in order to link him both to the Nazis and to American white racists like composer John Powell; Ewell recently

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13 This passage is mistranslated on the Schenker Documents Online website. See Schenker, diary entry, 26 July 1914, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-15\\_1914-07/r0039.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-15_1914-07/r0039.html)

14 Schenker, *Der Tonwille: Pamphlets in Witness of the Immutable Laws of Music: Issues 1–5 (1921–1923)*, ed. William Drabkin, trans. Ian Bent et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4–5, quoted in Cook, *The Schenker Project*, 144.

15 Schenker, letter to August Halm, 25 September 1922, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/DLA-69.930-10.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/DLA-69.930-10.html)

16 Thomas Mann, *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983), 17.

contributed to a BBC broadcast about Powell's repugnant anti-black racist attitudes and their reflection in his own music. The problem of racism among noteworthy composers is, unfortunately, far larger than Ewell acknowledges. In addition to the notorious Richard Wagner, Varèse praised Hitler<sup>17</sup> and Sibelius collaborated with the Nazis, to his pecuniary benefit.<sup>18</sup> Stravinsky boasted of his hatred of Jews and ingratiated himself with the Nazis as well.<sup>19</sup> Chopin famously remarked about Liszt, "One of these days he will be a member of parliament, or perhaps even King of Abyssinia or the Congo." Such examples can be multiplied indefinitely.

Although Ewell makes the claim that Schenker's bigoted notions about other nations are examples of biological racism, this assertion must be seriously qualified. In his discussion of art, Schenker enunciated a doctrine, common to his time and place, of German *cultural*, not biological racism. Paradoxically, Schenker classified the music of the Pole Chopin and the Czech Smetana as examples of German genius:<sup>20</sup>

And if one, for instance, speaks of a national music, then it should not be forgotten that a Smetana would not have been at all imaginable without German organizational efforts in musical matters. (It is exactly the same with Chopin in Poland, whose intellect was born in the German art of synthesis.)<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, in the mid-nineteenth century, the German cultural critic Wilhelm Riehl wrote that the Frenchman George Onslow was so fine a composer that his music was "really German."<sup>22</sup> Ewell castigates Nicholas Cook for attempting to discuss Schenker's racism in "humorous" terms. Cook points to the absurdity in Schenker's circular argument when he "defines great music (whatever the national source) as German and concludes from this that German music is great."<sup>23</sup>

Ewell creates the impression that Schenker was uniformly hostile to non-European cultures throughout his career.<sup>24</sup> In fact, while Schenker sometimes made reprehensible comments, he occasionally expressed positive thoughts instead. For example, in 1906, he wrote, "In the Apollo

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17 Olivia Mattis, "Edgard Varèse's 'Progressive' Nationalism: Amériques meets Américanisme," in *Edgard Varèse: Die Befreiung des Klangs*, ed. Helga de la Motte-Haber (Hofheim: Wolke, 1992), 149–78.

18 Timothy L. Jackson, "Sibelius the Political," in *Sibelius in the Old and New World. Aspects of His Music, Its Interpretation and Reception*, eds. Timothy L. Jackson, Veijo Murtomäki, Colin Davis, and Timo Virtanen (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2010), 69–127.

19 Richard Taruskin, *Defining Russia Musically: Historical and Hermeneutical Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 458. While Schenker scholars have freely discussed his prejudices, Taruskin points out that both Robert Craft and Soviet editors systematically expunged Stravinsky's anti-Semitic rants from their editions of his letters. See Taruskin, 457.

20 Cook, *The Schenker Project*, 238–40.

21 Heinrich Schenker, diary entry, 5 November 1912, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-11\\_1912-11/r0006.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-11_1912-11/r0006.html)

22 Wilhelm Riehl, "Georg Onslow" (1852), in *Musikalische Charakterköpfe: Ein kunstgeschichtliches Skizzenbuch*, Erster Band (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1886), 294.

23 Cook, *The Schenker Project*, 238.

24 Ewell, "Music Theory's White Racial Frame," Slide 13.

Theatre with Dr. and Mrs. Robert Brünauer. The Negro dances very nearly exciting. The Japanese do wonderful things in the realms of imagination and energy. Delightful fantasies in the variety of other offerings.”<sup>25</sup> In 1927, he wrote, “The notice about the ‘black singers’ shows the state of affairs today. The musician who assembled the negro choruses that you played for us on your phonograph today has to be called a true musical genius; it would be worthwhile to know who that is: he deserves a first place among musicians, certainly ahead of Strauss and Pfitzner.”<sup>26</sup> While we cannot pinpoint the recording that Brünauer played for Schenker, many choral recordings of spirituals were made in the 1910s and 20s, some by the renowned Fisk Jubilee Singers, which toured Europe in 1924 and 1925.<sup>27</sup> At the time Schenker made these comments praising African-American music at the expense of Strauss and Pfitzner, they were considered the two leading composers in Germany.

In connection with Schenker’s cultural racism, I note Ewell’s citation of Schenker’s supposed use of the term “inferior races” in *Counterpoint*, Book I (1910). In a defense of the perfection of the modern tonal system of major and minor modes, Schenker criticized *musically* inferior races:

In view of the benefits of so beautifully developed an art as music, how can anyone dare to suggest that we look to musically **inferior races** and nations for allegedly new systems, when in fact they have no systems at all! . . .

Skillful artists . . . have always successfully limited the problem of musical exoticism in practice. They solved it by attempting to make the original melodies of foreign peoples . . . accessible to us through the refinements of our two tonal systems. They expressed the foreign character *in our major and minor*—such superiority in our art, such flexibility in our systems! . . . Think, for example, of Haydn’s and Beethoven’s *Schottische Lieder*, Schubert’s unique *Divertissement à l’hongroise*, the Hungarian Dances by Brahms, the Slavonic Dances by Dvořák, and the Norwegian Dances by Grieg, as well as *Scheherazade* by Rimsky-Korsakov, among others.<sup>28</sup> [Ewell’s quotation in **bold**]

In other words, Schenker was identifying northern European nations like the Scots and the Norwegians, as well as central European nations such as the Czechs and Hungarians, as *musically* inferior races. Not satisfied with these caveats, Schenker denigrated the church modes and German folksongs as well: “If art had never gone beyond the folk song or the Gregorian chant, how could we have conquered polyphony, motets, sonatas, and symphonies?”<sup>29</sup>

25 Schenker, diary entry, 13 December 1906, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-05\\_1906-12/r0013.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-05_1906-12/r0013.html)

26 Schenker, letter to Anthony von Hoboken, 12 August 1927, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/OJ-89-1\\_2.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/OJ-89-1_2.html)

27 Tim Brooks, “‘Might Take One Disc of This Trash as a Novelty’: Early Recordings by the Fisk Jubilee Singers and the Popularization of ‘Negro Folk Music’,” *American Music* 18/3 (Autumn 2000): 278–316.

28 Schenker, *Counterpoint*, 28.

29 Ibid., 30. See also 29: “If folk songs are to be brought into the realm of art, art has to prevail—even if the songs are as advanced and developed as the folk songs of the German nation.”

## RACISM, GERMANS, AND JEWS

In the end, Schenker believed it was his mission to save the legacy of German music for everyone—without distinction of race, religion, or national origin. He simultaneously condemned the Germans and reaffirmed his own Jewish identity: “the product of the German music-geniuses which, *ununderstood, betrayed, defiled by the Germans, but long since having become an asset of all mankind*, is now destined to become a new message to the world from the Jews for the coming eternities.”<sup>30</sup> [my italics; words underlined by Schenker] In the introduction to *Der freie Satz*, Schenker made similar remarks about the accessibility of great art to all: “Since the linear progression, as I have described it, is one of the main elements of voice-leading, *music is accessible to all races and creeds alike*.”<sup>31</sup> [my italics] Almost fifty years before Dr. King’s “I have a dream” speech, Schenker stated that what counts in a person is the content of one’s character, not nationality: “Does a mother tongue teach a better love of one’s neighbors, a better art, and a better conduct of life in general? Is it more than this or that headdress; and, beyond the mother tongue, *is not the inner character of a person more decisive?*”<sup>32</sup> [my italics]

In his simplification and vulgarization of Schenker’s problematic political views, Ewell never mentions that Schenker was a Jew, that his wife died in a concentration camp, that his disciples had to flee from Europe because they were Jews or of Jewish descent,<sup>33</sup> and that they were resented or ignored in America when they arrived here. As late as 1969, more than thirty years after the refugee scholars came to America, Ernst Oster complained, “The basic trouble is Schenker. . . . With very few exceptions, people still don’t want it.”<sup>34</sup>

Ewell accuses the Jewish Schenker’s primarily Jewish advocates of being powerful, dishonest, and deceptive people who institutionalized racism in American music theory by suppressing his racist political ideas, *precisely* because they all abhorred them. This argument recapitulates the myth—disseminated by the Nazis—of the demonic, powerful Jew whose ostensible social marginality is merely a disguise for his secret manipulation of the levers of power. Near the end of his talk, Ewell mentions the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism in the history of philosophy as a rhetorical move to strengthen his argument, quoting a short *New York Times* op-ed piece by Laurie Shrage, a philosopher who studies sex and gender.<sup>35</sup> Unlike Ewell, Shrage argues that coverage of the ideas of Jewish thinkers should be increased, not reduced, in the curriculum. Shrage notes that “philosophy departments were among the

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30 Schenker, letter to Oswald Jonas, 21 December 1933, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/OJ-5-18-33.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/OJ-5-18-33.html)

31 Schenker, *Free Composition (Der freie Satz): Volume III of New Musical Theories and Fantasies*, trans. and ed. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, Inc., 1979), xxiii.

32 Schenker, diary entry, 18 November 1914, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-16\\_1914-11/r0020.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-16_1914-11/r0020.html)

33 Not all escaped. In October 1941, Schenker’s friend and student Robert Brünauer was deported to the Łódź ghetto, where he was forced into slave labor and died in 1942. See [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/profiles/person/entity-000107.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/profiles/person/entity-000107.html)

34 Ernst Oster, letter to Allen Forte, 30 January 1969. Thanks to Prof. Timothy L. Jackson (University of North Texas), for providing me with a copy of this letter.

35 Laurie Shrage, “Confronting Philosophy’s Anti-Semitism,” *The New York Times*, 8 March 2019, <https://nyti.ms/2W5tn5x>



last to hire professors of Jewish ancestry.” For most of the history that Ewell purports to recount, Jews were marginal, powerless figures in the American academic world.

Ewell writes, “One point roundly disregarded in Schenker studies concerns his views against racial mixing.” Many scholars have described Schenker’s personal dilemma as a stigmatized Jew in Vienna. Paradoxically, Schenker had no hesitation in describing *himself* as a racial alien, just like blacks and Slavs. Ewell excerpts a sentence about racial mixing from a letter that Schenker wrote in 1934, after Hitler took power in Germany. By his use of selective quotation, Ewell conceals the fact that Schenker portrays *himself* as a racial alien living among Germans:

Vienna today seems to me to be the most plausible location for you, just because here—don’t laugh—the Jews can make their mark in music and show many varieties (e.g. annoyance, entertainment). **“Race” is good, “inbreeding” of race, however, is murky** (as the Romans used to say: even virtue must not be overdone). Art occupies a completely different place, so it is perfectly appropriate in the world that in Vienna *racial aliens still represent interesting flecks of color* (Jews, Hungarians, Slavs, Italians, etc., etc.).<sup>36</sup> [my italics; Ewell’s quotation in **bold**]

As Richard Kramer has pointed out, Schenker was willing to accept the anti-Semitic reasoning of his friends: “In the course of the conversation, he [Furtwängler] openly revealed himself as an anti-Semite, not without reason, yes, *I had to agree with the reasons*, but did not refrain from emphasizing my strong position in adhering to Judaism.”<sup>37</sup> [my italics] Nevertheless, some of Schenker’s contempt for the nations of Europe may be tied to his anger at anti-Semitism, for example, this 1899 screed, prompted by the Dreyfus Affair: “At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, good Catholic Frenchmen are burning the Jew Dreyfus [Alfred Dreyfus] at the stake of perjuries!” In reaction to the Dreyfus affair, Schenker also labeled Europe “still a big peasant ruffian in the 19<sup>th</sup> century!”<sup>38</sup>

## POLITICS AND THE CORRUPTION OF LANGUAGE

Schenker was not *merely* a theorist. He played a major role in musicological history as well. Schenker helped to establish an archive of photographs of composer’s manuscripts, promoted the forgotten works of C. P. E. Bach and Haydn, and published an edition of Beethoven’s piano sonatas, in which he attempted to reproduce Beethoven’s manuscript notations in order to illuminate the composer’s musical intentions. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to connect Schenker’s interests in C. P. E. Bach’s *Versuch* and Beethoven’s notation of stems and phrases to a political program. Nicholas Cook has suggested that Schenker’s theoretical work served to explain and justify his musicological activity; that is, it was an appendage to his editorial work: “I would go so far as to say that Schenker’s theory of

36 Schenker, letter to Hoboken, 13 January 1934, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/OJ-89-7\\_2.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/OJ-89-7_2.html)

37 Schenker, diary entry, April 1925, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-03-07\\_1925-04/r0011.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-03-07_1925-04/r0011.html)

38 Schenker, diary entry, 15 January 1899, [www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-03\\_1899-01/r0001.html](http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-01-03_1899-01/r0001.html)

levels was conceived as, more than anything else, a decisive contribution to editorial method. And to say this entails a considerable revision of the image of Schenker prevalent today.”<sup>39</sup> Ewell’s description of Schenker as a “theorist” decouples the two aspects of his scholarship, and serves as a preparatory move for his demonization.

While for Schenker, theory and musicology are tightly connected, there is no obvious connection between his politics and his musical ideas, other than the idea that some composers apply the laws of art in more creative ways than others. Ewell cites Nicholas Cook’s discussion of a tenuous parallel between Schenker’s authoritarian politics and his theory of levels.<sup>40</sup> Cook’s discussion of a series of hierarchies in Schenker’s thought is misguided, however. Rather, Schenker “unfolds” (Schachter’s term<sup>41</sup>) the details of a work, like peeling an onion, in order to show their subordinate place within a broader scheme. A more apt comparison of Schenker’s theories to the intellectual concerns of his contemporaries is Leslie David Blasius’s identification of *Der freie Satz* as “a coherent and developed psychology of music.”<sup>42</sup> Cook’s suggestion about parallels between Schenker and Nietzsche<sup>43</sup> is dependent on a misinterpretation of the ideas of both men, and suggests that he sees the philosopher through the prism of Nazi propaganda.

Ewell’s real target is not Schenker, but music theory itself. He doesn’t limit his accusations to the claim that Schenker’s political writings have helped to legitimize harmful stereotypes about blacks and other people of color. Ewell also claims that Schenker’s concepts of scale degrees and dissonance resolution are inherently racist. Furthermore, he claims that the very concepts of tonal centrality and functional tonality are racist as well. In fact, all grammars, verbal and musical, privilege certain structures above others for the sake of comprehensibility. In his Grove article “Tonality,” Brian Hyer includes a variety of non-Western musical cultures in his discussion of tonal music: “Tonal music in this sense includes music based on, among other theoretical structures . . . the *slendro* and *pélog* collections of Indonesian gamelan music, the modal nuclei of Arabic *maqām*, [and] the scalar peregrinations of Indian raga.”<sup>44</sup> Ewell cites Hyer in his recent article about the Russian theory of *lād* (a term usually translated as “mode”).<sup>45</sup> He is certainly aware that tonality and tonal centrality are not only “white,” Western constructs. Why does Ewell condemn the concepts of tonal centrality and functional tonality, while promoting the study of similar concepts in Russian theory, which is also “white,” “European,”

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39 Cook, “The Editor and the Virtuoso, or Schenker versus Bülow,” *Journal of the Royal Musical Association* 116/1 (1991), 78.

40 Cook, *The Schenker Project*, 153.

41 Carl Schachter, *Unfoldings: Essays in Schenkerian Theory and Analysis*, ed. Joseph N. Straus (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

42 Leslie David Blasius, *Schenker’s Argument and the Claims of Music Theory* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 33.

43 Cook, *The Schenker Project*, 154.

44 Brian Hyer, “Tonality,” *Grove Music Online* (2001), accessed 26 Jan. 2020, [www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-0000028102](http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-0000028102)

45 Ewell, “On the Russian Concept of *Lād*, 1830–1945,” *Music Theory Online* 25/4 (December 2019), [www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.19.25.4/mto.19.25.4.ewell.html](http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.19.25.4/mto.19.25.4.ewell.html)



and the product of an imperialist culture? There can be only one conclusion: in his own research and publications, Ewell is willing to reinforce music theory's "white racial frame."

Ewell asserts that programs to generate "diversity" in academia simply reinforce inequality, citing queer feminist scholar Sarah Ahmed. Ewell's solution to his stated problem is an expansion of the role that rap music already plays in the music-theoretical curriculum. At the same time, Ewell suggests that the study of Western music theory should be radically curtailed in American universities, while the coverage of non-Western theory should be increased. He wishes to cut the undergraduate theory sequence in half and eliminate the "racist" German requirement for graduate study.

In support of his thesis that music theorists employ a "white racial frame," Ewell cites Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*.<sup>46</sup> Bonilla-Silva begins his book with an epigraph, the first two sentences of Tunisian-Jewish sociologist Albert Memmi's book *Racism*.<sup>47</sup> In that book, Memmi, one of the founders of post-colonial theory, wrote, "Self-affirmation sometimes takes on mythic proportions; to the injurious myths of the past, one counterposes substitute myths that are just as deluded. The least important ancestor becomes a legendary hero, and a folk dance the pinnacle of art. . . . But is it necessary to pass from self-refusal all the way to hypervaluation? To valorize oneself in excess because one has been devalored in excess? Does one not risk committing the same errors as the racist partisans of difference?"<sup>48</sup> Ewell valorizes rap music while explaining its significance in primarily sociological terms, suggesting that its place in academic discourse lies elsewhere than in the music classroom: "Because of rap's strong roots in the struggle against racism, and the intersection of social justice and rap, introducing rap into the music theory classroom is a worthy goal."<sup>49</sup> In a recent lecture about Russian rap, Ewell abandoned his claims about rap's musical content, characterizing it as "first and foremost poetry."<sup>50</sup>

Tamara Levitz has recently objected to the "Eurocentric, heteronormative, exclusionary, colonial, settler colonial, non-diverse, and white supremacist legacies" of the discipline of musicology.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, in one of the articles included in *Music Theory Online*'s symposium about rap music, Robin Attas suggests that, in conjunction with their exploration of rap music, students should be asked to "share and discuss definitions for terms such as race, racism, stereotype, the white gaze, cultural

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46 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*, 5th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

47 "There is a strange kind of enigma associated with the problem of racism. No one, or almost no one, wishes to see themselves as racist; still racism persists, real and tenacious." Bonilla-Silva, 1. See Albert Memmi, *Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 1.

48 Memmi, 50.

49 Philip Ewell, "Introduction to the Symposium on Kendrick Lamar's *To Pimp a Butterfly*," *Music Theory Online*, 25/1 (March 2019), <https://mtosmt.org/issues/mto.19.25.1/mto.19.25.1.ewell.html>

50 Philip Ewell, "Friends or Enemies: Politics & Poetry in Contemporary Russian Rap," Tucson Humanities Festival, University of Arizona, 18 October 2019, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8Le3vC6ruQ](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8Le3vC6ruQ)

51 Tamara Levitz, "The Musicological Elite," *Current Musicology* 102 (Spring 2018), 9.

appropriation, reclaim/reclaiming, and post-racial.”<sup>52</sup> This is the language of political and ideological reeducation camps, not the academy. Students should not be required to confess “guilt” as a prerequisite for studying musicology or music theory. Commenting on the ideology of the intersectional Left—promoted by Levitz, Ewell, and Attas—African-American journalist and political activist Chloé Valdary writes, “Intersectionality has . . . become . . . a rigid system for determining who is virtuous and who is not, based on traits like skin color, gender, and financial status. The more white, straight, or rich you are, the less virtue you have—and vice versa. Some have pointed out that it’s eerily similar to Christianity, complete with pointing out one’s original sin (whiteness), preaching repentance (admitting you’re privileged), and ritualistic attempts at salvation (working to dismantle one’s own alleged role in oppressing others).”<sup>53</sup>

For more than one hundred years, European intellectuals fought a losing battle to realize the ideal of the “good European,” defeated by petty and ultimately genocidal national politics. After the conclusion of World War II, a pan-European identity was finally created on the ashes of the devastated continent. In the past two decades, the growth of the Internet has sparked demands for the creation of a global culture. At the same time, the political and cultural project once put forth by lonely European idealists while the world disintegrated has been reinterpreted as a program for “hegemonic dominance” over humanity. If Ewell is successful, the result will be precisely the opposite of his ostensible program to democratize the discipline of music theory. Instead, it will necessarily become the exclusive preserve of a few. In the preface to *Der freie Satz*, Schenker wrote, “Surely it is time to put a stop to the teaching of music in condensed courses, as languages are taught for use in commerce.”<sup>54</sup> We can only hope that the future of music in the academic world lies with Heinrich Schenker’s idealism, rather than the current politics of music theory.

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52 Example 7, “Modules for teaching on racism with *To Pimp A Butterfly*,” in Robin Attas, “Music Theory as Social Justice: Pedagogical Applications of Kendrick Lamar’s *To Pimp A Butterfly*,” *Music Theory Online* 25/1 (March 2019), <https://mtosmt.org/issues/mto.19.25.1/mto.19.25.1.attas.html>

53 Chloe Valdary, “What Farrakhan Shares with the Intersectional Left. The Farrakhan Problem: The problem is the demonization of whiteness. But there’s a cure,” *Tablet* (26 March 2018), <https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/258364/what-farrakhan-shares-with-intersectional-left>. See also Molly Brigid McGrath, “Sacrificial Politics and Sacred Victims,” *Law & Liberty* (3 February 2020), [www.lawliberty.org/author/molly-flynn/](http://www.lawliberty.org/author/molly-flynn/)

54 Schenker, *Der freie Satz*, xxiii.

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## Response to Ewell

### ANONYMOUS

I was at the plenary session and I was the only person (that I could see) who didn't stand for the ovation. Not for any political reasons, but because I was unsure about a lot of the content just presented. After the session, both at the conference and later on social media, I began to feel a growing sense of unease about the enthusiastic responses to Ewell's paper in particular. There were a lot of anti-Schenker comments, especially on social media. It seemed that quite a few people interpreted Ewell's paper as intending to "abolish Schenkerian studies" in music theory. I got the feeling that most of those reactions were from people who have little-to-no experience with Schenkerian analysis; that this paper validated their preconceived (and terribly uninformed) notions about what Schenkerian analysis is ("it's reductionism," "it removes my favorite notes," etc.). Regarding the conference as a whole, I noticed that Schenkerian analyses were uncommon. It felt like it had already been abolished to some degree.

In Ewell's defense, he certainly didn't suggest what many people later drew from his remarks. I felt on board with his paper in the beginning, that diversifying the music repertoire is a good idea. And while I would also support additional classes that teach music theory for non-European traditions, I did not like the suggestion of reducing the core theory courses from four to two classes (most undergrads are bad enough after four classes as it is!). For most music schools, a large portion of the music students are performers who participate (almost exclusively) in the European tradition. They are learning European instruments to perform European music. That's, for better or worse, our reality. It would be a disservice to those students because they need the full theory context to best engage with that music.

The most I knew of Schenker's views regarding race was that he was pro-German, and that the majority of the composers he glorified were German (with some notable exceptions like Chopin). But I'm certainly not as informed about Schenker the person as I am the Schenkerian methodology. What I do know is this: that the historical context is of utmost importance for a topic like this. That Schenker, or anyone else alive during the turn-of-the-century time period, espoused racist views is completely unremarkable. For Schenker to have not, at some point, hold those beliefs would be truly exceptional. A good correlating example is Abraham Lincoln. Essentially, he made, on several occasions, some pretty devastating remarks about black people. And this is Abraham Lincoln, who we, today, laud as the ideal progressive who freed the slaves. It turns out that he was a lot more complicated than that; that his views on race, and black people in particular, were not that different from the typical white supremacist of his day. He was a product of his society and his society was racist. That's unfortunately human nature. His views began to change, particularly during the Civil War, after he engaged with more black people on a personal level. He progressed, much in the same way, it seems, that Schenker did. It's really difficult to look at these historic figures with "2019 eyes" – or now, with the new year, "2020 eyes." Which is ironic, because I think our vision, as a society, is definitely not 2020; we've become quite near-sighted and it is increasingly difficult to see the past in the proper historic context. It's become too common to judge those of the past by today's standards, which is a simplification and just not possible.

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*Charles Wuorinen: A Celebration at 70*

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